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Abstract 
This project undertakes a study of the representations of violence in a 
number of twentieth century American narratives. Traditional approaches to 
violence, both real and fictitious, frequently focus on causal analysis in an 
attempt to divide the violent from the non-violent. Such analysis precludes the 
shared human experiences that form the basis of existential philosophy. 
Approaching violent narratives from the perspective of philosopher Jean-Paul 
Sartre, my study considers certain acts ofviolence as originating from a distorted 
search for freedom and autonomy. 
"Freedom Fighters" is divided into five chapters, four of which focus on a 
series of texts from different eras, different authors, and different social settings. 
Their commonalities result from the characters' use of violence, in one form or 
another, to attempt to give a sense of meaning and freedom to their human 
existence. In so doing, they confront a diversity of social circumstances, 
sometimes successfully, and sometimes not so successfully. Chapter One 
introduces the basic theories of violence and explores the philosophical concepts 
of existentialism that illuminate such theories. Part One includes Chapters Two 
and Three; it reflects on the desperation produced by the need to escape from 
threats to freedom. Chapter Two considers the fear provoked by racial 
intimidation as particularized in slavery; it explores texts by William Faulkner, 
Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison, and Toni Morrison. The first three authors have 
particular significance to this work because of their own affinity for the 
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philosophical writings of Sartre. Chapter Three in Part One deals with the 
responses to a new form of slavery, perhaps as pernicious as the old: that of 
corporate capitalist domination. Part Two, which includes Chapters Four and 
Five, deals with the freedom to become self-realized--to individuate. Chapter 
Four explores the movement towards individuation in novels by E.L. Doctorow 
and Walker Percy. In Chapter Five, the issues surrounding the struggle for 
subjective freedom in the face of gender dynamics are analyzed. The thesis 
concludes with a further consideration of the implications ofSartre's philosophy 
for a more complete and constructive understanding of violent behaviour. 
"Freedom Fighters" offers a new critical approach to the understanding of 
violence in texts, and subsequently perhaps in reality. Introducing the ideas of 
Sartre into such analysis opens up a new field of inquiry that will, one hopes, 
lead to innovative critical approaches. Reading the philosophy of existentialism 
with a more affirmative gaze offers the potential to shed new light on traditional 
concepts of individualism, freedom, and violent action. 
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Introduction 
Existentialism and Violence in Literature 
The artwork presents itself to me as an absolute 
end, a demand, an appeal. It addresses itself to my 
pure freedom and in this way reveals to me the pure 
freedom oftheOther. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
The subject of art has been extended from psychology 
to the human condition. 
Albert Camus 
Sartre asserts that literature is an excellent method of comprehending his 
philosophy of existentialism. Efforts to establish an existential psychoanalysis 
are particularized in his biography of Gustave Flaubert, The Family Idiot. 
Sartre's plays, such as The Flies and No Exit, offer further realizations of his 
unique form of humanistic analysis. Hazel E. Barnes, the American professor 
who initially brought Sartre's philosophy to the English world with her 
translation of Being and Nothingness, explores his theories in Humanistic 
Existentialism: The Literature of Possibility. Few philosophic concepts more 
singularly both refer to, and lend themselves to interpretation of, literary 
narratives. 
One aspect ofSartre's conceptual analysis that has received little attention 
is his concern with violence. Of late, studies by philosophers Tony Stigliano and 
Ronald E. Santoni attempt to rectify this lack. It is with this concern in mind that 
the following study was written. "Freedom Fighters" is grounded in Sartre's 
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opus, Being and Nothingness, wherein he devotes a short section to the violence 
in William Faulkner's Light in August. Sartre's text is devoted to ontological 
considerations of individuals and their relationships. As he discusses Faulkner, 
the philosopher elucidates a connection between the individual's desire for 
freedom and the potential to resort to violent behavior against the Other who is 
perceived as a threat. From this page or two of Sartrean analysis grew the present 
literary approach. It offers a fresh perspective on American culture, literature, 
and the violence inherent in both. 
The obsession with violence in American culture has been well 
documented by such critics as Patrick Shaw, Michael Kowalewski, Kathryn 
Hume, and James Richard Giles. Society's increasing concern with violence is 
reflected in contemporary American literature, providing an imaginative 
resource for authors. Literary criticism, in turn, has become engaged in a search 
for terms to describe and deconstruct these violent narratives in ways that seem 
to parallel "the activity in which American authors themselves have been 
personally engaged" (Kowalewski I 00). "Freedom Fighters" seeks to enter the 
critical discourse with a theory that speaks to the connection between violent and I 
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liberating desires. Grounded in philosophic existentialism, this study considers 
aspects of violence that reflect the ongoing search for individual identity and 
freedom, a search that navigates between conflicting considerations of race, 
gender, and social identity. My thesis argues that such narratives enable 
2 
resolutions to emerge that reveal, and sometimes even dissolve, the gap between 
the victimizer and the victim's conflicting demands for individual freedom. 
I depart from previous perspectives in significant ways. Although 
existential treatments of literature are not new, critical focus has often been on 
nihmsm, angst, and alienation. My focus explores the positive aspects of a 
philosophy that emphasizes individual responsibility and chosen action as escape 
from alienation. My work sees the novel not as a mere presentation of an 
existential problem, but rather as the initial first step in framing a solution. To 
see "into violence", argues Tanner, "is a form of resistance when what is 
exposed before the reader/viewer is the dynamics ofviolation ... the power 
dynamics upon which the violator's force depends" (Tanner 104). Along with 
critic James Giles and others, I reject critical positions that "cannot serve the 
purpose of assuming an ethical function for literature as well as recognition of 
the political realities ofthe cultures in which individual works of literature are 
written" (Giles 113). French existentialism, as propounded by Jean Paul Sartre 
and others, takes a strong ethical position that always attempts to consider the 
political milieu of the individual. Nevertheless, I do not attempt to deal with 
large scale social violence in this thesis, but I maintain focus on individual 
violent responses. 
Critical studies of violence in American literature begin with Frohock's 
study, The Novel of Violence, in the 1950s. He considers the work of early 20th 
century novelists, such as Dos Passos, Hemingway, and Faulkner. Since that 
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time, various literary critics have turned their attention in that direction and most 
at least mention William Faulkner. None, though, explore Faulkner's narratives 
of violence as illuminated in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Sartre's 
analysis challenges us to critically consider the nature of power, both individual 
and collective. In fact, such considerations are essential to a meaningful, 
authentic human existence. Failure to accept the individual and social 
responsibility outlined by existentialism results, according to Tony Stigliano, in 
"the loss of authorship over one's actions [that] may well be so threatening to 
one's sense of being the author of one's life that only an extreme action can 
overcome one's being objectified in and by one's situation" (60). Certain 
novelists, such as E.L. Doctorow, explore in their writings ways to reassume 
such authorship and establish authentic realizations of freedom without the need 
for violent action. 
Not all novels of violence result in such redemption. In American Psycho 
Bret Easton Ellis brutally presents a contemporary man for whom money and 
commodities are the essence of life. His main character's attempts to narrate 
himself are fragmented; one might say of this serial killer that he "attempts to 
glue together his fragmented self with blood" (Gomel 60). Ellis draws a picture 
of an "everyman" who is essentially "no-man" in a world where all subjects are 
interchangeable and equally objectified. If post-modernism offers no unified self 
as subject, American Psycho reveals the nightmarish quality of such a world. 
This postmodern moment is devoid of a humanizing moment; its center is a void. 
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Beginning with Sartre's treatment of Faulkner, my thesis originally 
focuses upon an exploratory narrative style that seeks to escape the limitations of 
time and space, subject and object, victim and victimizer. Writing in the shadow 
cast by Faulkner, Ralph Ellison and Richard Wright articulate a black man's 
perspective on the struggle for recognition, freedom and visibility. Toni 
Morrison's Beloved enters this discourse with a presentation of the 
power/exclusion dialectic wherein sexual sadism is utilized by power figures to 
attempt the complete appropriation of the Other's freedom. Morrison directs her 
narrative gaze on a revisioning of the past that allows future possibilities to open 
up for her characters. As horrifying as the events in the text are, the main 
character lives to become free and to move freely, if painfully, in the direction of 
self-realization. The novels studied here show the gradual emergence of the 
black subject, from the relatively impersonal early slave narratives to Morrison's 
Sethe, who chooses death for her baby rather than slavery. 
Narratives such as Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club and Dorthy Allison's 
Bastard out Of Carolina demonstrate the challenges to freedom that can result 
from socially restrictive gender prescriptions. Such subjects, although 
superficially free, are not at liberty to realize their subjectivity in ways that are 
socially acceptable. In contemporary Western culture there are various 
impediments to self-realization. Critical theorists such as Mark Currie and Elana 
Gomel define subjectivity as primarily a narrative construct: "the only way to 
explain who we are, is to tell our own story [ ... ] we learn how to self-narrate 
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from the outside, from other stories" (Currie qtd. in Gomel xv). Characters in 
Allison, Palahniuk, Doctorow, and Percy have much insight to offer concerning 
the road to subjective freedom and the violence that can accompany it. 
All of the texts chosen for this study shed some light on Sartre's concepts 
of freedom and violence. Hazel E. Barnes clearly expresses the significance of 
such an original perspective: 
For almost a century now, prevailing psychologists and the literature 
written under their influence have agreed that men cherish the illusion of 
freedom while in fact being determined by heredity, by environment, and 
by early childhood experiences. Humanistic existentialism challenges this 
doctrine and claims that exactly the reverse is true: every man is free, but 
most men, fearing the consequences and the responsibilities of freedom, 
refuse to acknowledge its presence in themselves and would deny it to 
others. [ ... ] The literature which shows that men are free presents to the 
world a new philosophy of man. (Barnes 3) 
Such a philosophy requires a shift in perspective, a new appraisal of the human 
situation. The novels explored below reveal the consequences of evading and of 
embracing one's individual freedom of choice. Man is more than his history and 
more than his biology. As in the myth of Eden, man's self-consciousness begins 
with an act of choice. Some choices come with serious consequences, such as 
expulsion from the Garden. Death at one's own hands is a rational choice in 
certain circumstances acknowledged by Sartre, Camus and other existentialists. 
Whatever the choice, one is free to make it, if one is prepared to accept the 
consequences. This is the understanding implied in Sartre's well know phrase, 
"dreadful freedom." "Freedom Fighters" researches the relationship of concepts 
of freedom and violence with narratologies of the self. 
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The novels, philosophic works, and literary criticism that I have chosen to 
approach in this work are limited, of course, by necessity. Selected texts treat 
individuals as ontologically free, and confront the issues that result from that 
basic grounding. Violence, as one possible exercise of that freedom, is explored 
to ascertain its success or failure as an existential mode of being. In later works, 
such as Notebooks for Ethics, Sartre considers counterviolence as a justified 
social response to restraints such as colonization, but this is not the focus of 
Being and Nothingness, or of "Freedom Fighters." 
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Chapter One 
The Discourse of Violence and Freedom: 
"Raiding the Inarticulate" 
[T]he ominous escalation of violence on both the interpersonal and the 
global level represents one of the central social and political challenges 
for the dawning twenty-frrst century. 
Violence and Its Alternatives 
1.1 Putting Violence to Words 
Violence in America has increasingly been the subject of critics and novelists 
during the advance of the twentieth century. In fact, says Patrick Shaw, "Violence is at 
the heart of the American culture" ( 1 08). 1 Haunted by the ghosts of slavery, civil unrest 
and major wars, America finds itself hostage to terror both at home and abroad. American 
literature has come to reflect society's increasing concern as authors seem, almost 
obsessively, to tum violence into an imaginative resource. Literary criticism finds itself 
engaged in a search for terms to describe and deconstruct these violent narratives in ways 
that seem to parallel ''the activity in which American authors themselves have been 
personally engaged" (Kowalewski 1 00). Grounded in philosophic existentialism, this 
study considers aspects of violence that reflect the ongoing human search for individual 
identity and freedom, a search that spans considerations of race, gender, and social 
identity. My thesis argues that such narratives enable resolutions to emerge that reveal, 
1An important resource for this study is Patrick Shaw's The Modern Novel of 
Violence in America. Troy, N.Y.: Whitston Pub, 2000. Also significant is the ground 
breaking work ofW.M. Frohock in The Novel of Violence in America. Boston: Beacon P, 
1950. 
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and sometimes even dissolve the gap between the victimizer and the victim's conflicting 
demands for individual freedom. 
There are numerous definitions of violence offered by theorists; many agree that 
the violent act is an evil act, albeit sometimes a necessary evil, to be avoided if possible. 
As Arendt states, "Violence can be justifiable, but it will never be legitimate" (Arendt 9). 
In her accessible account of the narrative construction of the violent subject, 
Bloodscripts: Writing the Violent Subject, Elana Gomel offers some interesting and 
controversial insights. The act of murder, she claims, shatters the integrity of the self 
because the perpetrator is caught in the dichotomy of both acknowledging and denying 
the humanity of the victim. This vacillation, this inevitable splitting of the perpetrator's 
self-hood in the act of violence, is how Gomel accounts for the shattering impact of 
killing on the coherence of the self. This shattering of the self is seen in texts that will be 
discussed below, such as American Psycho and Fight Club. This shattering, says Gomel, 
is mistaken by the narrativized self as liberation from the "prison house of language". 
Violence, argues Gomel, appears as a communion with the Real that seems to carry one 
beyond the shifting illusions of the Symbolic. Gomel asserts that this 'communion' is he 
I 
' greatest illusion of all (198). 
Certain ofGomel's concepts in Bloodscripts are comparable with conclusions 
arrived at in this thesis, although she mentions neither existentialism nor Sartre. The 
perspective which I assume here defmes the dichotomy of the violator as one vacillating 
between the attempt to obliterate the freedom of the Other, while simultaneously coming 
to the realization that he needs this freedom to acknowledge his power. For Gomel, the 
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motivating force of violent action is what she terms the "violent sublime"; for Sartre, the 
motivation of the violent subject is to reduce or eliminate the threat to his own freedom 
that the Other presents. Nevertheless, Gomel recognizes violence as one aspect of 
freedom: "The desire for violence is part of human freedom and thus it can never be 
eliminated, only confronted" (Gomel205). Once violence is acknowledged as one 
possibility of action, it must also be accepted as a possibility of language and therefore of 
narrative. Arguing against the position that violence is some form of contagion, with 
representations of violence serving as ''vectors of transmission," Gomel asserts that we 
must accept violence as embedded in the subject and therefore rooted also in narratives of 
subject construction. She perceives the desire to inflict pain as grounded in the 
individual's need to transcend the limitations of his own embodied self. This bears a 
relation to my own thesis, which argues that the violent act is based on the need to defend 
one's freedom in the face of a threat perceived from the Other. I agree with Gomel's 
conclusion that violence "delivers nothing but what is available to every human being 
anyway: mortality" (208). I discuss this argument in detail as I explore Sartre's 
explication of Faulkner in Chapter 2 of this wor~ ''Dying to be Free". 
Although much of my research revolves around physical violence, there is another I 
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manifestation of violence that informs my study. In his article entitled "Cultural 
Violence" Johan Galtung offers this definition: "By 'cultural violence' we mean those 
aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence [ ... ] that can be used to justify or 
legitimize direct or structural violence" (Galtung 40). Any study of violence, says 
Galtung, must consider both the use of violence and the justification of that use. Direct or 
10 
structural violence he defmes as "avoidable insults to basic human needs" ( 40) which are 
listed in this article as four: 1) survival, 2) well-being, 3) identity, and 4) freedom. This 
type of violence has "exploitation as its center piece," with some members of the 
structure (the top-dogs) getting more from the interactions than the others (underdogs) 
(Gal tung 42). Two of those basic needs with which this work concerns itself primarily are 
the needs of meaning - the deprivation of which produces alienation - and freedom needs 
-the deprivation of which produces repression and resulting violence. Galtung includes a 
notion of "cultural violence" which he defmes as "any aspect of a 
culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form" (Violence 
and Its Alternatives xvi). The ultimate violent structure, says Galtung, has exploitation at 
its center, with those at the top getting much more from the exchange than those at the 
bottom: "A violent structure leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the 
human spirit" (Galtung 42). In the vicious cycle that he describes: ''the culture preaches, 
teaches, admonishes, eggs-on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as 
normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then 
come the eruptions, the effort to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron-cage, 
and counter-violence to keep the cage intact" ( 43). Exploitation results in repression, 
which is essentially the deprivation of freedom. One potential response to this deprivation 
is direct violence. With this conclusion, Galtung's argument is aligned with my own as 
well as those presented by Tony Stigliano in "Jean Paul Sartre: On Understanding 
Violence." 
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When we speak of the need for liberation we generally consider the liberation of 
the working classes, the downtrodden, and the poor underclass. There is, however, in the 
western world of our time, the need to be liberated from "a relatively well-functioning, 
rich, powerful society" (Marcuse 264). Such a society, taking the U.S. as the model, is 
characterized by the "apparently inseparable unity ... of productivity and destruction, of 
satisfaction of needs and repression, of liberty within a system of servitude" (Marcuse 
268). Such servitude in the face ofthe possibilities of freedom, says Herbert Marcuse, 
"activates and intensifies in this society a primary aggressiveness to a degree, I think, 
hitherto unknown in history" (268). The need for change is suppressed, both by the 
apparent satisfaction of superficial, created needs, and by the 'liberating' scientific 
knowledge of psychology and psychiatry. Dissatisfaction is treated with therapy or 
Prozac. What is there to complain about when living in the best, the freest society in the 
world? There can be no improvement in our system, according to Marxist critic Fredric 
Jameson, until we develop "a self-punishing enumeration of all the blocks that make the 
reimagining of utopia today a difficult, if not to say a well-nigh impossible task" (111). If 
we are to explore these blocks, and if we are to perceive violence as emerging from 
threats to freedom, it is necessary to explore the concept of violence and thus the concept 
of freedom itself. 
1.2 Sartre and Violence 
I recognize that violence under whatever form it may manifest 
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itself is a setback. But it is an inevitable setback because we are in 
a universe of violence; and if it is true that recourse to violence 
risks perpetuating it, it is also true that it is the only means of 
bringing an end to it. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
At the center of this reality [industrial societies] is conflict and 
violence, not merely as a social contingency in times of economic 
upheaval, but necessary to the attempt to preserve subjectivity, to 
prevent the formation of unknowing, thing-like, working but inert 
"persons" who would be nothing more than proletarian and 
bourgeois: nothing human. 
Tony Stigliano 
We live in violent times, yet I suppose this might be said of any age. For 
Americans, it is certainly true that the infamous events of what is termed 9111 have 
manifested that nation's vulnerability to unimaginable violence. Awareness of that 
vulnerability has been intensified by the rise of random school shootings across North 
America, along with an increase in serial killings. Taken together, these events threaten 
the individual's sense of safety. In such circumstances it would appear more than ever 
before that the world needs to come to terms with the philosophical issues surrounding 
violent action. How is such action to be understood and can it ever be justified? "Is it e er 
morally defensible, in an unjust world shamefully divided between the privileged and the 
'least favored,' to employ violent means in order to rectify injustice and create what some 
have called a 'new humanity' and more humane world?" (Santoni x). These complex 
issues demand attention; unlike many current thinkers, Sartre has been consistently 
engaged with these issues. They are pervasive motifs in all of his work, both literary and 
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philosophic. This dissertation addresses, in some small way, my interpretation of Jean-
Paul Sartre' s dialectic of freedom: a dialectic which sheds light on the issue of violence. I 
confine myself to fiction that expresses existential concepts of freedom, wedded to 
violent imagery. I do not attempt to deal with the larger political issues that concerned 
the great French thinker, issues that surround WW II, the Algerian war of independence, 
or his changing views on Marxism. As Sartre himself believed, it is essential to 
understand human existence from the individual perspective before addressing the 
collective. The individual subject is a necessary moment, as Hegel would argue, in the 
comprehension of humanity at the sociopolitical stage. Literary texts generally approach 
their themes from the position of the individual subject. 
The tendency of our time to reduce theories of violence to empirical theories of 
causality is anathema to the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. His perspective, on a social 
level, is more in line with Foucault's analysis of power in Discipline and Punish. They 
both perceive that the control of asocial behaviour is one way in which the dominating 
powers manipulate their underlings in order to achieve predictable results. Today's 
methods may be less blatantly cruel than torture, but the prison system, chemical 
castration, behaviour modification, etc. can be violent to the spirit. In his article, "Jean-
Paul Sartre on Understanding Violence," philosopher and critical theorist Tony Stigliano 
explains: 
For a philosopher like Sartre, causal analysis precludes the idea that 
social reality is constituted by "sensuous human activity", by shared 
practices of work, understanding and discourse. If violence is 
"explained" by gene structures, we remove from our analysis the 
person, his/her habits and culturally received practices to the point 
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where self-expression and self-affmnation are reduced to a 
manipulable etiology. Hence, we no longer would be concerned with 
the way a person "makes" the world he/she inhabits, and we are caught 
up in the fruitless search for the variable dividing the pacific from the 
violent. (52) 
Sartre' s social theory is, of course, primarily informed by the work of Marx. His much 
publicized disillusionment with the Communist Party, one shared with writers Richard 
Wright and Ralph Ellison, had more to do with the political policies ofthe USSR than 
with the philosophy of Karl Marx, and Marxist socioeconomic theory always informed 
his ideology. For Sartre, individual actions are generated from a demand for meaning, 
grounded by the need to survive in the face of artificially generated scarcity. Sartre was in 
sympathy with the rights of the colonized to violently seize their freedom from the 
colonialist; this constituted his famous feud with his old friend Albert Camus. "Freedom 
Fighters" does not attempt to address the political forms of violence, except indirectly. 
My primary concern is with acts of violence perpetrated on or by the individual. Although 
resulting from individual choice, violence can be viewed as "a distorted way people seek 
meaning and autonomy in their lives" (Stigliano 52). Since man exists as freedom in the 
existential sense, therefore all perceived threats to freedom are interpreted as threats to 
that same self.2 
One's choices are based upon, or are related to, the concept of self which the 
individual holds. Such self-concepts, in turn, are rooted in race, class, gender, etc. To 
understand violence one needs to attempt to comprehend the ideologies that inform these 
2 For ease of reading and translating from Sartre, I use the masculine noun "man" 
and the masculine pronoun "he" to refer, in a general way, to persons or beings. 
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relevant categories. No being is ever simply an individual, according to Sartre, but is 
"universalized by his period." Stigliano offers this analysis of Sartre: 
In Sartre the terror and boredom of modernity is clearer than in the 
work of the more conventional scientist. The criminal is seeking ways 
of breaking free, thus his situation holds, in an ironic twist, the "secret" 
of a way out for society as a whole. The criminal forces upon us the 
question of the nature of liberation. (53) 
Sartre' s own forays into fiction, as well as his interest in other writers, indicates that the 
narrative is an excellent method of comprehending an individual in life process. 
To begin to understand violent action, or indeed any existentialist action, one must 
start with the dialectics that make up Sartre's ontology-self/other, materiaVpraxis, etc. 
Moving outwards from the conscious self, termed by Sartre being-for-itself, we encounter 
the Other, whom we perceive as a threat to our sense of self, and to our individual 
freedom to defme ourselves as we wish. The material world presents us with another 
threat, against which we attempt to assert ourselves through our actions. We overcome 
this threat "only to discover the lack, the threat again ... [since] material reality and the 
relationships arising from that reality shape the different ways need is limited ... " 
(Stigliano 58). All subjects confront these outside forces; the response of each is, of 
course, unique. The violent individual has the same self-actualizing needs as everyone 
else and may give the appearance of being conventional, such as I will later argue is the 
case with the narrator of Bret Easton Ellis' American Psycho. However, "the loss of 
authorship over one' s actions may well be so threatening to one' s sense of being the 
author of one' s life [which surely is freedom] that only an extreme action can overcome 
one' s being objectified in and by one's situation" (Stigliano 60). A subject or group who 
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feels stripped of their subject-hood may act in such a way as to objectify an Other. In fact, 
Stigliano maintains that there are only two possible ways to overcome the scarcity in the 
world that confronts us: one is class struggle and the other is individualist violence. While 
I disagree that Sartre' s philosophy is this nihilistic, Stigliano's position certainly accounts 
for the increasing violence in our post-modern world. The latter philosopher views the 
violent criminal as analogous to an ' acting-out' child; he/she acts out the anger and 
frustration that is passively experienced by the rest of us. This theory implicates all ofus 
in the violent behaviour to which society then becomes victim. Such a sense of 
implication is frequently considered in reader-response theories to violent narratives. 
Sartre' s position, as translated from his Notebooks by Ronald E. Santoni, is clearly 
expressed when he argues that there "are no witnesses to violence, only participants" 
(59). 
Philosopher and Sartre scholar Ronald E. Santoni has written extensively on Jean-
Paul Sartre's complex perspective on violence.3 He summarizes the philosopher's 
ideology thusly: "Violence is 'pure exercise of freedom' appropriating either the world or 
human being by destruction" (Sartre cited in Santoni 23). Sartre's first great philosophic 
treatise, Being and Nothingness, owes much to the German idealist G.W.F. Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel' s famous dialectic of the Master-Slave relationship had 
profoundly influenced Karl Marx. Sartre invokes this analysis in his own account of 
3 See Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent for an in-depth study of the 
evolution of Sartre's ideology on violence in all of his philosophic works. Santoni deals 
with hitherto unanalyzed material, such as Sartre' s later lectures, as he explores Sartre's 
search for a philosophy grounded in the ontological and social freedom of humanity. 
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relations between the self and Others. In Hegel's account, one becomes truly human only 
when one is prepared to risk everything: it is "only through the risk of life that freedom 
comes to light" (cited in Santoni 8). The Hegelian struggle does not end in death, but 
rather in the subservience of one to the Other; each begins by demanding self-recognition 
by the Other. The resolution of the conflict results in one who is prepared to risk life 
becoming the Master, while he who is prepared to submit becomes the slave; he has 
chosen "dependent consciousness" rather than "autonomous consciousness." This is only 
what Hegel calls the first "moment" in the dialectic. In the next "moment," the Slave is 
revealed as the only one of the two who is ready for transformation or change from his 
present situation. The Master is fixed in his position and cannot accept another Master: 
The slave is the secret of change in history and his desire for freedom 
from oppression is the ground of man's becoming more human. [ ... ] 
In "overcoming" his Master as Master, the Slave "overcomes" himself 
as Slave and reveals reality; in surpassing Slavery, he achieves 
satisfaction, authentic freedom, and self-transformation. So ifHistory 
is, as Hegel claims, a "dialectic between Mastery and Slavery", then 
this "overcoming" by the Slave starts a new "period" in History in 
which the postfight domination of the Slave by the Master is replaced 
by the Slave' s "determination" of human existence. (Santoni 9) 
Human existence will not be satisfied until the resolution of this dialectic; when and how 
this transformation will occur becomes the issue for those, like Sartre, Marx and others 
who were influenced by this Hegelian analysis. 
This dialectic informs Sartre' s account of intersubjectivity and the difficulty of 
establishing authentic human relationships as given in Being and Nothingness and later in 
The Critique of Dialectical Reason. Husserl's phenomenology, along with Hegel's 
influences the premise on which the "self' is established. Phenomenology points to two 
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divergent beings, for which Sartre uses the Hegelian terms-"being-for-itself' (l'etre-
pour-soi) and "being-in-itself' (1' etre-en-soi). 
Being-in-itselfis "object" being or thing being: it is what it is, has 
"identity," is not conscious, cannot refer to itself, has no possibilities 
or projects (human reality has projects for it), coincides with itself, is 
one with itself. In radical contrast to being-in-itself, being-for-itself is 
conscious, self-aware, self-referential being. As distinctive human 
reality, being-for-itself is not what it is and is what it is not. It is not a 
"what" or object or thing. ( ... ]in a word, being-for-itself, or human 
reality, is freedom. (Santoni 11) 
This being-for-itself, this conscious subject encounters the Other in his "look" or "gaze." 
This gaze reveals the subject as now an object: as an "in-itself' for the Other and for the 
world. Desiring a world wherein he is no longer controlled or defined by the "gaze of the 
Other," the violent individual considers that he has the right to destroy the Other in order 
to achieve that goal. Of course, violence is an alienating enterprise, doomed to fail in its 
purpose. It is an act which Sartre terms "mauvaise foi," or bad faith; it dehumanizes the 
perpetrator as it dehumanizes the victim. Such violence, in Santoni's view, destroys 
Sartre's system of rules for being authentically human (28). In his famous lecture 
"Existentialism is a Humanism," since published as Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre 
responds to those who have misinterpreted his doctrines. Of human relationships he 
explains the following: 
Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also 
discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his 
own existence. He recognizes that he cannot be anything (in the 
sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or 
jealous) unless others recognize him as such. I cannot obtain any 
truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of 
another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so 
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to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the 
intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the 
other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which cannot think or 
will without doing so either for or against me. Thus, at once, we fmd 
ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of"inter-subjectivity". 
It is in this world that man has to decide what he is and what others 
are. (Italics mine 45) 
We ourselves decide what we will make of what we are "made of." It is through our 
actions in the world that present us with limitations that we posit ourselves as subjects. 
Whether our actions are successful or not, they determine who we are. All human purpose 
consists of attempts to deal with given limitations in one of these ways: we try to surpass 
or expand them, or we attempt to deny or accommodate them (Existentialism is a 
Humanism 46).4 That is the essence of our existential freedom. "Obviously," Sartre says, 
"freedom as the definition of a man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is a 
commitment, I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as my own" (E&H 
52). Violent action which is not in the clear defense of one's freedom, and which denies 
the freedom of the other, is an action of"bad faith." The issue to which we now turn is 
the concept of freedom itself, as the Western world generally understands it. 
1.3 ffistorical Freedom 
Dating from the Enlightenment, freedom has emerged as an important concept in 
the liberal democracies of our Western culture. Theorists for whom freedom was a 
cultural concern, such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mill used 
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism. Trans. Philip Mairet. London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1948. Hereafter cited in text as "E&H." 
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freedom and equality as foundational ideas for their theories of human nature. 5 The rise 
of individualism, as we know it, began with the writings of John Stuart Mill. The 
humanism of the Enlightenment led to an emphasis on the human ability to make choices. 
Theorists concerned themselves with how such choices would or should be decided upon. 
Mill recognized the human right to be independent, acknowledging the rights even of 
women, a revolutionary perspective in his time. He did, however, distinguish between 
what an individual wanted and believed would make him happy and what one should 
want and would truly result in happiness. Mill's Utilitarianism aligned with the Kantian 
position in one respect: that true freedom follows from allowing the will rather than desire 
to determine our actions. 
1.4 Freedom: Negative and Positive 
In the negative sense, freedom is the absence of obstacles to the exercise of 
choice; it represents the opportunity to act. Positive liberty is concerned with the 
presence of conditions required to take advantage of freedom - conditions that an 
individual cannot create on his/her own. Considering the situation of welfare recipients, 
one frequently hears the comment that ''No one is preventing them from getting a job." 
They may have liberty in the negative sense (or they may not). However, are conditions 
beneficial to allow them to take advantage of the choices available? Do they have the 
5 There are many excellent books that offer detailed histories of freedom in the 
United States. Such a broad discussion is, of course, outside the scope of this thesis. I 
refer the reader to one such extensive study by Eric Foner, The Story of American 
Freedom. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1998. 
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clothes, the transportation, or the babysitter required to take on a job? Beyond such 
external conditions, there are often internal barriers to the exercise of choice. There 
might be fears, addictions, etc. If this hypothetical person on welfare is addicted to 
alcohol or drugs, are there provisions for help? Has he/she been given the educational, 
social, and cultural advantages necessary to develop as persons? ''People must exercise 
their full capacities if they are to be free" (Hirschman 8). By this defmition, few are free. 
Freedom includes, and significantly so, the ability to govern or master oneself-
an issue recognized by various religions. In a secular society, where advertisers 
constantly appeal to our "second order" desires, and there seems no motivation to attain 
self-control, one might wonder how there can be true freedom. If autonomy, the capacity 
to govern oneself, is a prerequisite for freedom then the lack of same clarifies a crisis of 
freedom amidst one of the "freest" societies in the world. Erich Fromm, psychoanalyst, 
humanist, and freedom researcher, suggests that the Western world confuses the escape 
from external restraints with the far more complex nature of true freedom. The 
"abolition of external domination seemed to be not only a necessary but also a sufficient 
condition to attain the cherished goal: freedom of the individual" (The Fear of Freedom 2 
italics mine). 6 The events of WWII, Fromm argues, have "compelled [us] to recognize 
that millions in Germany were as eager to surrender their freedom as their fathers were to 
fight for it; that instead of freedom, they sought for ways to escape from it; that other 
millions were indifferent and did not believe the defense of freedom to be worth fighting 
6 Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956. 
Hereafter cited in text as "FF." ' · 
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and dying for." (FF 2-3). Fromm's arguments demonstrate affmity with Sartre's own 
ideology; freedom is both a blessing and a curse. We both seek it and run from it. My 
study is divided into sections that approach freedom from restraints and freedom to self-
realize. Our human nature is often immersed in a dialectic that involves both running 
towards and running away from our individual freedom. Having largely achieved freedom 
from restraints in our society, we are free to pursue our individual wants. If only we knew 
what they were! 
We cannot minimize the importance of negative liberty, of individual rights to 
safety within a social system. The first chapter in Part One establishes the horrors of 
slavery in America. As Cyrus Patell points out in his text Negative Liberties, there are 
still many places in the world where a Hobbesian 'state of nature' prevails, where ''the 
strong prey upon the weak with impunity and without remorse" (186). In refusing to 
reflect on, or question the nature of the country's freedom, Patell asserts that Americans 
blind themselves to the dangers inherent in a system that is so entrenched in the psyche 
that it remains largely unchallenged and unexplored. Dichotomies must be explored; 
hypocrisies must be revealed. In the words of Toni Morrison: "living in a nation of people 
who decided that their world view would combine agendas for individual freedom and 
mechanisms for devastating racial oppression presents a singular landscape for a writer" 
(qouted in Patell 10). These inherent dichotomies in the American national narrative, I 
will argue, provide fodder for the culture of violence that plagues the country today. 
Refusing to recognize threats to individual freedom leaves Americans open to the type of 
violent perpetrators described by philosopher Tony Stigliano, whose frustration at their 
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powerlessness is expressed in violence. This 'emancipated' situation is more pernicious 
than "the old slavery because one now believes that the new chains represent freedom" 
(Stigliano 62). Efforts, such as those of Cyrus Pate II, to deconstruct freedom ideology are 
significant and enlightening. 
In his analysis of the conceptual bedrock of American liberty, Cyrus Patell asserts 
that "some of the most important philosophizing that is going on within late twentieth-
century U.S. culture can be found in works of fiction" (xv). Literature, he maintains with 
Sartre, brings philosophy to life. Concerning himself with the negative consequences of 
individualism as it appears in contemporary American thought and fiction, Patell explores 
the work of Morrison and Pynchon, as they deconstruct the official narratives of freedom 
and self-reliance: "Philosophers like Emerson, Rawls, and Kateb make compelling cases 
for the potential of individualism as the basis for an ideal democratic society, but as 
Pynchon and Morrison so dramatically depict, this potential has yet to be realized in 
American culture, let alone elsewhere in the world" (xviii). However, neither novels nor 
critical deconstructionists have made much of an impact on the American love affair with 
the concept of individualism as an a priori reality. 
The American national narrative of individual freedom contains within it various 
undifferentiated concepts such as those of liberalism and individualism. The latter has 
become part of the national American identity since·the nineteenth century and is largely 
attributed to the writings of Emerson. Individualism extols the virtues of non-conformity 
and self-reliance; the individualist is the 'Adam,' the self-made man who figures so often 
in American literature. Patell, however, argues that the concept is misunderstood: "from 
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the time that the term became part of the American vocabulary in the early part of the 
nineteenth century, Americans-including Emerson and his followers-have always 
conceived of individualism as a social formation. Herein lies the genius of the ideology 
and perhaps the reason for its efficacy: it enforces conformity at the very moment that it 
extols conformity" (xii). Emersonian liberalism, so popular in U.S. thought, is centered 
on this false concept of self-reliance. The rugged individualist, the Indiana Jones version, 
is an example of wish fulfillment. Readers or viewers can fantasize that they are masters 
of their own fate even as they succumb to the mind-numbing bureaucracy that defmes 
their lives. Indeed, few persons have any belief in the ability of the average individual to 
be master of his own fate. Such freedom exists only in popular culture. Even on-screen 
rugged individualists like Indiana Jones or Batman never seem to deviate from actions 
which society has determined are in the general best interest. The anti-heroes, the anti-
social psychopaths, are the only characters who seem able to act in their own best 
interests even when these do not align with those of society. Perhaps this is why we are so 
fascinated with them. 
1.5 Freedom and Existentialism 
Many contemporary critics argue for a new conception of philosophic 
existentialism. K. Sangari confronts the issue in Ruby Chatterji's frequently referenced 
collection of essays, Existentialism in America. Previously, says Sangari, the philosophy 
has been for American critics merely "a handy means for maintaining their own value 
25 
systems" (179). It might be better employed, he argues, as "a critical response to the 
contemporary situation as well as a philosophy which contains the potential for being 
transformed into an instrument for buttressing that very situation" (179). Central to the 
existentialist is the concept of man as freedom. Such concerns have long been a major 
motif of American literature. Freedom is a recurring theme in such texts as Moby Dick, 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, and in the writings of Thoreau and Emerson. 
Existential freedom is also a focus in the works of African American writers such as 
Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison. These authors might well be expected 
''to respond to certain elements in existentialism, particularly the sense of alienation and 
protest, by the very nature of [their] social constraints" (Chatterji 13). That same concern 
can be found in the works of many contemporary American authors, for example, Ellis, 
Percy, Doctorow, Auster, Ford, and various others. They confront an increasingly 
threatening world of globalization, urbanization, and bureaucratization in which the 
individual seems insignificant and manipulated by forces beyond his/her control. 
By paradoxically making the ineffectual individual both creator and 
arbiter of his own values, existentialism allows him to retain the last 
vestiges of his human dignity through a neo-stoic affirmation of the 
self in metaphysical revolt. (Chatterji 14) 
Many of the novels considered in this thesis are such self-affirming fictions. The 
following section, Part One, encompasses the struggle against chains- both the old and 
the new. 
Finally, as we begin to explore French Existentialism in American literature, it 
behooves us to remember that its gradual emergence into significant critical theory has 
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diverse roots. The European climate from which the French movement arose and 
flourished had little impact on America in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Emerging factors, certain of which this study shall address, came to threaten the 
individual in American society. No study could even begin to concern itself with all the 
challenging forces which the individual must battle, either in fiction or in reality. 
Multinationals, mass media, home-grown and global terrorism, all have arisen to replace 
American optimism with European angst. One might argue that these are growing pains, 
which reveal only that America is growing up. One might assert that a more complex 
society requires a more complex philosophic system: Sartre replaces Mill. "Freedom 
Fighters" strives to show that, regardless of the threats to freedom that rock her shores, 
existentialism can provide a lighthouse to illumine the way home. 
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PART I 
FREEDOM FROM 
Chapter Two: Dying to be Free: Escaping Racial Oppression in the 
Works ofFaulkner, Wright, Ellison and Morrison 
Chapter Three: Corporate Raiders: Violence on Wall Street in the 
Works of Tom Wolfe and Bret Easton Ellis 
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Chapter Two 
Dying to be Free: 
Escaping Racial Oppression 
No one can treat a man like a dog without frrst regarding him as a man. 
The impossible dehumanization of the oppressed, on the other 
side of the coin, becomes the alienation of the oppressor. It is the 
oppressor himselfwho restores, with his slightest gesture, the humanity 
he seeks to destroy; and, since he denies humanity in others, he regards 
it everywhere as his enemy. To handle this, [he] must assume the 
opaque rigidity and imperviousness of stone. In short, he must 
dehumanize himself, as well. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
2.1 Faulkner's Existential Gaze: Black Man as Oppressed Freedom 
Nobody has better portrayed the power of the victim's look at his 
torturers than Faulkner has done in the fmal pages of Light in August. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
In his unique study ofthe author's works, Existential-Phenomenological Readings 
on Faulkner, William J. Sowder remarks that the previous critical approaches have been 
too restrictive to deal with the complexity of Faulkner's characters: "Existential 
phenomenology can change this. As a philosophy of consciousness it covers the whole 
human spectrum" (Sowder xiii). It is somewhat surprising, then, that in his analysis of 
Light in August Sowder fails to consider the brilliant light shed on the main character by 
the father of existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and Nothingness. It was this brief 
but insightful analysis that started my exploration of the connection between freedom and 
violence. For whatever the reason, although Sartre is often credited with vaguely defmed 
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existential concepts, his work has rarely been given the careful study it requires, even by 
philosophers. As recently as 2006 David Sherman remarks on this lack in Philosophy 
Today: 
Although Horkeimer had wanted the Frankfurt School to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis ofSartre's philosophy, the only consideration 
of it that was anything more than superficial was Marcuse's 1948 article 
"Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'etre et le Neant." (198) 
For these reasons I feel that a close reading of Sartre's concepts of freedom as they apply 
to interpersonal relationships is long overdue. 
Much has been written about the central character of Joe Christmas in Faulkner's 
Light in August.7 Not one of these critical works considers Sartre's scrutiny of this 
existential anti-hero, encased as it is in the dense Part Three of Being and Nothingness, 
"Being-For-Others."8 In his preliminary discussion of sadism, Sartre states: 
What the sadist thus so tenaciously seeks, what he wants to knead with his 
hands and bend under his wrists is the Other's freedom. The freedom is there 
in that flesh; it is the freedom which is this flesh since there is a facticity of 
the Other. It is therefore this freedom which the sadist tries to appropriate. 
(Being and Nothingness 522)9 
7 For a complete consideration of the criticism on Joe Christmas see William J. 
Sowder's Existential-Phenomenological Readings on Faulkner. Conway, AR: UCA 
Press. 1991. 
8 In Part Three we see the introduction of the basic concept of freedom as it 
concerns human relationships. This is further elucidated in Part Four of Sartre's Being 
and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1977. 
9Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological 
Ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square, 1956. Hereafter cited 
in text as "BN." 
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Violence becomes the means by which the violator attempts to enslave the Other's 
freedom for himself and he seeks proof of this enslavement through humiliation and 
torture ofhis victim: ''this distorted and heaving body is the very image of a broken and 
enslaved freedom" (BN 524). However, this attempt to appropriate the victim' s freedom 
is doomed to failure because his/her transcendent freedom is, on principle, out of reach. 
Once the Other is treated as an object, his freedom is not transcendent but rather a dead 
thing. "The sadist discovers his error when his victim looks at him; that is when the sadist 
experiences the absolute alienation of his being in the Other's freedom" (BN 525). This 
reality is nowhere better portrayed, says Sartre, than in Faulkner' s Light in August. 
One important aspect of Sowder' s criticism is that he writes of Joe Christmas as 
violator rather than victim. Indeed, as a rapist, a murderer and a murder victim, he is both 
in the novel. Sartre' s analysis begins with the moment of Joe's death, for the 
philosopher's interest is in the gaze, the look in which the violator comes to realize the 
failure of his attempt to appropriate his victim' s freedom: 
But the man on the floor had not moved. He just lay there, with his eyes 
open and empty of everything save consciousness, and with something, a 
shadow, about his mouth. For a long moment he looked up at them with 
peaceful and unfathomable and unbearable eyes. Then his face, body, all, 
seemed to collapse, to fall in upon itself and from out the slashed garments 
about his hips and loins the pent black blood seemed to rush like a released 
breath. It seemed to rush out of his pale body like the rush of sparks from a 
rising rocket; upon that black blast the man seemed to rise soaring into their 
memories forever and ever. They are not to lose it, in whatever peaceful 
valleys, beside whatever placid and reassuring streams of old age, in the 
mirroring face of whatever children they will contemplate old disasters and 
newer hopes. It will be there, musing, quiet, steadfast, not fading and not 
particularly threatful, but of itself alone serene, of itself alone triumphant. 
Again from the town, deadened a little by the walls, the scream of the siren 
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mounted toward its unbelievable crescendo, passing out of the realm of 
hearing. (BN 526) 10 
Looking into the Other's eyes that are "empty of everything save consciousness," the 
men recognize the continued presence of the freedom which they sought to enslave. 11 The 
sadist fails in his goal on two levels. Once the Other is objectified, forced into the 
immediacy of the flesh by pain, the transcendence is no longer present. As he/she 
recovers this transcendence in the moment of death, the freedom is seen in the final gaze 
that is "of itself alone triumphant." In his victim's gaze the violator again becomes the 
objectified Other, moving from the "being-in-the-act-of-looking" to the "being-looked-
at" (BN 527). It is likely this fear of being objectified by the Other's gaze that prompts 
certain serial killers to blind or blindfold their victims. Sartre explains this issue rather 
succinctly in these words: "Such is the origin of my concrete relations with the Other; 
they are wholly governed by my attitudes with respect to the object which I am for the 
Other" (BN 473). In his final moments Christmas chooses his black heritage, "where life 
has already ceased before the heart stops and death is desire and fulfillment" (Light in 
August 496). 12 He chooses his victim status as "crouched behind that overturned table 
[he] let them shoot him to death, with that loaded and unfired pistol in his hand" (LIA 
496). 
10 The italics are Sartre's and the quotation is directly from Barnes' translation 
rather than from Light in August, since I wanted to be certain that I was looking through 
Sartre's own gaze, so to speak. 
11 See also Jacques Derrida's The Gift of Death: "[T]his conscience that looks 
death in the face is another name for freedom" (15). 
12 William Faulkner, Light in August. 1932. New York: Vintage, 1990. Hereafter 
cited in text as "LIA." 
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In his other aspect, Joe Christmas is also a violator. Sartre explains that both 
sadism and masochism are two sides of the same primitive, mistaken effort to relate to 
others: 
Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies 
to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the 
Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, 
the Other seeks to enslave me[ ... ]Conflict is the original meaning of being-
for-others. (BN 475) 
This resembles Hegel's famous and often quoted section in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit on the master/slave dialectic, the section Hegel calls "Lordship and Bondage." 
This primitive state in which two beings with conflicting needs confront each othe1 to 
the death is often taken as evidence of Hegel's fascism. It is, though, only one 
moment in Hegel's Phenomenology, a moment which must be overcome by a 
developing consciousness: "[Man's] freedom is not to be found in any legendary state-
of-nature, but evolves out of his effort to disassociate himself from his state of primal 
savagery" (Hegel 102). All efforts to assimilate the freedom of the Other are doomed 
to failure, yet they are the source of much violent behaviour of individual subjects. 
Such failure, both for victim and violator, is revealed by Faulkner's text. Deeper 
analysis of the character of Joe Christmas offers a more complete picture of the 
dialectic. 
Joe Christmas is a man who is on a search for his identity, an identity which 
can only be revealed in the act of being, that is to say through consciously chosen 
action. Sowder argues, rightly, that any analysis of his character must begin "with the 
uncontested fact that Christmas was incapable of forming a satisfactory relationship 
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with any other human being" (41). As a result of Joe's own fragmented sense of self, 
he seeks to wrest from others what the self feels it is lacking. He vacillates between 
identifying himself as white, with all that entails in his environment, and identifying 
himself as black, with its negative consequences. His sense ofhimselfis caught up in 
the object status given him by the Other. He is at one time called a "nigger bastard" 
by white children, and named a "white bastard" by a Negro man. The only constant 
in this identity is the pejorative term, "bastard." Christmas rejects both ofthese 
designations thrust upon him by others, albeit in different ways and with very distinct 
social implications. 
The reader does not know the reality of Joe's heritage, and this says John L. 
Longley, is one of Faulkner's strokes of genius (166). It is not visible to the others he 
meets: "He dont look no more like a nigger than I do" says one of the deputies sent 
to track him down. The Negro yard boy tells him: "You ' lllive and you'll die, and 
you wont never know" (qtd. in Longley 167). He needs to know though, or at least 
"because he is free, he cannot let others tell him how or what to be" (Longley 167). 
Having tried to live in both roles, Christmas is finally enraged by Joanna Burden ' s 
insistence that he embrace the black struggle to live as white men live. He will insist 
on his right to be free simply by virtue of his existence or being. 
Joe begins his efforts towards self-empowerment in his relationships with 
women. As he approaches a Negro prostitute, after the other boys have done so, his 
rage explodes in violence towards the ''womanshenegro": " it seemed to him that he 
could see her--something prone, abject; her eyes perhaps" (LIA 172). Feeling, rather 
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than seeing her gaze, he must assert his own being the only way he feels able: 
through violent submission of the Other. Santoni explains Sartre's position: "To be 
human ... any exploited native must be violent" (Santoni 50). On other occasions Joe 
seems to seek to surrender his own being to the Other, as a masochist does: "with 
something ofthe exaltation of his adopted father he sprang full and ofhis own 
accord into the stranger's fist[ ... ] he just lay there with a profoundly contemplative 
expression, looking quietly up at the two men, and the blonde woman still as 
immobile and completely finished and surfaced as a cast statue" (LIA 240). This 
scene foreshadows Joe's passive acceptance of his own death, as he lies beneath the 
table with a gun that he refuses to shoot. The passive acceptance of pain also mirrors 
his relationship with his adopted father, and his stoic tolerance of the beatings 
received from him. He expected nothing more, but was threatened by "the woman: 
that soft kindness which he believed himself doomed to be forever victim of and 
which he hated more than he did the hard and ruthless justice of men" (LIA 185-6). 
This soft feminine kindness he sees as a tool to take from him his own masculine 
identity, his only freedom: "She was trying to make me cry. Then she thinks that 
they would have had me" (Ibid). 
Joanna Burden's kindness is perceived as a familiar threat and he needs to 
make her feel his masculine power. Raping her, he is angered by her masculine 
stoicism: "'My God,' he thought, 'it was like I was the woman and she was the 
man"' (LIA 258). When he returns to her house later, he is surprised to find the door 
is not locked: 
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When he found that it was not locked it was like an insult. It was as 
though some enemy upon whom he had wreaked his utmost of violence 
and contumely stood, unscathed and unscarred, and contemplated him 
with a musing and insufferable contempt (261). 
"In fact, his victim's passivity appears to fuel Joe's rage because he needs to terrify 
Joanna, a white woman, to feel power" (Bush 121). Although she resists, it is with 
what he considers to be masculine rules of combat (LIA 259). What he cannot 
tolerate is for others to discover the control that Joanna, a white woman, maintains 
between them: "He would have died or murdered rather than have anyone, another 
man, learn what their relations had now become" (271). As the sexual relationship 
gains in intensity, Christmas fears the loss of his identity: "He began to be afraid. He 
could not have said of what. But he began to see himself as from a distance, like a 
man being sucked down into a bottomless morass" (285). Sartre's analysis reveals 
love as a non-violent attempt to appropriate the freedom of the Other; subjects such 
as Joe Christmas, who have a weak sense of self, are threatened and overwhelmed by 
even this innocent feeling. 
Once he has decided to kill Joanna he does so with recklessness that reveals 
little concern for getting caught. In Sowder's words: "In pride he will act or in 
shame be acted upon, but either way the initial action is rooted in fear, fear that if he 
does not attack, the other will, fear that if he does attack, he will lose" (53). What 
Christmas fears to lose, I assert, is the basic freedom that comes with existence as a 
human being. Without it, there can be no subjective sense of identity. He seeks it 
throughout his tragic life, but in such a racist environment he has few ways to assert 
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it. Finally, as in childhood, he finds that the only way to express this existential 
freedom is by confronting and consciously choosing the fate that seems to pursue 
him. He murders, frrst his adopted father and then Joanna Burden, in an attempt to 
liberate himself from their attempts to define him, to dictate his identity. He finds, 
though, that this does not work; the ghosts of his victims still haunt him and his sense 
of alienation is increased. He sets out to meet his fate, to choose it as his own. Like 
any modern existential hero, Joe Christmas accepts the responsibility for the choices 
he has made. Only this finaJ action, this final choice, gives him the freedom he has 
sought. 
Sartre affirms that in certain circumstances the only freedom available is in 
the relinquishing of one's life. For the existentialist, one of the fundamental 
characteristics ofthe authentic man, termed Dasein by German existential 
philosopher Heidegger, is his acceptance of the ownership of his death. In his 
Heideggerian study ofRichard Wright, The Death-Bound-Subject, Professor Abdul 
JanMohamed of the University of California argues ''that it is precisely the slave's 
ability to 'actualize' his potential death that permits him to find the exit that leads to 
his freedom" (15). The choice that Joe Christmas makes leads the other characters to 
reason that he must, in fact, be a Negro. According to Jean Weisgerber, "Christmas 
has only the preposterous freedom of choosing his own defeat, a particle of freedom 
bent by the environment towards evil and death". 13 His crime is to attempt, through 
13 Jean Weisgerber's text, Faulkner and Dostoevsky, is an interesting study of the 
influence ofthe Russian existentialist writer on the ideology of Faulkner. (See especially 
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violent means, to regain the freedom which has been threatened on all sides since his 
birth. He must choose a death of either the spirit or of the body: to live in servitude 
or to die in freedom. This dreadful choice is one that appears often in novels of 
slavery and of racially determined violence, and one that provides a major motiffor 
our next author, Richard Wright. 
2.2 Richard Wright's Existentialism: Violent Self-Assertion 
But if a selfish West hamstrings the elite of Asia and Africa, distrusts 
their motives, a spirit of absolutism will rise in Asia and Africa and will 
provoke a spirit of counterabsolutism in the West. In case that happens, 
all will be lost. We shall all, Asia and Africa as well as Europe, be 
thrown back into an age of racial and religious wars, and the precious 
heritage, the freedom of speech, the secular state, the independent 
personality, the autonomy of science- which is not Western or Eastern, 
but human, will be snuffed out ofthe minds of men. 
Richard Wright, White Man, Listen! 
Wright's relationships with the famous French existentialists Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus are well documented. 14 In fact 
Wright had already read the Germans Heidegger and Nietzsche, along with the 
Scandinavian Kierkegaard, before he was introduced to the French thinkers by Ralph 
pp. 203-217 on Light in August) Trans. By Dean McWilliams. Athens: Ohio UP, 1968. 
Unlike my analysis, Weisgerber's view of Christmas has him steeped in determinism. 
This refuses the basic tenets of Sartrean existentialism: man always and everywhere exists 
in a terrible freedom. 
14 Fabre gives an interesting account of the social and political connections 
between Sartre and Wright during this time. They collaborated on many different 
journals, committees, etc. for the anti-colonialist cause. Although certain writers, such as 
Jeffrey Atteberry, see The Outsider as a critique of Existentialism, this is not a position 
with which I agree. 
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Ellison. He developed a personal relationship with Sartre and de Beauvoir in Paris, a 
city which had become a center for American writers in the early part of the 20th 
century. The political issues that developed from Algeria's fight for independence 
from French colonialism, a cause that much occupied Sartre and Camus, created a 
milieu that African Americans found sympathetic to their own struggles against 
racism. Sartre was a literary force, as well as a political force. He wrote extensively 
on American writers such as Dos Passos, Hemingway and Faulkner. These 'new' 
writers had their reputations established in Europe before they became well known in 
the U.S.A. Jean-Francois Foumy, in the introduction to his edited collection, 
Situating Sartre in Twentieth-Century Thought and Culture, demonstrates this point: 
"In his conception of the novel and narrative structures, Sartre accorded a central role 
to the American novel, which he enthusiastically promoted in his critical and 
theoretical writings" (7). Literature, as defined by Sartre, is an action for which the 
political dimension is essentially paramount. In this also, his ideas were in sympathy 
with the African-American authors. Fabre asserts of Wright and Sartre that they 
represent "the confluence oftwo minds preoccupied with the same problems of 
human existence, freedom and responsibility, oppression and revolution" (47). 
In his comprehensive and i11uminating study of Wright's philosophy, The 
Death-Bound-Subject, JanMohamed asserts that Wright's literary works have the 
deployment of death as their constant subtext. Articulating this subtext, JanMohamed 
explores the existential choices open to slaves and blacks in the Jim Crow South. 
Wright's narratives consist of"a thorough archeology ofwhat I will call the 'death-
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bound-subject' , that is of the subject who is formed, from infancy on, by the 
imminent and ubiquitous threat of death" (JanMohamed 2). 15 Actual death, as a 
constant threat, induces terror in the subject and results in a social death whereby the 
subject is denied socio-political standing including protection from summary 
execution. Only by confronting the fear of actual death can the subject negate the 
social death and achieve some semblance of choice. This results in what 
JanMohamed refers to as symbolic-death: "a political and existential moment of 
sublation" that constitutes a revision of Hegel's "valorization of work as the singular 
avenue through which the slave can supposedly find his salvation" (JanMohamed 
13). 
The essential questions that Wright explores concern ways in which the 
constant threat of death permeates and affects every aspect of the individual's 
subjectivity. This threat did not end with abolition of slavery, for "the one feature 
that links the two periods [ante- and post-bellum] is the reliance of both societies on 
the threat of death and the systematic use of lynching to coerce subject populations" 
(JanMohamed 5). The progressive ' subjectivity' of African-American literary 
tradition extends from early, rather impersonal, slave narratives to the incredibly 
moving, first-person account given in Toni Morrison's Beloved. In this gradual shift, 
JanMohamed claims that Wright occupies an important median point (4). Wright 
15 This book is an interesting perspective based primarily on Heidegger's Being 
and Time; its focus is Dasein's (Heidegger's name for man) being-towards-death. He also 
gives import to Hegel' s master/slave dialectic from The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
JanMohamed sees Wright as implicitly anti-Hegelian, having significantly revised 
Hegel's concept of work as the slave's route to salvation. 
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reflects a relation between the individual and his milieu in which that "subjectivity 
never feels authorized to be, to do, or to possess anything; it is a subjectivity that can 
never feel securely grounded in the myriad social, political, and cultural values, rules 
and procedures that 'normal' society takes for granted: the bareness of bare life 
permeates its finest capillary structures" (Emphasis in original, JanMohamed 1 0). 
Thus, we understand through Wright's narratives that, even after the Emancipation 
Proclamation, the black subject still experiences the most direct threats to his 
freedom and to his very life. This is not, in any real way, a subject who is free from 
violence or free to realize his/her human potential. 
The issue of freedom is, for the blacks in the narratives we are considering, 
closer to that of Sartre' s victim of the sadist. He can approach his freedom only in his 
confrontation with his own death, as a choice that the master cannot appropriate: 
We can begin by saying that if :freedom is the recognition of necessity, 
then the slave's road to freedom lies through death, for the threat of 
death and the possibility of death together define the fundamental 
condition of the slave. The road to freedom is revealed precisely by the 
slave's ability to recognize that while the master can appropriate the 
value of his labor and, by confining him to the realm of social-death, 
even the value of his life, the only thing that the master cannot 
appropriate is the use-value of his actual-death. (JanMohamed 18) 
Actual death is the only available escape from the Other's appropriation of his freedom; 
through it he negates the master's power as exercised in social-death and exerts his 
freedom of choice. The death becomes voluntary, as we saw above with Joe Christmas: 
''they imply that they die with a deliberate consciousness of their action and, that thereby, 
their deaths are concretely affirming their freedom" (JanMohamed 19). Thus, as Joe 
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Christmas gazes at his murderers, he reveals to them a consciousness which still exists in 
opposition to their own. 
Wright's 1953 novel, The Outsider, follows in the existential tradition of Albert 
Camus' L 'Etranger, and like Camus, Wright's narrative considers the limits, possibilities, 
and consequences of human freedom. Beginning his work with the words of Soren 
Kierkegaard, Wright establishes his existential theme: the fear and dread that are part of 
the human experience of what Sartre calls a dreadful freedom. Feeling trapped by the 
choices he has made, central figure Cross Damon finds himself free to begin again when 
others are led to believe he has died. Cross finds that the new life he creates out of his 
struggle to be free is as terrifying as the previous one in which he felt trapped. He breaks 
all social laws of responsibility to others and becomes a murderer. When asked at the end 
of the narrative to explain his choices, Cross responds in the discourse of the 
existentialist: 
"Damon, you were an outsider. You know what I mean. You lived 
apart ... Damon tell me, why did you choose to live that way?" [ ... ] 
I wanted to be free ... to feel what I was worth ... what living meant 
to me. (The Outsider 404)16 
In pursuing his freedom, though, Cross flees from the responsibility that accompanies it; 
with no opportunity to develop a sense of self, Damon comprehends freedom only as 
freedom from external restraints. There is no well defined subject who is able to embrace 
a freedom to self actualize. 
16 Richard Wright, The Outsider. New York: Harper, 1953. Hereafter cited in text 
as "TO." 
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The overt existential theme is "clearly predicated on Cross' symbolic-death, but 
another part reveals that his symbolic-death opens up a tangle of repression that permits a 
deeply embedded death drive to manifest itself in the most gruesome way possible" 
(JanMohamed 175). This subtext allows the exploration by the author ofthe destructive 
powers of the death drive over the constructive life force. Cross Damon's name unites 
the two opposing forces of good and evil: his mother names him Cross after the cross of 
Jesus. Damon, originating from the Greek daimon, can be aligned with the name of the 
satanic power, and Cross refers to ''the demoniacal" in him (124). His friends refer to 
him, at the opening of the narrative, as "Mr. Death" (TO 2) and also as one who "feels 
like God" (7). Thus Cross, in his all-encompassing nature, is "human, all too human," and 
he echoes those words ofKierkegaard with: "I'm simply too damned human" (TO 37). 
His existential subjectivity is revealed by his reading material: Kafka, Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard, etc. Ironically, these books reveal him to his hunter, as the philosophers 
reveal man in all his "fear and trembling." From the opening of the novel, his life is 
"situated at the intersection of social-death and potential suicide [and] is circumscribed 
and entirely permeated by death" (JanMohamed 177). Confirming his manhood by 
calling on his willingness to die by his own hands, Cross manages to eke out an existence 
on the margins of society. 
How does one reconcile the actions of Cross Damon with the tenets of 
philosophic existentialism, in particular with the existential concept of freedom? 
Beginning with a chapter named ''Dread," Damon establishes his Heideggerian 
being-towards-death, which was "conferred upon him in his childhood [and] staining 
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all the future that he was to embrace even to that lonely grave which he would some 
day have to fill alone" (TO 11 0). He resents the Roman Catholic priest he meets on 
the train because of the moral simplicity that Cross believes the priest' s faith confers. 
Unlike the religious, including his mother, Damon's atheistic philosophy entails that 
he alone is responsible for his moral code: 
Cross had to discover what was good or evil through his more exacting 
than own actions, which were the edicts of any God because it was 
he alone who had to bear the brunt of their consequences with a sense 
of absoluteness made intolerable by knowing that this life of his was 
all he had and would ever have. For him there was no grace or 
mercy if he failed. (114) 
With this dread of his responsibility for his own life, Cross Damon flees from his own 
freedom and attempts to start anew, "responsible for nothing" (126). In existential terms, 
he is living in "bad faith." 
The knowledge of his own existence, as essentially this freedom, pursues him 
into his new life. Man, he tells the white, hunch-back 'outsider' he meets on the 
train, " is nothing in particular" (125). It is this knowledge of his becoming, this task 
of creating himself in every moment, which man both knows and is afraid to 
acknowledge. The void at the center of being is man ' s nature; freedom is this 
nothingness to which man is condemned to give shape. In Humanistic Existentialism: 
The Literature of Possibilities, Hazel Barnes' insightful and illuminating study on 
Sartre' s Being and Nothingness, she addresses the existential human condition: "Man 
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is freedom, and freedom is a lack of being" (Barnes 41 ). 17 Man is nothing, but he is 
always about-to-be whatever he chooses. Man's nature is in his becoming, but this 
responsibility is accompanied by fear and dread. If, in his dread he refuses to face 
this realization, then he lives in what Sartre calls "mauvaise foi" or "bad faith." This 
is a state of self-deception in which man refuses to accept the responsibility which is 
thrust upon him by virtue of his existence or being. "Bad faith is an evasion of man's 
essential freedom" (Barnes 156). 
Society is, within the parameters of existentialism, both the product of man's 
freedom and the site for possible forms of alienation. 18 As an outsider by virtue of 
his race, Wright's Cross Damon suffers from social alienation, or what JanMohamed 
calls social-death. As such, his subjectivity is in revolt against any system or persons 
who try to enslave him. Gladys and Dot identify him primarily as 
father/provider/husband. His mother identifies him as son and husband substitute. 
Society acknowledges his lower working-class Negro identity. What Houston, the 
other outsider, realizes is that this social alienation forces the subject to confront the 
truth of his existence: 
17 Hazel Barnes, the well-known English translator ofSartre's Being and 
Nothingness, addresses this issue with particular clarity in The Literature of Possibility: A 
Study in Humanistic Existentialism. The sudden awareness ofthis totality of freedom can, 
and in literature often does, result in negative effects. Barnes explains that "the immediate 
consequences of man's discovery of himself as a free nihilating being are almost 
inevitabt;' shattering - or at the very least, extremely depressing" ( 42). 
1 In his article published in the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, "Existentialism and Existentialisms", Mikel Dufrenne of the University of 
Rari~, expli~a~e& Sartre Qn this subject. For Sartre the main forms of social alienation are: 
"class or race struggle, colonialist oppression, and capitalistic ferocity" (61). 
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'The negro has to know this [that man "is nothing in particular"]. How 
could he escape knowing it? He looks right at it every day of his 1 ife, 
every hour. .. ' Houston paused, smiled cynically. 'All my life I've been 
haunted by the notion that this life we live is a pretense, and all the 
more deadly because it is a pretense. And woe to the man who dares to 
reveal that pretense! He is the criminal. .. ' He pulled deeply at his 
cigarette and laughed softly. "'Man's nothing in particular"', he 
repeated Cross's words. 'I think you're pretty close to something there.' 
(125) 
In his position in American society, which is essentially a non-position, the Negro is 
forced into social-death by the threat of actual death, which continues for the African-
American long after slavery's abolition. 19 It is this coercion, however, that constitutes the 
very authenticity remarked upon by Houston. One demand made upon what JanMohamed 
refers to as the 'death-bound-subject' is the repression of his desire for a life full of 
possibilities (19). He is in the unenviable position ofbeing caught between avoiding death 
and avoiding life; he exists in the shadows.2° Cross expresses the desperation this half-life 
engenders: "Goddam! To swap the burden of this sorry consciousness for something 
else!" (TO 126). 
19 JanMohamed writes that "there exists a powerful, if somewhat submerged, 
tradition within African American literature and culture that continually and 
systematically mediates on the effectivity of the threat of death as a mode of coercion" 
(3). The continuation of certain socio-political conditions of slavery, such as 
powerlessness, social-death, and lack of honor, indicate that ''the effective practical, if not 
legal, continuation of slavery" still exist in the U.S. (5). Although Wright experienced 
certain sorts of freedom unavailable to his slave ancestors, "in spite of this relative 
freedom, he felt as if he were a slave" (6). In this way he constitutes a perfect ''witness" to 
slavery, says JanMohamed, as "someone who is simultaneously within and outside the 
experience of slavery'' ( 6). 
20This metaphor is more fully explored by Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, which 
will be discussed in a following section. 
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The existential truth regarding all our encounters with the Other is that such 
encounters are a necessary part of the dialectic of being. Joe Christmas realizes this truth 
as he tentatively begins to approach people at the conclusion of his lonely race from the 
murder scene. Correspondingly, Cross Damon also reaches such an epiphany; he cannot 
live in isolation. He must eventually re-enter the human community: 
[H]e avoided looking into the faces of the passers-by, feeling 
instinctively that he did not have the right to do so. He was without a 
name, a past, a future; no promises or pledges bound him to those about 
him. He had to become human before he could mingle again with 
people. Yet he needed those people and could become human only with 
them. Dimly he realized that his dilemma, though personal, bore the 
mark of the general. (127) 
Unfortunately for Damon, the person he approaches is so horrified by what she perceives 
in him that she makes the choice to die herself. "A person who came to the knowledge of 
himself through murder, Cross has no place in the human society" (Denissova 245). 
Exploring the limits of his freedom, Damon fmds that nothing outside can restrain him if 
he does not learn self-restraint. This wish for external limits is the motivating force 
behind the anti-social behaviour of many criminals, as the D.A. Houston remarks early in 
the novel: "Most of them almost beg you to punish them. They would be lost without the 
law. The law's vengeance is what gives meaning to their lives" (TO 124). In the fmal 
pages of the narrative, Cross echoes this attitude; Houston informs him that his murders 
will go unprosecuted, and he must be his own judge, as he was his own law: 
I'm alone, he said to himself. He felt dizzy. Terror wrapped him 
around in a sheet of flame and his body wept tears ... The prop had gone; 
the world against which he had pitched his rebellion had pitied him, 
almost forgiven him[ ... ] He had broken all his promises to the world 
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and the people in it, but he had never reckoned on that world turning on 
him and breaking its promise to him too! He was not to be punished! 
Men would not give meaning to what he had done! Society would not 
even look at it, recognize it! That was not fair, wasn' t right,just. .. the 
ludicrous nature of his protest came to him and he smiled wryly at his 
own self-deception. (TO 396) 
Damon realizes, in this moment, that he has refused the responsibility that freedom brings 
to live authentically; he has been living in "bad faith." For Damon, deprived ofthe social 
recognition essential to selthood, violence becomes a distorted way to search for meaning 
in his life. The ultimate tragedy for him is that even in this goal he is thwarted. Human 
beings, Sartre tells us, are fundamentally identified with their actions. Refusal to punish 
Cross Damon for his actions is tantamount to a refusal to acknowledge his existence. 
2.4 Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man: Freedom as Recognition of Possibility 
The struggle of the individual to realize and test his freedom 
could be named as the theme most common to Dostoevsky, 
Wright, and Ellison. 
Lynch 
Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man is a quintessential existential work. As with 
Wright's The Outsider, this narrative incorporates the ideology of literary existentialism; 
Ellison's muse appears to be Dostoevsky in the novel, Notes from Underground. Almost 
in response to the lack of responsibility exhibited by Wright's anti-hero, Ellison has his 
character address this responsibility issue early in the narrative: 
Irresponsibility is part of my invisibility; any way you face it, 
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it is a denial. But to whom can I be responsible, and why should I be, 
when you can't see me? (Invisible Man 16i1 
What options does he have, he seems to suggest, but to rebel by way of anti-social 
behaviour? Given no socially approved identity, like Cross Damon he seeks 
acknowledgement from society in the form of social penalties. Like Wright's Damon, he 
finds that even his anti-social actions are often overlooked; he remains invisible. The 
question that arises for him concerns the degree of freedom available to one whose 
position in society is so marginalized as to be almost nonexistent. 
"What once looked tame or apolitical in Ellison's work--his emphasis on identity, 
freedom, and the vast potential for diversity in American life--has come to seem more 
radical than the political criticism that rejected it; this too has become part of our revised 
view of the postwar years" (Dickstein 33).22 In his article on Ellison, Morris Dickstein 
argues that the narrative of Invisible Man was "far more personal than Wright's, more 
metaphysical, more concerned with individual identity, including sexual identity" (30). 
Ellison never disputed the depiction of the difficulties faced by black Americans that 
were central concerns of his mentor, Richard Wright. For his part, though, his interest was 
in a broader picture of American life than one of victimization and limited possibilities. 
21 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man. 1947. New York: Vintage, 1990. Hereafter cited 
in text as "IM." 
22 In his article in Raritan: A Quarterly Review, Morris Dickstein explores the 
detailed criticisms that accused Ellison of being a traitor to the cause of black nationalism 
as espoused by his mentor, Wright. Perhaps Ellison was too well accepted by the 
conservative literary culture to please critics like Irving Howe. Ellison himself seemed 
undisturbed by this criticism, but Howe accuses Ellison of ending his only novel with a 
"sudden, unprepared and implausible assertion of unconditioned freedom" (Qtd. in 
Dickstein 31 ). 
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He aspired to write the great American novel and that involved a broader range of 
encounters than previously prevailed in African-American literature. The issue of 
freedom, says Dickstein, became the cornerstone ofEllison's opus and "of his radical 
rethinking of the role of race and culture in American life" (31 ). The message for African-
American readers was one that encouraged self-reflection: "When I discover who I am, 
I'll be free" (IM 185). The narrative moves the invisible man through various roles, 
created by others, towards a holistic sense of identity that he creates for himself. In this 
way, the novel points towards a postrnodern, anti-essentialist notion of identity (Dickstein 
36). 
Elements of universality, found in Ellison's novel, direct us to the European ideas 
of existential theory that grounded the work of his mentor, Wright, and are evident in 
Invisible Man. Freedom is a central motif for both authors, but Ellison has been criticized 
for what some see as an unrealistic portrayal of the American Negro's transcendence over 
racism and exploitation. His interest as an author is to present the development of the 
individual consciousness in the face of challenging external circumstances and this is an 
existential theme. "One objective of his writing was to point out how black Americans 
[ ... ]found ways to exercise their liberty as people free by nature but constricted by racial 
discrimination" (Morel 68). The narrator of Invisible Man exclaims at the conclusion that 
his world "has become one of infmite possibilities" and he identifies this recognition with 
freedom (IM 576). 
This is not to imply that Ellison was not concerned with racism and its effects. 
However, he saw the possibilities open to the victims of racism as a result of their 
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invisibility. They seemed less hindered than the dominant white race by the fears of 
looking foolish to others, since what they did was insignificant in the eyes of the 
prevailing culture. Consequently, they could experiment with music, dance, and language, 
getting to know their identities in ways that the whites never could. Michael Lynch, in 
Creative Revolt, asserts that Invisible Man "shows folk traditions and values as the key to 
blacks' self-awareness and strength to overcome their environment" ( 69). What the 
invisible man discovers is how to make use of his cloak of invisibility to explore the 
possibilities inherent in his existential freedom. Unlike Cross Damon, who seeks to flee 
responsibility, Ellison "uses the word ' responsibility' quite often in Invisible Man, 
stressing it as the corollary of possibility and freedom" (Lynch 171). Ralph Ellison's 
emphasis, in this text, on the responsibility of the individual for his own fate, for his own 
choices within his environment, is analogous to that of Sartre. Ellison's close relationship 
with Wright makes it almost certain that he was made familiar with the ideas of French 
existentialism. Lynch quotes from an essay of Ellison's: 
The hero' s invisibility is not a matter of being seen, but a refusal to run 
the risk of his own humanity, which involves guilt. [ ... ]It is what the 
hero refuses to do in each section which leads to further action. He must 
assert and achieve his own humanity. (171, italics mine) 
With this narrative we begin to see a movement in African-American fiction towards the 
individual's.freedom to develop his talents and his personality; in short we see a 
development towards self-realization. Ellison criticizes Wright for developing black 
characters as primarily victims, having no possible release from entrapment except in 
death. However, one might argue that the more positive, humanistic narratives were only 
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made possible by the changing attitude towards civil rights for African Americans.23 
"Unlike the narrator of Notes From Underground, who remains stalled in his neurosis, the 
invisible man unifies his personality by choosing to accept the weight of freedom and the 
lightness of possibility" (Lynch 184). This is indeed a significant existential moment in 
African-American literature. "It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen" (IM 3). In 
Ellison's narrative, says Todd Lieber, he elevates the condition of invisibility from a 
metaphor for the cultural and social situating of blacks in America, to a metaphor for all 
mankind (Lieber I 00). 
Hazel Barnes, in her major study on the implications ofSartre's philosophy, 
Humanistic Existentialism: The Literature of Possibility, the original translator of 
Being and Nothingness relates the positive importance of the existential vision: 
Because it presents to us a new picture of man, and because this picture 
is one which includes the view that man is free to determine future 
portraits of himself, the existentialist [position] is concerned above all 
else with pointing out to us what are the possibilities of man (37). 
An understanding of these possibilities involves knowledge of the psychological and 
social, as well as the metaphysical, situations with which the subject is confronted. 
23 For more detailed description of the disagreement in artistic perspective and 
ideology, see Lynch's Creative Revolt: A Study of Wright, Ellison, and Dostoevsky, 
Chapter Two. Also, as mentioned in the footnote above, Morris Dickstein discusses this 
issue in great detail in his article in Raritan. One who argues for Wright as an equally 
enlightened author is Todd M. Lieber in his American Quarterly article, "Ralph Ellison 
and the Metaphor of Invisibility in the Black Literary Tradition". He persuasively 
demonstrates that Bigger Thomas, of Native Son, also explores the possibilities of"the 
power and freedom that lie within invisibility" (89). The difficulty with Wright's 
characters is that they are only able to come to a sense of identity through anti-social, 
violent action .. They never reconcile the dichotomy between individual needs and those 
of the social group. 
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Nowhere does Sartre ever suggest that the sociopolitical aspects of life are irrelevant. He 
is, after all, well known as an anti-colonialist who supported the use of violence as one 
method by which the colonial subjects might gain political freedom. On this issue, and its 
relevance to Algerian independence, he engaged in a prolonged disagreement with his old 
friend Albert Camus. The philosophical discourse of Being and Nothingness is the 
discourse of the individual subject. His freedom, and the responsibility that goes with that 
freedom, constitute the major focus of that work. Man is freedom, in fact, and freedom is 
a Jack ofbeing. It is every man's task to define and give substance to that nothingness: 
"He must set himself apart from the totality of Being in order to assign significance to the 
particular Being which he confronts and to the relationship which he establishes with it" 
(Barnes 41). If he is to live an authentic existence, to be in good faith with himself, then 
he must be constantly about the process of defining himself and giving meaning to his 
existence. 
Sartre's existentialism is an atheistic one, as are certainly that of Wright, and 
probably that of Ellison and Faulkner. In a god-free universe, man's particular way of 
being is always in flux and never guaranteed. As Houston says to Damon, in The 
Outsider, "You've made yourself your own law, so you'll be your ownjudge ... " (TO 
396). This is the origin ofthe aloneness that Cross experiences (397). Existential man has 
to recognize, in every moment, that he is nothing but what he makes himself with every 
choice. At the level ofthe subject, the being-for-itself(or consciousness) is responsible 
for his responses to the being-in-itself, which means to the given world that he confronts. 
Even as a prisoner, says Sartre, being-for-itself can choose to respond to the given 
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situation in a way that defines him. The life situations of the African-American characters 
in the novels chosen for analysis have political significance, but the exact nature ofthat 
significance is not directly addressed in Being and Nothingness, a text primarily 
concerned with the particular rather than the universal. What Sartre considers here is the 
freedom that defines man: the freedom to realize himself in every moment. The reality of 
the milieu in which one finds oneself, what Heidegger terms "throwness," presents the 
experiences to which being-for-itself responds, thereby determining itself as free subject. 
As such, man is half in love with death, as the one certainty in his otherwise uncertain 
life. 
It is the gaze of the Other that simultaneously threatens the freedom of the for-
itself, and yet it is the mirror by which consciousness knows itself as subject. Invisibility 
is then a frightening thing, particularly for one whose sense of self is already threatened 
by racism. The narrator in Ellison's novel responds with anger to this threat to his own 
existence, his own freedom as being: 
It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often 
rather wearing on the nerves. Then, too, you're constantly being 
bumped against by those with poor vision. Or again, you often doubt if 
you really exist. You wonder whether you aren't simply a phantom in 
other people's minds. Say, a figure in a nightmare which the sleeper 
tries with all his strength to destroy. It's when you feel like this that, out 
of resentment, you begin to bump people back. And, let me confess, you 
feel that way most of the time. You ache with the need to convince 
yourself that you do exist in the real world, that you're a part of all the 
sound and anguish, and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you 
swear to make them recognize you. And, alas, it's seldom successful. 
(IM 3-4) 
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He describes a violent attack he makes on a man who bumps into him on the street, a man 
he almost kills in his outrage at the fact that he feels ignored. He stops himself from 
slitting the man's throat only when he realizes that the Other probably experiences him as 
a waking nightmare: "Would he have awakened at the point of death?" the invisible man 
wonders (5). Nevertheless, he reasons, "[m]ost of the time (although I do not choose to 
deny the violence of my days by ignoring it) I am not so overtly violent. I remember that I 
am invisible and walk softly so as not to disturb the sleeping ones" (5). He recognizes the 
inherent bad faith of those around him, and continues to fight surreptitiously so that he 
can "feel my vital aliveness" (7). Freedom is "a hard job, son," the old woman from his 
dream tells him (11 ). It lies not in hating, but in loving. 
Sartre describes various ways in which consciousness as subject can deal with the 
threat to his freedom obviated by the gaze of the Other. One way, as explored in Sartre's 
analysis of Faulkner presented above, is by violence or by surrender to violence: 
masochism or sadism. In the masochist's case, the subject surrenders his freedom, while 
yet asserting it through his voluntary acceptance of death. The position of the sadist is to 
appropriate the Other's freedom by reducing him to being-in-itself, that is to say to a body 
as object for the sadist. For the masochist, the subject is objectified and may lose his own 
life. The sadist realizes his failure to appropriate the Other's freedom when that self as 
freedom is revealed in the victim's death gaze. One might define these positions as 
essentially hate motivated: the masochist is motivated by self-hate, and the sadist by 
hatred of the Other. In Invisible Man the protagonist, or the existential hero, spends the 
major part of the novel trying to live within the roles proscribed for him by Others. 
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Norton, Bledsoe, and the Brotherhood all attempt to impose some kind of identity on the 
hero. In this process he becomes for them an object; as long as he tries to please, to see 
himself mirrored in the gaze of the Other, his freedom as subject eludes him. Attempting 
to live according to the dictates of others, he cannot realize his true identity, and he feels 
lost in a world whose rules are unfamiliar to him: 
My doubts grew. Perhaps all was not well. I remained in my room 
all the next day. I grew conscious that I was afraid; more afraid here in 
my room than I had ever been in the South.[ ... ] In the evening I went 
out to a movie, a picture of frontier life with heroic Indian fighting and 
struggles against flood, storm and forest fire [ ... _] I forgot myself 
(although there was no one like me taking part in the adventures) and 
left the dark room in a lighter mood. But that night I dreamed of my 
grandfather and awoke depressed. I walked out of the building with a 
queer feeling that I was playing a part in some scheme which I did not 
understand. (171) 
Fearful of the responsibility of defining himself, Ellison's character accepts the 
identification given him by others, however absurd or demeaning it might be. In the early 
pages of the narrative, he describes the feeling that came over him as he listened to the 
music of Louis Armstrong, singing: "What did I do/ To be so black/ And blue?'' The 
words filled him with fear, because ''this familiar music had demanded action, the kind of 
which I was incapable, and yet had I lingered there beneath the surface I might have 
attempted to act" (IM 12). In spite of all his disillusionment the invisible man still has 
belief in the power of action, in the power of individual freedom. This is what makes this 
narrative a more hopeful one than either Faulkner or Wright conceived. The underground 
home of the character is, he tells us early on, a temporary state: "A hibernation is a covert 
preparation for a more overt action" (IM 13). 
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We are never told what actions the character has in mind, only that his isolation 
has a purpose: "Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, 
in quiet" (571). His narrative has shown "me the hole I was in, if you will-and I 
reluctantly accepted the fact" (572). Accepting his own "facticity," as Sartre terms it, he 
comes to understand that he is the creator of his own life: 
You go along for years knowing something is wrong, then suddenly you 
discover that you're as transparent as air. At ftrst you tell yourself that 
it's all a dirty joke, or that it's due to the 'political situation'. But deep 
down you come to suspect that you're yourself to blame, and you stand 
naked and shivering before the millions of eyes who look through you 
unseeingly. That is the real soul sickness. (IM 575) 
The basic ontological problem outlined in Being and Nothingness is this dilemma faced 
by all human beings?4 "Alone, I can see myself as pure consciousness in a world of 
possible projects; the Other's look makes me see myself as an object in another 
perception" (Davis 325). According to Davis, when the subject is confronted with this 
threat to his being, to his freedom as consciousness, the task becomes to absorb this other: 
to make the Other an object for the self. As the quotation from Sartre at the onset of this 
chapter states: by denying the humanity of the Other, I deny my own humanity. This is 
the complex nature of subject-object relations; being-for-itself both receives its freedom 
(as action potential) and has its freedom threatened by the presence of other beings. The 
24 This issue is clearly, ifbriefly explained by Cynthia A. Davis in her analysis in 
Contemporary Literature, "Self, Society, and Myth in Toni Morrison's Fiction". She 
explores elements of Jean Paul Sartre in Morrison, and although she does not directly 
discuss Ellison, the pages devoted to Sartre have an admirable clarity about them. Her 
focus is primarily on the issue of "bad faith" and its relationship to racial identity in black 
characters from The Bluest Eye and The Song of Solomon. 
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resolution of this problem leads onward towards the freedom to pursue the endless 
possibilities of life, to go with Stephen Daedalus to "create the uncreated conscience of 
my race." 
The invisibility of the main character in Ellison's novel is a metaphor for the 
marginalized and the dehumanized 'outsiders' in society.25 Lieber describes Ellison's 
contribution to this literary theme as a groundbreaking synthesis of two previous 
approaches. The first deals with invisibility as inherent and involuntary, resulting from 
society's refusal to acknowledge the subject's humanity. The second metaphor deals with 
the issue of mask-wearing; here the mask wearer consciously adopts a false identity to 
hide the true self underneath the mask: 
Each of these metaphors has received full and complex treatment by 
black writers; in the dialogue centered about them, each has yielded a 
sense of both positive and negative potential; but in work prior to 
Invisible Man both metaphors have been essentially vehicles for an 
expression of anguish and despair. Ellison's primary contribution lies 
in the recognition that mask-wearing and inherent invisibility are related 
aspects of the same problem. With this insight he is able to fuse these 
two approaches, which for the most part have been treated separately, 
into a new imaginative synthesis and move beyond despair to an 
affirmative resolution ofthe difficulties and paradoxes involved in 
being an 'invisible man.' (Lieber 59) 
Richard Wright's Cross Damon consciously chooses his invisibility by feigning his own 
death. He assumes various masks, but he is never certain of the identity which lies 
beneath them. He experiences himself as primitive consciousness--as freedom unfettered 
25 For an enlightening and comprehensive study of this motif, see the article by 
Todd Lieber mentioned in a previous footnote: "The Metaphor of Invisibility in the Black 
Literary Tradition." 
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by relationships with the world around him. If Others do not see him, it is because he has 
chosen to hide his true identity. Their blindness to the truth about him is symbolic; the 
real difficulty is his own blindness to the truth about himself and about his need for 
relationships. Not until his death confronts him does he come to see reality about 
existence. In the impetus to grab his freedom, appropriating it by any means available-
flight from his family, murders, etc.-he misunderstands the truth. His own humanity lies 
in recognizing the humanity and freedom in those around him. Lieber is correct in 
recognizing the advances made by Ellison's narrator. His isolation has been a preparation 
to return to the world and participate in it with his new awareness. He does not have the 
"bad faith" of characters like Damon who ignore the truth central to existence. He loves 
light, he informs us in the early pages of the narrative, light "gives birth to my form. [ ... ] 
Without light I am not only invisible, but formless as well; and to be unaware of one's 
form is to live a death. I myself, after existing some twenty years, did not become alive 
until I discovered my invisibility" (IM 7). Light is symbolic, as it often is, of truth: "The 
truth is the light and the light is the truth" (7). The entire narrative is this search by the 
invisible man for the truth about himself and those around him, and part of this truth is the 
acceptance of his own responsibility: "I do not choose as I once did to deny the violence 
of my days by ignoring it" (italics mine, 1M 5). He comes to embrace life, with all its 
unknown experiences, in a Joycean moment in the Epilogue: 
So it is that now I denounce and defend, or feel prepared to defend. I 
condemn and affirm, say no and say yes, say yes and say no. I denounce 
because though implicated and partially responsible, I have been hurt to 
the point of abysmal pain, hurt to the point of invisibility. And I defend 
because in spite of all I find that I love. In order to get some of it down I 
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have to love. I sell you no phony forgiveness, I'm a desperate man-but 
too much of your life will be lost, its meaning lost, unless you approach 
it as much through love as through hate. So I denounce and I defend and 
I hate and I love. (IM 580) 
He goes forth, like Joyce, to take up the responsibility for giving form to the chaos, 
the nothingness of Being, not only for himself as individual but for his world "since 
there's a possibility that even an invisible man has a socially responsible role to 
play" (581). Of course it is only a beginning, but a more positive beginning than we 
have seen so far. It remains for the invisible man to decide what shape this life of his 
will take as he tries "belatedly to study the lesson of my own life" (572). His 
authentic existential awakening establishes the movement away from a life of "bad 
faith" and toward positive relationships with others. "Once we grant that the best life 
for man is a life in good faith, a life in which he does not hide from himself the 
reality of what he is, a life in which he will assume the responsibility of his freedom, 
then the fact that we both need others and recognize a duty toward them is 
inescapable" (Barnes 229). 
2.5 Morrison's Beloved: A Feminist Revisiting of Racial Oppression 
"Memory believes before knowing remembers" 
Light in August 
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In her article "Self, Society, and Myth in Toni Morrison's Fiction," Cynthia 
A. Davis addresses the issue of invisibility in Morrison's narratives.26 "The theme of 
invisibility is, of course, a common one in black American literature, but Morrison 
avoids the picture of the black person who is invisible in a white community by 
immersing "the reader in the black community; the white society's ignorance of that 
concrete, vivid, and diverse world is thus even more striking" (323). Blacks are 
visible to white culture only, Davis says, when they serve a particular need and fit a 
pattern of identity defined for them by whites. In this process they lose any sense of 
an individual identity; this is the innate invisibility that Todd Lieber elucidates. The 
issue is an existential one. As subject, each being comes to know himself through the 
gaze of the Other. As we have discussed previously, this encounter with the Other is 
at once a confirmation of one's existence as freedom and a threat to that freedom. 
"Alone, I can see myself as pure consciousness in a world of possible projects; the 
Other's look makes me see myself as an object in another perception"(Davis, 324-5). 
The tendency of some subjects to defme themselves literally through the eyes of 
others is strengthened in inverse proportion to the sense of power in one's own 
identity. Like the invisible man on his journey towards enlightenment, the subjects 
who allow others to define them are living in Sartrean "bad faith." 
26 Although this article was written before Morrison published Beloved it is 
significant to the topic of existentialism and therefore demanded consideration in 
"Freedom Fighters". Davis criticizes the fact that Morrison has not created a strong 
female heroine at this point; one wonders how she might respond to Beloved, but no 
article could be found on the topic. 
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Some characters, and that would include all of the black characters we have 
so far considered, fall into bad faith "by internalizing the 'Look' of the majority 
culture" (Davis 325). As we are about to discuss a female protagonist, for the first 
time in this study, it is relevant to note that this is particularly true of female subjects, 
whose objectification in our culture has been well documented. 27 Characters, such as 
Morrison's Sethe, that are black and female face particular challenges in any attempt 
to lead an authentic existence. One possible response to gain power is forbidden to 
them: they cannot even meet the eyes of the Other who threatens them with object 
status. Sartre explains this subject-object dialectic thus: 
It may be that I choose at the moment of my upsurge into the world to 
look at the look of the Other (whereupon the look and its objectifying 
power disappear, leaving only the eyes) and to build my subjectivity on 
the collapse of the Other's freedom (that is, therefore, on the Other-as-
object). (quoted in Streller 43) 
One common circumstance of black experience is the prohibition against staring directly 
at a white person. JanMohamed describes various cases where whites responded violently 
when a black "did not display the expected humble demeanor" (7). In fact, he states "that 
in the racialized relations between whites and blacks in the South nothing short of the 
absolutely total subservience of blacks was, in practice, demanded and, most important, 
policed by the threat of death" (7). Forced into subservience, it would seem that mask-
wearing is the only alternative open to such subjects. Resolution of the subject-object 
27 This issue will be more fully discussed in a Chapter Five. Various authors have 
dealt with this as it applies to existentialist thought, including the famous French 
philosopher and friend of Sartre-Simone de Beau voir. 
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conflict, in a mutual recognition of freedom, power, and need is not in the realm of 
possibility for these characters. How do they respond? 
"Power relations can have a similar effect on the community as a whole" (Davis 
327) as they do on the individuals within that community. The strength of the white 
ideology and of the white "Look" brings all blacks together in their objectification. 
Fredric Jameson, using the existential language of Sartre, explores this experience. 
It is only when I feel myself become an object along with someone else 
under the look of such a "third" that I experience my being as a "we-
object;" for then, in our mutual interdependency, in our shame and rage, 
our beings are somehow mingled in the eyes of the onlooker, for whom 
we are both somehow ''the same": two representatives of a class or a 
species, two anonymous types of something, two workers or 
intellectuals or Americans or whatever. Then my being is outside me, 
inextricably involved with that of my partner and his with mine, in that 
we share a common situation, face a common enemy, and submit to a 
mutual alienation or reification. (Marxism and Form 249i8 
In attempting to make the self more pleasing to the white gaze, some characters try to 
make themselves into whatever image they feel is expected of them. Davis explores this 
response in Morrison's The Bluest Eye and Song of Solomon. Although strictly speaking 
these characters are in "bad faith" by defming themselves, as Davis says, through the eyes 
of others, I cannot agree that it is accurate or fair to assert that ''they use others to escape 
their own responsibility to define themselves" (325).29 When the dominant Other is 
28 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectial Theories of 
Literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1971. Hereafter cited in text as "MF." 
29 Davis claims that Morrison's novels are "full of characters who try to live up to 
an external image-Dick and Jane's family, or cosmopolitan society, or big business. 
This conformity is not a disguise, but an attempt to gain power and control" (325). 
Attempting to live up to another's image of you, when that Other holds the power of life 
and death over you, does not appear much of a choice. "Mauvaise foi" involves a 
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permitted, by society's laws and mores, to establish rules by which one must live, one 
lives by them or risks death. As JanMohamed persuasively argues in his chapter on "The 
Culture of Social Death," the processes of subject formation of African-Americans are 
constantly affected by the terror of reprisal. This applies whether one considers actual 
slaves or those in the post-emancipation era, where there exists "a fundamental continuity 
in the process of coercion" (JanMohamed 5). His understanding of what he refers to as 
''the death-bound-subject" has been greatly informed by the works of Morrison. He 
admits: 
I would like to note that this tradition of African American literary 
meditation about the death-bound-subject evinces a fascinating 
transformation- from relatively "impersonal" meditations of the early 
slave narratives, such as those of Jacobs and Douglass, to progressively 
more "subjective" presentations ofthe fundamental experiences. This 
gradual shift, in which Wright occupies an important median point, 
reaches its climax generally in the work of Toni Morrison and most 
particularly in Beloved, which, by focusing so relentlessly and 
unsentimentally on an instance of infanticide that is fueled by 
undeniable maternal love, raises that aporetic structure of the death-
bound-subject to its excruciatingly painful and profoundly illuminating 
climax. It is impossible for me not to read and understand the entire 
tradition retrospectively through the lens of Beloved, and I must confess 
that I would probably have been unable to understand and analyze 
Wright's archaeology of death quite in the way that I have without the 
retrospective illumination provided by Beloved. (4) 
conscious refusal to face the truth of one's own existence. For some characters, such as 
Faulkner's Joe Christmas, living in good faith involves making the choice that freedom is 
more important than life. He voluntarily chooses death. Damon Cross also chooses death, 
although indirectly, and for the reason that he is unable to handle the responsibility that 
his freedom brings to him. Morrison's characters are, in general, less free-as females-
than either Christmas, Cross, or the "invisible man". 
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It is not possible to explore the depth of JanMohamed's argument here, since it 
constitutes his entire work. In short, the position of the black30 subject in a white 
dominated society is a complex one wherein the paradox of forced choice plays a 
substantial role in the process of subject formation. Participating in his own 
objectification, as he must under threat of death, this very participation asserts his own 
subjectivity. His coming to self-awareness, that is to say overcoming "bad faith," will be 
slow and painful, if it occurs at all. "In short, he will have to annihilate his old self and 
(re)form another one" (JanMohamed 22). Caught between despair and a desire for 
liberation, the black subject faces an intolerable position that leaves little room for choice. 
With Morrison's Beloved we can see how violent aggressive action in these situations can 
be seen as a form of working through resistance to this subjective process. The strength 
demanded of such subjects is poignantly suggested in these words of Wright: "'What 
quality of will must a Negro possess to live and die with dignity in a country that denied 
his humanity?'" (qouted in JanMohamed 34; emphasis by JanMohamed). Such a black 
character of strength and dignity is created by Toni Morrison in Sethe. 
Davis recognizes that "[t]he temptation to Bad Faith is immensely greater in a 
society that forcibly assigns subject power, the power to look and define, to one person 
over another" (326). This temptation to deny the truths about past and present are 
acknowledged by Morrison herself. In an interview given to Time magazine in 1989, the 
author comments that slavery is "something that the characters [in BelovedJ don't want to 
30 JanMohamed uses the terms black and slave interchangeably, since for his 
purposes in discussing subjective positions, they are analogous. See p. 5 for a complete 
explanation of this approach. 
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remember, I don 't want to remember, black people don't want to remember, white people 
don ' t want to remember" (Holden-Kirwam 120). Yet, she rewrites the black subject with 
this revisioning ofthe female slave's fight for freedom and dignity, for herself and for her 
children. In Beloved Sethe is forced to confront her horrific memories as well as those of 
her relatives: "While the end of slavery sought to transform objects (slaves) into subjects 
(free men and women), the characters in Beloved find the passage into subjectivity 
somewhat elusive" (Holden-Kirwam 416). This painful process, the search for the self, is 
the focus of Morrison's narrative. Having lived as a slave all her life, Baby Suggs has no 
sense of her identity as a mother, a daughter, a wife, or anything except an object 
belonging to her Master. Stripped of her identity as a mother, Sethe tries with ferocious 
intensity to hang onto whatever aspect of it she can grasp. Deprived of a relationship with 
her own mother, Sethe was denied the subjectivity of daughterhood. The absence of the 
mother' s presence, of the mother's mirroring gaze, is destructive to the child ' s creation of 
identity. Lacan' s mirror-stage affirms the significance of this to the development of the 
subject. As an adult, Sethe tries to assert her subjectivity through her own children, as a 
mother. She comes to realize, partially through the horrible scene of her lashing when 
they take her baby' s milk from her breasts, that as a slave she has no rights as a mother. It 
is for the children that Sethe seeks her freedom, and for her right to identify herself as 
their mother. When she kills her child rather than see her taken into slavery, she 
simultaneously asserts her freedom as maternal subject and her child's freedom as 
offspring subject. 
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JanMoharned explains the text's infanticide as ''the reflective subject's desire for 
freedom from his historical, determinate psychopolitical formation as a subject" (221 ). 
For Sethe the threat to her children's freedom is simultaneously a threat to her subject 
status as maternal protector, to the part of her she sees as "her best thing, her beautiful, 
magical best thing" (Beloved 251 ). 31 As she tries to persuade Beloved that killing the 
baby was an act of love, she recalls the scene where Schoolteacher is inculcating in his 
students the belief that blacks are more animal than human. This belief, supported by the 
works of various Enlightenment philosophers, made it possible for whites to rationalize 
their treatment of blacks, despite the ideals of liberty and equality for all.32 Sethe will not 
allow her children, or herself, to lose the hard won subject position: 
And no one, nobody on this earth, would list her daughter's 
characteristics on the animal side of the paper. No. Oh no. Maybe Baby 
Suggs could worry about it, live with the likelihood of it; Sethe had 
refused-and refused still. (B 251) 
Her struggles to begin to see herself as a human subject will not be in vain, she 
determines. The process allows her to love her children in a new way: "Looks like I 
loved em more after I got here. Or maybe I couldn't love em proper in Kentucky 
because they wasn't mine to love" (B 162). The killing of her child presents itself as 
the only way to prevent their return to object status: "I couldn't let all that go back to 
31 Toni Morrison. Beloved. New York: Knoph, 1987. Hereafter cited in text as 
"B." 
32 Cyrus R.K. Patell, a Professor at New York University, deals extensively with 
this topic in his informative work, Negative Liberties: Morrison, Pynchon, and the 
Problem of Liberal Ideology. He quotes from Morrison that slavery is the "anodyne of 
individualism" (84). "If individualism is the product ofthe Enlightenment, then for 
Morrison it is also the product of what she calls the Enlightenment's 'twin, born at the 
same time, the Age of Scientific Racism"' (84). 
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where it was, and I couldn't let her nor any of em live under schoolteacher. That was 
out" (B 163). She chooses freedom for herself and her children; making the choice 
for them that they are not able to make for themselves. She makes a tentative move 
forward towards her own being when Paul D. tells her at the end of the narrative: 
"You your best thing, Seth e. You are." She responds with a query full of incredulity, 
but touched with the stirrings of hope: "Me? Me?" (273). 
2.6 Writing Identity 
In his seminal work, What Else But Love: The Ordeal of Race in Faulkner 
and Morrison, Philip Weinstein asks the following valuable question: "What light 
does the [literary] practice ofthe white male Faulkner and the black female Morrison 
shed upon their culture's ways of understanding self and others" (157). He answers 
this question primarily from an aesthetic perspective, but the query itself raises issues 
which the theme of"Freedom Fighters" can address. One can hardly disagree with 
Weinstein's rather transparent claim that each novelist offers us a relational truth. 33 
Occupying different times and different spaces, as well as different racial 
experiences, they come from opposing perspectives. Yet Morrison has acknowledged 
her debt to Faulkner in a way that neither Wright nor Ellison was able to do. She 
33 Weinstein's analysis of the two authors and their selected works is informed by 
Kantian ideology based upon Kant's Critique of Judgment. The Kantian concern is with 
the justification of an aesthetic claim; the appeal needs to be a universal one and at the 
level of form. This discussion, while philosophically interesting in itself, has little bearing 
on the intent of this thesis; it does raise some interesting questions, however. 
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wrote her doctoral thesis on the white writer who expressed the dilemma of African-
Americans so eloquently that Jean-Paul Sartre chose Faulkner's words to illuminate 
his own philosophy of appropriated freedom. As Light in August reveals to the 
reader, subjects are defined in part by events they do not remember. Joe Christmas 
never becomes fully aware of the early events that shaped his personality and his 
responses to life events. Called a "little nigger bastard" by the dietitian at the 
orphanage and by other children, neither he nor we, as readers, ever know if he is, in 
fact, black. Accepting this view of himself, based on the gaze of the Other, Joe 
becomes exactly this by the conclusion of the narrative. He embraces this identity, in 
the way in which blacks in that society are forced to accept this outside 
determination. His freedom comes only from accepting it willingly and voluntarily 
approaching his own death. 
Not until Morrison, JanMohamed points out, is the black slave given true 
subject position in a narrative. Early slave narratives are too impersonal, he argues. 
No white person could provide that insight, not even Faulkner. I agree with him up to 
a point, but I would affrrm that Ellison's Invisible Man marks the fictional 
development of the black self-identified subject. Can such a subject, born with only 
object status, be free in the existential sense of the word? Is he/she in "bad faith," as 
Davis claims, due to the willingness to accept the Other's definition of himself as 
object? Answering these questions involves a consideration of Sartre's later work-
the Critique of Dialectical Reason. As critical theorist Fredric Jameson suggests, in 
Marxism and Form, most misinterpretations of Sartre's philosophy proceed from a 
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failure to see the Critique as a logical development from previous work. There is no 
contradiction between early and later works Jameson asserts: 
It is clear, however, that [ ... ] it will not logically be possible to 
describe the Critique as a radical break with the position of Being and 
Nothingness. The fact is that in genuinely Sartrean fashion the new 
book has changed the old; Being and Nothingness can no longer be 
read in the same way after its appearance. The idea of logical 
inconsistencies between the two positions is a static one: it is more 
satisfactory to think that the Critique comes to complete Being and 
Nothingness in certain basic areas where it remained abstract or 
insufficiently developed; and this act of completion, lifting all the 
problems onto a higher dialectical plane, ends by utterly transforming 
the very appearance of the earlier system. (209) 
Jameson' s commentary invites us to reconsider the concept of choice for the African-
American characters under discussion. Sartre's Being and Nothingness is essentially 
concerned with the subject rather than with his interaction in the community. The 
Critique concerns itself with "the collectives in and through which our individual lives 
are pursued" (MF 209). Sartre is laying the groundwork for the existential analysis which 
he promised at the end of Being and Nothingness, combining Freudian and Marxist ideas 
with his own existential philosophy. What appear to be class (or racial) conflicts, he 
confirms, will eventually be translated into the individual's psychological reality. 
"Clearly, the child is vitally absorbed in last year's social conflicts; his choice of self in 
the present takes place on the basis of the realities of the previous generation, namely 
that of his parents" (MF 219; italics are mine). 
Clearly, then, the ability ofthe black individual to come to subjectivity is 
informed by the experiences of a racially determined childhood. Deprived of parents 
who know themselves as subjects, the process of coming to know oneself as 
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freedom, in the existential sense, must be virtually impossible. Sethe observes to 
herself, having escaped from slavery: "Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming 
ownership of that freed self was another'' (B 95). Although it is true that the Other 
can limit one's experience of one's freedom in his defmition of"me" as object, 
Sartre discusses the result of this situation in different terms. 
We must recognize that we have just encountered a rea/limit to our 
freedom-that is a way of being which is imposed on us without our 
freedom being its foundation. Still it is necessary to understand this: 
The limit imposed does not come from the action of others. In a 
preceding chapter we observed that even torture does not dispossess us 
of our freedom; when we give in we do so freely. In a more general way 
the encounter with a prohibition in my path[ ... ] loses its peculiar force 
of compulsion only within the limits of my own choice and according to 
whether under any circumstances I prefer life to death or whether, on 
the contrary, I judge that in certain particular cases death is preferable to 
certain kinds of life, etc. (BN 672) 
The limit on the choices available to the individual makes the pursuit of freedom difficult, 
and probably violent, but not insurmountable. From Sartre's perspective the most violent 
action would be that of the white racists, and readers of the narratives discussed in this 
chapter will surely agree.34 
Sartre's discourse on colonialism provides us with an opening to further consider 
his position on racism. Ronald Santoni, respected philosopher and Sartre scholar, offers 
34 For a comprehensive analysis ofSartre's position on racism, colonialism, etc., 
see Aron' s History and the Dialectic of Violence. Aron, who had been a fellow student 
with Sartre at Ecole Normale Superieure, explores the philosopher's Marxism and 
discusses the various attacks on his position as represented in Being and Nothingness. 
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enlightenment on this subject in his evaluation of Critique I and its chapter on "Racism 
and Colonialism." 35 
Given his [Sartre's] profound sympathy for the oppressed, alienated, and 
disadvantaged, and his intense lifelong commitment--ontologically and 
politically-to human freedom, it is hardly surprising that he would, in certain 
circumstances, 'endorse' [ ... ] revolutionary movements that aim to dislodge 
oppressors and undo oppression, even if their activities suppress the freedom of 
capitalist, colonialist, bourgeois oppressors. (Santoni 167) 
It was this attitude expressed toward the Algerian War of Independence, as previously 
mentioned, which caused the rift between Sartre and his friend Camus. The 
rationalization and self-justification of the oppressors, evinced by the pseudo-scientific 
dehumanization of the Africans, ensure that they are, in Sartre's terms, in "bad faith." 
When the Other refuses to acknowledge you as subject, there can be no valid form of 
reasonable communication. This involves a mutual respect for the freedom of the Other. 
Without this, both self and Other are objectified and dehumanized. Within this situation, 
violence may be one of the few choices available to the self who endeavors to assert 
himself as subject. The other possible choice is love. It was love that Joe Christmas 
sought but never found. It is love which Cross Damon came close to finding at the end of 
his life. It is love towards which the invisible man turns out of sheer desperation. This 
love Paul D. longs for, as he recalls the words ofthe dead Sixo: "She is a friend of my 
mind. She gathers me, man. The pieces that I am, she gather them and give them back to 
me in all the right order. It's good you know when you got a woman who is a friend of 
your mind" (B 273). 
35 Santoni's Book, Sartre and Violence: Curiously Ambivalent, is at present the 
only comprehensive work on the subject. 
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Morrison's Beloved differs significantly from the other texts discussed here. 
Critics offer various perspectives on this variation, and since the novel is a complex 
one, there is surely some element of truth in each interpretation. For the purposes of 
the present thesis, though, what seems strikingly significant is the motif of love that 
runs through the novel and endows it with its title. The ghost that haunts the text is 
the fragmented subject, at once daughter and mother, dead and yet alive, past and 
present, and loving and angry all simultaneously. The narrative opens with the 
famous words of the apostle Paul in his letter to the Romans, words which speak of 
unification between people who hitherto were adversaries. 
I will call them my people, 
which were not my people; 
and her beloved, 
which was not beloved. 
Romans 9:25 
This suggests that the text which follows will be one of redemption and unity. 
Nicole Coonradt, in an insightful article based on the character of the white 
indentured servant, Amy Denver, carefully explores the relationship between Sethe and 
Amy. On her escape from Sweet Home, Sethe hides as she perceives what she thinks is a 
white boy approaching. This boy is in fact Amy, a servant girl who has experienced many 
of the same abuses as has Sethe, and is also attempting to escape her cruel existence. 36 
36 Coondart explains that such servitude was abolished with the same Amendment 
with which slavery was abolished, revealing the analogous lack of freedom each girl 
shared. 
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Amy saves the life of Sethe and that of her unborn baby, whom Sethe names Denver, 
after her Good Samaritan. It is this relationship with a caring white person which allows 
for some lessening of the hatred naturally engendered by the treatment at the hands of 
Schoolteacher and his men. Coonradt reminds us that Amy, from the French "Aimee," 
also means Beloved. Her kindness and her humanity enable Sethe to remain alive in spirit 
as well as in body: 
It was the voice full of velvet and Boston and good things to eat that urged 
her along and made her think that maybe she wasn't, after all, just a crawling 
graveyard for a six-month baby's last hours. (B 34) 
Sethe later affirms to Paul D: "When I got here, when I jumped down off that wagon-
there wasn't nobody in the world I couldn't love ifl wanted to" (162). Amazingly, she 
has escaped with her ability to love still intact. Surely, this symbolizes the future 
integration, and eventual healing, of the subject. When being-for-itself seeks to know 
itself as freedom through the Other, and yet without violence, love is the medium. 
Nicole Coonradt offers this timely quote from Morrison: 
Actually, I think, all the time that I write, I'm writing about love or its 
absence. Although I don't start out that way ... But I think that I still write 
about the same thing, which is how people relate to one another and miss it 
or hang on to it ... or are tenacious about love. (4) 
Love is the theme, then, that provides Morrison's Beloved with a character-subject who 
is engaged in the healing process. There is revealed a possibility of a bridge between the 
races, a connection based on the recognition of the Other's freedom and humanity. It will 
be difficult, painful, and fraught with violence; "[a]nything dead coming back to life 
hurts" (B 35). In Denver's words, this is a truth for all times. 
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The question posed by Weinstein and quoted at the opening ofthis section, asks 
what Morrison can teach about the African-American search for identity. One central 
lesson is that often asserted by Sartre: when one refuses to accept the humanity of the 
Other, one dehumanizes oneself as well. Respect for, and recognition of the freedom of 
the Other is central to experiencing such freedom in the self. Morrison's Amy Denver 
stands as a white person who teaches Sethe that such recognition of humanity, across the 
races, is possible. Seeing her humanity, reflected in Amy, Sethe rejects Schoolteacher's 
identification of her as an animal. She embraces herself as subject, as mother, and accepts 
her "terrible freedom" to choose for her "crawling already? baby." With her "too thick" 
Jove, she affirms her child's right, as human being-for-itself, to be free from enslavement. 
Every individual is always more than his/her history, for in existential terms the 
subject exists as a "becoming." Human conflict is defined by the dialectical struggle 
between the concepts of fraternity and violence. The hard won liberty of the African-
American race, the right to be free from slavery, instantiates the essential nature of human 
freedom and brotherhood. Without the conscious awareness of such freedom, man is, in 
the words of Rousseau, "everywhere in chains." More insidious threats to human freedom 
have arisen in the last century, threats that are all the more dangerous because they 
frequently go unrecognized as such. It is to these new chains that my thesis now directs 
itself. 
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Chapter Three 
Corporate Raiders: Violence on Wall Street 
It is the violence of the majority's need that is the rich man's necessity 
for counter-violence. 
Santoni 
In a capitalistic economy dominated by multinational corporations where the 
profit is supreme, where decentralized decision-making diffuses responsibility, 
where the quest for economic success and security are managerial imperatives, 
and where a company engineer or corporate manager is more absorbed by the 
constraints of carrying out his or her specific tasks than by the probable results of 
those tasks, evil takes on a certain banality. 
Hills 
3.1 Freedomfrom Consumer Capitalism 
To tum from fictional representations of the horrific violence perpetrated against 
African Americans and begin to speak of a less corporeal violence seems almost 
irreverent. Yet there is a very different sort of violent behavior that itself engenders 
physical rage and ferocity. In her article on the incorporeal aspects of violence, the 
philosopher Eleanor Kaufman briefly draws attention to ''the abstract and less overtly 
corporeal violence of a state or a multinational class that dominates those who are less 
powerful" (14). In Kaufman's view, the two manifestations ofviolence are analogous to 
distinctions drawn by Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison System. 
Foucault expands on these dissimilarities as different mechanisms of organizing power. 
The sovereign power over the life and death of subjects, held by the old monarchs, might 
be compared to the direct forms of violence described in the texts considered in the 
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foregoing chapter. The modem disciplinary structures, such as prisons and schools, can 
be compared to the more indirect, although no less violent, control exerted by the 
consumer culture of late capitalism. 
Consumerism is so entrenched in our society that we rarely reflect on its 
consequences. We know that the capitalist system requires consumers to purchase the 
items that seem indefatigably produced, we laugh at the advertisers' efforts to stimulate 
our acquisitiveness, yet rarely do we consider the effects on ourselves as individuals or on 
our social systems. Were a survey done to inquire into the root cause of violent crime in 
North American society, most responses would point a fmger at the poverty among racial 
minorities. Sue McGregor's article, "Consumerism as a Source of Structural Violence", 
pinpoints consumerism itself as the source of much of the violence in America. When the 
identity of self as subject depends on the ability to purchase 'things', what happens to the 
freedom so integral to man's existence? What is created by the system is a new form of 
slavery-slaves of the market. How does one escape from this form of slavery? 
When one speaks of the need for the liberation of a group of people, the general 
assumption is that the group in question consists of the working classes, the downtrodden, 
racial minorities, or some other underclass. Famous philosopher from the Frankfurt 
School, Hebert Marcuse, addresses the need for liberation from "a relatively well-
functioning, rich, powerful society" (Marcuse 264). Such a society, taking the U.S. as the 
model, is characterized by the "apparently inseparable unity ... ofproductivity and 
destruction, of satisfaction of needs and repression, of liberty within a system of 
servitude" (Marcuse 268; italics are mine). Such servitude in the face of the possibilities 
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of freedom, says Marcuse, "activates and intensifies in this society a primary 
aggressiveness to a degree, I think, hitherto unknown in history" (Marcuse, 268; italics 
are mine). Considering the increase in almost anonymous violence, such as we see in 
school shootings, perhaps the time has come to reconsider some of the warnings made by 
Marcuse and others. 
In his comprehensive and often quoted critique of American capitalism, The 
Culture of Narcissism, Christopher Lasch considers the cultural consequences of subjects 
who determine themselves not only by the Other's gaze, but by possession ofthings. "His 
apparent freedom from family ties and institutional constraints does not free him to stand 
alone or to glory in his individuality. On the contrary, it contributes to his insecurity, 
which he can overcome only by seeing his 'grandiose self reflected in the attentions of 
others, or by attaching himselfto those who radiate celebrity, power, and charisma" 
(Lasch 1 0). Furthermore, says Lasch, this insecurity and its repression lead to individuals 
who are outwardly "bland" and sociable but who "seethe with an inner anger" for which 
there are few outlets. Denial and rationalization are rampant, and psychiatry, at least as 
presently practiced in North America, offers people any number of excuses for their 
asocial behaviour. 
From Theodre Dreiser's Sister Carrie to E. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby 
writers have portrayed the evils of capitalist consumerism in their narratives. The 
characters of these novels possess a restlessness, and an acquisitiveness, that results in 
death and in the destruction of ideals. Novels of the late 20th century reveal the changing 
culture of what Jameson calls "late capitalism." Characters are still acquisitive, in fact 
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ever more so, but the restlessness has been replaced by alienation, anxiety, and ennui. 
Death becomes a central motif in these "blank fictions," a term I borrow from James 
Annesley. Such texts concern themselves chiefly with violence, inter-textual mass-
cultural references, and with meaningless sex. 37 The postmodern moment often appears 
devoid of a humanizing moment. 
American consumer culture has constructed commercial desire not as an index of 
"real" consumer needs but as a dynamic produced by commercial institutions bent on 
reproducing capital. Contrary to original assumptions, commercial advertising didn't 
generate the freedom of choice typically ascribed to American capitalism - it precisely 
foreclosed it. The advent of commercial culture, Lasch argues, denied ''the American 
people access to insight into other ways of organizing and conceiving life, insight that 
might have endowed their consent to the dominant culture (if such consent were given at 
a11) with real democracy" (xv). Cultural critics of the Frankfurt School, such as Marcuse 
and Adorno, were open critics ofthe commodity form. 38 The artificial needs created by 
the commodities market are never satisfied and result in a cynicism and discontent with 
the culture. We see the literary result in the "blank fictions" of the day; we see the social 
37 For an interesting discussion ofthe central self-absorbed themes of late 20th 
century fiction, see James Annesley's Blank Fictions: Culture and the Contemporary 
American Novel. 
38 Shane Gunster offers an inclusive exploration ofthe critical theory of Culture 
Studies in his seminal work: Capitalizing on Culture. Acknowledging the profound 
influence of commodity forms on all contemporary forms of culture, this book offers a 
particular focus on the ideology of Adorno, issues of political economy and "the evolving 
relationship between culture and capitalism". 
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result in the aimless, destructive violence that has become a regular part of contemporary 
existence in America. 
Neurotic repression through repetition does not always succeed in 
completely managing the rage, frustration, and disappointment aroused 
by the broken promises of the culture industry and capitalism itself.[ ... ] 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Benjamin are fond of citing the tortures of 
Tantalus and Sisyphus as reborn in a never-ending circle by which 
desire is invoked by capitalism only to be denied. When the rage and 
frustration inspired by this contradiction break through the barriers 
erected by the repetition compulsion, they are redirected away from that 
which causes them toward more helpless targets. (Gunster 61) 
The subject, "lost in the funhouse," seeks outlets in the form of socially direct~d anger, 
frequently in some act of socially accepted prejudice, or through individual acts of 
violence. 
3.2 Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities: A Tale of Two Cities 
The "banality of evil" phrase, referenced above, originates with philosopher 
Hannah Arendt and is chillingly portrayed by the 'anti-hero' ofBret Easton Ellis' 
controversial novel, American Psycho. It is heralded, though, by Tom Wolfe's capitalist 
hero in Borifire of the Vanities. Each narrative presents a character firmly ensconced in 
the upper echelons ofthe corporate world, each ofthem "working" on New York's Wall 
Street. Here the god of profit is worshipped above all others and humanity is buried under 
his sacrificial ashes. Although willing to believe almost anything about senior executives 
in the fmancial world, most readers fmd the extremes of these characters are only 
partially credible. Yet a perusal of real-life situations in the world of high finance reveals 
how realistic these narratives actually are. In his book Corporate Violence: Injury and 
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Death for Profit, Stuart Hills asserts that senior positions in corporate America seem to 
demand what Hills refers to as "non-demanding moral codes"(l94). The same forces that 
generate pressure to achieve profit by any means create individuals who are immune to 
the normal considerations of humanity, who have no empathy or conscience - who are in 
fact psychopaths. As one auto executive claimed, as he explained his refusal to use safety 
glass to reduce injuries: "We are not a charitable institution ... we are trying to make a 
profit for our stockholders" (191). 
Bonfire of the Vanities is a novel about the fact that "[p]rosperity and freedom can 
lead, in the same moment that it [sic]shines this brilliant light, to tremendous excesses and 
to extreme forms of individualism, one form being vanity" (Wolfe "Interview with 
Moyers" 274). Identifying this moment as a relatively benign form of money fever, 
novelist Tom Wolfe himself seems to be unaware of the corruption and inherent danger 
that his novel reveals. During an interview with Wolfe, Bill Moyers argues with the 
author on this issue: "But it's more than vanity, and it's more than money. It's utter 
amorality that pervades that picture ofNew York" (275). Wolfe responds that ''there is no 
corruption in the broad sense of people being bribed"; Moyers tartly reacts: "That's the 
old fashioned kind [of corruption]." One cannot help but sense that the reality portrayed 
in the novel is more clearly understood by the reviewer than by the novelist. However, the 
novel speaks- even shouts- its message of capitalist corruption, with or without the 
author's awareness. Wolfe set out to write a novel of realism in the manner ofEmile Zola 
or Henry Miller, a sort of documentary of life in America's New York City during the 
1980s. He seems to channel the reality without grasping its implications. 
81 
This narrative is what Liam Kennedy refers to as "a novel of urban decline."39 
"In the 1980s and 1990s the discourse of urban decline has served to focus anxieties 
about the dissolution ofthe national culture, about citizenship and about race relations" 
(Kennedy 4). Also of major concern is the fate ofthe white individual, besieged by crime, 
violence, delinquency, etc. associated with the urban ghettos. "Applied to the underclass, 
the metaphor of urban decline associates spatial deprivation and decay with the 
pathological separateness of black ghetto poverty" (Kennedy 5). It is, Kennedy suggests, 
a new form of 'spatial apartheid' obsessed with social security systems and other 
boundaries to keep the Other out. The dominant feeling of subject-subject encounters is 
one of fear; the response is to avoid contact, producing increasing isolation. Early in 
Bonfire of the Vanities we see this attitude in Sherman McCoy, as he walks to a phone 
booth at night to call his mistress: 
All at once Sherman was aware of a figure approaching him on the 
sidewalk, in the wet black shadows of the town houses and the trees. 
Even from fifty feet away, in the darkness, he could tell. It was that 
deep worry that lives in the base of the skull of every resident of Park 
Avenue south ofNinety-sixth Street-a black youth, tall, rang6', wearing 
white sneakers. (Bonfire of the Vanities 17; italics are mine)4 
39 Kennedy's important sociological study of racial issues in American cities, 
Race and Urban Space in Contemporary American Culture, is useful for anyone wishing 
to understand this complex issue. Its focus is on the creation of identities-individual, 
social, and national. It explores "the ways in which changed subjectivities are being 
articulated in literary and cultural texts, themselves subject to change." Although my 
main interest lies with a section in Chapter I, "'It's the Third World Down There': The 
Bonfire of the Vanities," the entire text informs my understanding of the issues. 
40 Thomas Wolfe, Bonfire ofthe Vanities. New York: Farrer, Straus, and Giroux, 
1989. Hereafter cited in text as "BV." 
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Nevertheless, McCoy thinks aggressively to himself that it is, after all, his territory. This 
defensive aggression defmes the events that take place in the narrative. Through these 
intersubjective encounters, the characters' identities are constructed and revealed. One 
aspect of Sherman's identity, in contrast to the literary characters of the previous chapter, 
is that of whiteness. 
"Drawing attention to 'whiteness' in narrative representation has become a 
common interest in literary, film, and cultural studies in recent years"; this 'whiteness' 
"functions as the invisible norm of dominant cultural values and assumptions while 
concealing its dependency on racialised others" (Kennedy 17). As Sartre remarked in 
a discussion concerning prejudice, "If the Jew did not exist, the anti-semite would have to 
invent him" (Barnes 66). The determination of white Americans to view African 
Americans as Other persists after the abolition of slavery, and even after the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s. The perspective of existentialism accuses such a prejudiced 
subject of living in "bad faith," which is essentially a refusal to recognize the truths of 
one's own existence. Such a subject, says Sartre, is seeking for some final and absolute 
justification for his existence; there is none, of course, and this engenders fear and rage. 
This fear is projected onto the Other: 
He is afraid of himself, or more accurately he is afraid to face the fact 
that he does not have a self in any final sense but that he is a limitless 
freedom which is constantly making a self. This endless pursuit of a self 
with which he can never quite coincide is too much for him. Moreover, 
he is afraid of the truth, not of any particular truth, but of the very nature 
oftruth, 'an indefinite approximation.' (Barnes 69) 
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Unable to accept the responsibility for his own self-identity, the racist seeks for some 
immovable sign of his superior identity, something that is permanently his without effort. 
For many of the white characters considered in my thesis, the colour of their skin 
becomes this defining, unalterable mark of the selfs superiority. 
Wolfe, says Kennedy, constructs not a realist novel ofNew York's urban totality, 
but "a narrative of two cities - represented by the black Bronx and white Wall Street/Park 
A venue-and focalizes all the action through the consciousness of white protagonists" 
(22). The novel begins with the speech of the white Mayor of the city to the black Harlem 
audience. As they begin to heckle him, the Mayor becomes increasingly panicked and 
allows his bodyguards to lead him off the stage. He thinks angrily of all the whites who 
depend on him to keep them safe: 
Do you really think this is your city any longer? Open your eyes! The 
greatest city of the twentieth century! Do you think money will keep it 
yours? Come down from your swell co-ops, you general partners and 
merger lawyers. It's the Third World down there! (BV 7) 
Everyone else is expecting him to hold offthe barbarians at the gate. 
The white elite are the central subjects of this narrative, as they are with most of 
Wolfe's writings- fiction and non-fiction. Central to the novel is the conflict between 
wealthy white Americans and what Joshua Masters in "Race and the Infernal City" refers 
to as ''the increasingly racialized Other" (209). The focus on whiteness as a threatened 
minority is personified by Sherman McCoy, the "beleaguered white male" who must 
resist the onslaught of the minority races, identified by the racial stereotypes that signify 
the system such as Weiss, the Jew, and Bacon, the black. Threatened by the "Other," the 
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Third World that is the city, Sherman eventually becomes the savage Other 
"appropriating the savage's brutish violent behaviour and embracing the law of the 
'Jungle"' (Masters 223). Perceiving himself as persecuted and oppressed, Sherman 
changes from a liberal who gives the Black Panther salute at the beginning of his trial, to 
a new white warrior taking up the fight ''to reclaim his 'birthright' from the 'ungodly' 
hordes" (Ibid). 
Such a narrative, while pronouncing the supposed end of white urban dominance, 
may pronounce, as Masters fears, the advent of a new order of violent white response to 
these threats from the "barbarian hordes." The presentation of a white male as a fragile 
and besieged identity, as Sherman appears in Wolfe's novel, is the inversion of the black 
male's literary presence as terminally threatened subject. Little has been written about 
this aspect of racial construction, and my present work can do no more than acknowledge 
its existence and point to its significance. "The critical study of whiteness and white 
privilege is a relatively new phenomenon, stemming largely from the emergence and 
development of critical race theory" (Brown 3).41 Liam Kennedy, in recognizing Wolfe's 
Bonfire of the Vanities as a novel ofurban decline in America, asserts that the narrative 
holds whiteness to function "as the invisible norm of dominant cultural values and 
assumptions while concealing its dependency upon racialised others;" it is both 
everything and nothing (17). Kennedy sees the paranoia that is revealed in American 
41 Although a thorough discussion on whiteness as a constructed concept is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, a study is available in The Literature of Immigration and 
Racial Formation: Becoming White, Becoming Other, Becoming American in the Late 
Progressive Era, by Linda Joyce Brown. New York: Routledge. 2004. 
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novels of urban decline as representative of the breakdown, in Freudian terms, of subject-
object boundaries. He explores this theme through the spacial trope, whereas I consider 
the breakdown of boundaries as the impetus that threatens individual freedom, resulting 
in a corresponding need to appropriate the freedom of the Other. Consumerism 
contributes to this fragmentation. 
In his article, "Tom Wolfe: Material Boy," Richard Cooper Rand sums up 
Wolfe' s opus in these words: 
No other writer-living or dead-can touch Wolfe on his subject. What 
his characters wear, what they drive (or wish they drove), where they 
went to school (or didn't), how much they earn (and why it's never 
enough), their beer of choice, music of choice, living room furniture of 
choice: he engages the hermeneutics of status with the crazed 
comprehensiveness of an idiot savant (or a Ph.D. from Yale). So too 
the narcissism, megalomania, and general churning anxiety that 
comprise the personal pathology of status. (13) 
Tom Wolfe, Rand reports, is not really interested in complexities; he does not ''write the 
whole person." In this he is definitely a forerunner ofthe postmodern novel , where 
everything exists on the surface and the subject is fragmented. 
The shallowness of the postmodem subject might partially result from the loss of 
any sense of shared identity with the past. Walter Benn Michaels, in The Shape of the 
Signifier, outlines the difference between two novels, Morrison' s Beloved and Ellis' 
American Psycho; the distinction he explores is centered on the relationship between 
generations. Michaels maintains that in the former narrative, identity is transferred from 
one generation to another, whereas in American Psycho the only inheritance is one of 
property rather than a sense of generational identity. Michaels' remarks can be 
extrapolated to include Wolfe' s Bonfire of the Vanities. Sherman McCoy inherits, along 
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with money, merely a sense of entitlement; he is "as imperious as his daddy" (BV 1 0). 
What is not transmitted, in Ellis or Wolfe, is the sense of a shared and significant past 
such as Morrison's Denver receives from her mother Sethe' s stories of slavery. Ellis, one 
is led to suspect, is following in Wolfe's shadow: pursuing the subject to the extreme 
fragmentation wherein he no longer exists as an identity at all.42 Wolfe's Sherman 
exhibits an obsession with status, with his own superiority, and with his inalienable right 
to his own narcissistic morality. Contemplating the moral dilemma of having both a 
mistress and a wife, he thinks to himself''that I, a Master of the Universe, a young man 
still in the season of the rising sap, deserve more from time to time, when the spirit moves 
me" (BV 13). He exists in a world of signifiers; the origin of a new narrative begins to 
make its appearance. This style is heralded in Walter Benn Michaels' description of 
Ellis's American Psycho: 
It's this interest in money and class rather than culture and race that 
establishes American Psycho as the novel of manners (rather than 
mores) it declares itself [ ... ] what people interested in these questions 
belong to is a class instead of a culture-what brings them together is 
their money. (Michaels 150) 
The threat to these capitalist characters, like Sherman McCoy and Patrick 
Bateman, lies in the scarcity around them and the conformity required ofthem. 
Tony Stigliano expounds on this position: "Violence is pervasive, for Sartre, 
42 In an interview with Jaime Clarke, Bret Easton Ellis discusses his literary 
influences at length. A prodigious reader, he does not cite Wolfe as one of those he has 
particularly admired. Nevertheless, my thesis suggests various unmistakable similarities 
between Borifire of the Vanities and American Psycho. 
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because it is characteristic of the process by which individuals spontaneously 
organize themselves in the face of scarcity or threat" (53). 
Bonfire of the Vanities, similarly to American Psycho, is replete with all 
the consumerism one might expect from a story focused on a wealthy stock-
broker on Wall Street. We are treated to frequent and extensive descriptions of 
clothes, of furniture, and of the physical attributes of different characters. 
Sherman thinks of his father as having "a manly chin, a big round chin such as 
Yale men used to have in those drawings by Gibson and Leyendecker, an 
aristocratic chin, if you want to know what Sherman thought. He was a Yale man 
himself' (BV 11). He describes his wife coldly, while rationalizing his affair 
with a younger woman: 
But the smile on her face was obviously genuine, altogether pleasant. .. 
a lovely smile, in fact .. . Still a very good-looking woman, my 
wife ... with her fine thin features, her big clear blue eyes, her rich 
brown hair ... But she 'sforty years old! ... No getting around it ... Today 
good-looking ... Tomorrow they' 11 be talking about what a handsome 
woman she is ... Not her fault.. .But not mine either! (BV 10). 
His apartment has "twelve-foot ceilings ... two wings, one for the white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants who own the place and one for the help." It is, he knows, the sort of place ''the 
mere thought of which ignites flames of greed and covetousness under people all over 
New York and, for that matter, all over the world" (BV 10). Surrounded by scarcity, by 
the ''third world down there," Sherman senses that his privileged position is decidedly 
threatened. It is a hunt-or-be-hunted existence, as he sees it, and he does not intend to 
lose. 
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The title ofthis narrative, Bonfire of the Vanities, offers insight into the author's 
vision for his work. It is informed by the edict pronounced by the prophet Savonarola 
during the Renaissance. Savonarola of Florence was a prophet of doom and repentance. 
Disgusted by the decadence which the residents of Florence exhibited, he ordered the 
destruction by fire of personal adornments considered signs of vanity, signs which he 
believed to reflect the decadence of the times. From this choice of title, Joshua Masters 
infers that Wolfe's "novel shares a similar prophetic vision of the city, one capable of 
illuminating the corruption and decay of contemporary American values, beliefs and 
practices" (209). However, Wolfe's novel offers no redemption, claims Masters, but 
rather illuminates the triumph of the apocalyptic city. In Savonarola's Florence the people 
repent and willingly sacrifice their adornments to the bonfire, whereas Wolfe's city is set 
aflame by jealousy from without and greed from within. Class domination is depicted by 
the prophet of Florence as a form ofvampirism, wherein the corpulent bodies ofthe 
wealthy feed on the blood ofthe poor. In Bonfire the fear ofbeing devoured, expressed by 
the paranoia of McCoy, masks the actual desire to devour the Other. In the end Sherman 
is himself devoured by the system, a powerful commentary on the capitalistic system 
which feeds on its own. Made into a sacrificial offering to the "barbarian hordes," he 
finds that "[t]here's no such thing as loyalty on Wall Street. .. I don't exist at Pierce and 
Pierce anymore" (BV 550). He realizes that his sense of self has been determined by the 
"gaze" of the Other and by the objects which he owns. In a discussion with his lawyer, he 
attempts to explain the sense of loss that results when all that he has taken for granted is 
suddenly stripped away from him: "It's damned sobering how fast it goes when it goes" 
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(BV 550). Without the status that defined him, people he assumed were friends will no 
longer respond to his calls: 
I can't explain the feeling. All I can tell you is that I'm already dead, 
or the Sherman McCoy of the McCoy family and Yale and Park 
A venue and Wall Street is dead. Your self-I don't know how to 
explain it, but if, God forbid, anything like this ever happens to you, 
you'll know what I mean. Your self. .. is other people, all the people 
you're tied to, and it's only a thread. (BV 551) 
In the capitalist system, one misstep can lead to a fall that results in being trampled by the 
herd of opportunists racing for their piece of the urban pie. As Sherman McCoy fmds, it is 
too easy to be consumed by the fires ignited by oneself. 
Masters sees no redemption in this novel. On the contrary, for him, the message is 
one that evokes white supremacy. He draws our attention to Sherman's violence at the 
end of the narrative, when he has accepted that all is lost and joins in the brutish 
behaviour of the underclass. No longer fearful of the Other, he now openly confronts him: 
"Sherman sought out their faces, as if to obliterate them with his very eyes" (BV 685). 
His gaze now threatens the freedom of the Other. Masters remarks that this is the most 
dangerous message of the novel: 
Sherman, The Great White Defendant rising phoenix-like from the 
ashes ofthe smouldering city, evokes a similar longing for a "new 
order'' of stronger, fiercer white males willing to accept the urban 
apocalypse as a utopian field of battle. Thus while the novel 
announces the end to an era of "white" supremacy, it also marks the 
beginning of a new urban struggle, sure to be just as terrifying as the 
last. (Masters 224) 
Masters might well be right. In the next novel that centers on a stocks-and-bonds trader 
in New York City, the main character is not on the defensive, but on the attack. 
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3.3 Ellis's American Psycho: New Notes from Underground 
Sexuality and violence, in life and in literature, have themselves become a 
significant part of the cultural system, as commodified as any other source of capital. 
Contemporary novelists like Bret Easton Ellis incorporate into their work the violent 
sexuality that surrounds them. The controversial novel by Ellis, American Psycho, created 
quite an unusual furor on its initial release. Despite two previous successful novels, Ellis' 
publishers (Simon & Schuster) canceled this third work on the eve of its release in 1990, 
due to corporate pressure. Organizations such as the National Organization of Women 
demanded a general boycott of the novel following its eventual release by Knopf in 1991. 
After publication there were continued calls for censorship, sometimes accompanied by a 
demand for the author's castration. As one might expect, keeping in mind the dictum that 
no publicity is bad publicity, such responses simply increased the book's desirability as a 
trendy consumer item, its hyper-violence making it so much grist for the corporate mill. I 
argue, with others such as Alex E. Blazer, that our society must assume some 
responsibility for the appearance, textually or otherwise, of a character such as the novel's 
anti-hero. In this chapter I explore both the capitalist critique and the existential position 
put forth in American Psycho. Ellis' epigraph from Dostoevsky explains the novel as an 
effort "to clarify the reasons why he appeared and was bound to appear in our midst" (AP 
3). The first section will consider the issue of psychopathy in today's society and its 
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implications for Patrick Bateman in American Psycho. Inherent in this consideration is 
the novel's critique of consumer culture in late capitalism. The final section considers the 
philosophy of existentialism and its dominating role in this piece of fiction. My thesis is 
that, far from being a gratuitous collection of sadistic pornography, Ellis' novel contains 
powerful observations regarding a social system that can spawn such a violent, 
narcissistic character. As Jean-Paul Sartre has observed there are "no witnesses to 
violence, only participants" (Santoni 39). Reactions from readers of this novel imply that 
they do indeed feel implicated in the violence as presented in the text. This must be 
reason enough to grant Ellis' work more than the cursory condemnation it has generally 
received in the critical literature. 
3.4 Psychopaths, the Real and Hyperreal 
Serial killers have long fascinated the North American reading/viewing public. 
Ellis's central character and narrator is named Patrick Bateman, an obvious allusion to the 
infamous Norman Bates of the Hitchcock classic, Psycho. Norman is a psychotic who 
functions normally on the surface, and might unknowingly be your neighbour. Patrick 
Bateman (bait-man) is a serial killer who might, unbeknownst to you, be your yuppie 
stockbroker. These works reveal the advancement of 'psycho' portrayals from the 
management of a small family Inn (Psycho) to managing millions of dollars on Wall 
Street (American Psycho). He's come a long way, baby! Other variations between these 
works include the detail that the psych in psycho no longer stands for psychotic: the new 
buzzword is psychopath. There are no Freudian suggestions of an oedipal fixation, no 
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mother issues for our new psycho. We are never given any obvious explanation as to why 
Bateman feels the need to kill. In a world made all too familiar with psychopathic killers 
via the media - recall the recent BTK horrors - we accept that this is simply what 
psychopaths do. Psychiatry is still struggling to understand the predisposing factors that 
may contribute to the development of such monstrous persons, while ruefully admitting 
that there is no form of treatment known to alter their personalities. 
One contributing factor, which cannot be ignored, is consumerism. In an article on 
American Psycho and postmodem thought, Alex E. Blazer suggests that "[o]ur obsession 
with consumerism is psychologically fatal; underneath the narcissist lies ... the sociopath." 
Where in society are the most intransigent narcissists certain to be found? The foremost 
specialist on psychopaths knows. Dr. Robert Hare from Vancouver B.C. is the author of 
Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us. He half-
jokingly claims that, had he not been able to study psychopathy in the penal system, the 
Vancouver Stock Exchange would have been his second choice. Quite a few white-collar 
criminals are psychopathic, says Hare. Since psychopaths love chaos and hate rules they 
are naturally comfortable in the fast-moving world of the modern corporation: 
[T]hey flourish because the characteristics that defme the disorder are 
actually valued [in the corporate environment]. When they get caught, 
what happens? A slap on the wrist, a six-month ban from trading, and 
don't give us the $100 million back. I've always looked at white-collar 
crime as being as bad [as other crime]. (Hare 222) 
Hare defmes psychopathy as "a socially devastating disorder defined by a constellation of 
affective, interpersonal, and behavioural characteristics, including egocentricity; 
impulsivity; irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse; 
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pathological lying; manipulativeness; and the persistent violation of social norms and 
expectations" (188). Of the cluster of distinctive personality traits described as 
psychopathic, the one most often in the foreground of forensic psychiatric discussion is an 
utter lack of conscience. In today's cynical world, we expect very little in the way of 
ethics from lawyers, politicians, or especially businessmen, often with good reason. We 
have been shown repeatedly that 'looking out for number one' is often the prevailing 
professional goal; profit margins have replaced any humanistic concerns on the Wall 
Streets ofthe Western World. "In a capitalistic economy dominated by multinational 
corporations where the profit is supreme, where decentralized decision-making diffuses 
responsibility, where the quest for economic success and security are managerial 
imperatives, and where a company engineer or corporate manager is more absorbed by 
the constraints of carrying out his or her specific tasks than by the probable results of 
those tasks, evil takes on a certain banality'' (Hills 8). 
This dullness is chillingly obvious in Ellis' anti-hero. Much of the novel's 
discourse is presented in a tone expressing boredom with even the most horrifying events. 
During a particularly brutal murder Patrick says: 
I can already tell that it's going to be a characteristically useless, 
senseless death, but then I'm used to the horror. (American Psycho 329)43 
Bateman and his acquaintances pride themselves on their imperviousness to shock. When 
people ask Patrick what he wants to do while out on the town he responds with some 
disgustingly vile and violent fantasy; "Well, yeah, but besides that," they quip (AP 313). 
43 Bret Easton Ellis, American Psycho. New York: Vintage Contemporaries, 1991. 
Hereafter cited in text as "AP." 
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Responding to his girlfriend's whining query as to why she could not come to his place 
the previous evening, Bateman yawns and says, "Because your neighbor's head was in 
my freezer" (118). Even the beauty of the natural world cannot reach Patrick: "I keep 
studying her face, bored by how beautiful it is ... " (125). Nothing registers. No one listens. 
No one cares. No one seems to be there at all. No wonder that our narrator feels himself 
invisible. He exists in a postmodern world of images, slipping and sliding across a sea of 
signifiers (Blazer 98). He spends the novel alternately drowning in this sea of signifiers, 
of television talk shows, clothing stores and porn videos, and fighting in his own 
desperate way to swim to the surface. 
This banality and lack of affect is typical of the psychopathic personality, and 
such personalities are typical of our consumer culture. Some sociologists believe that 
such behaviour is the only sane response to a sick society. Various forces within 
contemporary society contribute to an increase in the aggressive or destructive instinct to 
the detriment of the creative, life affirming instinct. One such influence is the 
dehumanization ofthe processes of production and consumption; the interests ofthe 
capital machine absorb the needs of the individual. Any sense of meaningful individuality 
is lost, a blatant theme in American Psycho. Patrick and his peer group all dress 
essentially the same, wearing designer labels, fashion salon haircuts and trendy 
eyeglasses (non-prescription, worn only for effect): 
Owen has mistaken me for Marcus Halberstam ... and it seems a logical 
faux pas since Marcus works at P&P also, in fact does the same exact thing 
I do, and he also has a penchant for Valentino suits and clear prescription 
glasses and we share the same barber at the same place, the Pierre Hotel, 
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so it seems understandable; it doesn't irk me. (AP 89) 
They go to the same tanning places and exercise gyms, all based on the dictates of the 
world of media fashion. Fundamentally, they themselves are interchangeable mannequins 
ofthe corporate world, and with slapstick absurdity they are constantly being mistaken 
for each other. In a climactic final scene Patrick confronts his lawyer and demands to 
know if he has listened to the message Patrick left on his machine, during which he 
confessed to many murders. Ironically, the lawyer thinks the phone call was a joke, thinks 
Bateman is either Davis or Donaldson, and claims that he had dinner last week with one 
of Patrick's supposed victims. After a brief argument Patrick retreats in defeat: 
After we stare at each other for what seems like a minute, I finally 
have the nerve to say something back to him, but my voice lacks any 
authority and I'm not sure if I believe myself when I tell him, simply, 
"No, you ... didn't." But it comes out a question, not a statement. 'Now 
Donaldson,' Carnes says, removing my hand from his arm. 'Ifyou'll 
excuse me"'. (388). 
Despite his extreme efforts through violent crime to assert himself in the face of 
anonymity, he remains unseen, his existential anxiety as overwhelming as ever. 
Postmodem thinkers such as Baudrillard suggest that the distinction between the real and 
the unreal is rapidly disappearing in contemporary society. For Bateman this sense of 
unreality haunts him, permeating even his confession. One question often raised about the 
novel is whether Patrick actually committed any murders. The central point, of course, is 
that he does not know either! '"Sometimes, Jean,' I explain, "the lines separating 
appearance-what you see-and reality-what you don't-become, well, blurred'" (378). He 
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spends much of the novel absorbed in the effort to establish some sense of distinction 
between the two; the effort is doomed to fail. The murders themselves, real or unreal, are 
attempts to force his way into some form of reality, a desperate kick at the darkness that 
engulfs him. 
Underscoring this blurring of reality's boundaries, this confusion of signifier and 
signified, the novel's characters are constantly checking themselves out in mirrors and 
attempting to assert some individuality, with no apparent success. Patrick and his 
'girlfriend' discuss Price, someone that he suspects might be her lover: 
'Why don't you just go for Price?' ... 
'He's rich,' I say 
'Ever body's rich', she says, concentrating on the TV screen. 
'He's good-looking,' I tell her. 
'Everybody's good looking, Patrick,' she says remotely. 
'He has a great body,' I say. 
'Everybody has a great body now,' she says (AP 23). 
In the ultimate triumph of the unreal, Patrick is unable to consummate sex with Evelyn 
and eventually masturbates alone, fantasizing about a Calvin Klein model. 
The crimes in the novel, alleges James Annesley, are those for which "an 
increasingly commercial and materialistic society must take the ultimate responsibility" 
(Qtd. in Bilton 209). Much of the text reads like a Saks catalogue, taken up as it is with 
descriptions of clothes, music tapes, and other accoutrements of the yuppie lifestyle. 
Patrick Bateman is the ultimate consumer who lives in a world where all excesses are 
indulged. In a drugged haze, he and his 'friends' elegantly slouch from one expensive 
restaurant or bar to another, looking bored and carelessly spending money as they go. The 
only emotional reactions are elicited by failed dinner reservations, unavailable cocaine, or 
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being bested by a peer. Surrounded by poverty in the streets, they remain unmoved. Price 
cruelly asks a beggar ifhe takes American Express, and walks away whistling "If I Were 
a Rich Man" (AP 7). The power that money gives them permits a certain freedom from 
restraint; for Bateman this license becomes expressed in vicious murders. Like an out-of-
control aggressive adolescent, our anti-hero continually pushes the social limits, often 
shocked when no one cares enough to stop his killing spree. Returning to the apartment 
where he has disposed of three bodies, he finds a real estate agent, aptly named Mrs. 
Wolfe, who refuses to acknowledge that anything has happened there. Patrick is confused 
and lost: 
All frontiers, ifthere had been any, seem suddenly detachable and 
have been removed .... This is not a game, I want to shout, but I can't 
catch my breath although I don't think she can tell...I turn my face 
away. I need rest. I don't know what to say. 'Don't make any trouble', 
she says quietly. (AP 370) 
Our narrator makes bizarre obscene phone calls that underscore the merger of sex 
and capitalism: "'I'm a corporate raider,' I whisper lasciviously into the phone" (206). 
Ellis consistently juxtaposes these supposed polarities of the criminal and the business 
world. When asked his occupation, Bateman, instead of responding with "mergers and 
acquisitions" as his co-workers do, replies "murders and executions" (206). His audience 
is either totally nonplussed or completely indifferent. Even his obscene phone calls often 
fail to sttock. As he whispers to yet another young girl that he is a "corporate raider ... ," 
the response he receives is disappointing. "'I orchestrate hostile takeovers. What do you 
think of that?' ... Most of the time I could tell they were frightened and this pleased me 
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greatly ... until one ofthe girls asked, unfazed, 'Dad, is that you?' and whatever 
enthusiasm I had built up plummeted" (206). The violence of Wall Street has become 
merely mundane, even familial. One can almost hear Patrick scream: What do you have 
to do around here to get a reaction? 
Despite the boredom and the lack of affect, Patrick is not without the form of 
suffering common to all protagonists of existential novels. Alienated and frightened he 
cries out to us from the depths of his existential hell, "a world where innocence, 
sympathy, guilt, waste, failure, grief, were things, emotions that no one really felt 
anymore ... evil is its only permanence" (AP 375; italics are mine). As the novel opens, 
Ellis' epigraph offers a quotation from Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, 
emphasizing his text's philosophical theme: 
Nevertheless, such persons as the composer of these Notes not only 
exist in our society, but indeed must exist, considering the 
circumstances under which our society has generally been 
forrned ... this personage describes himself and his views and attempts, 
as it were, to clarify the reasons why he appeared and, was bound to 
appear in our midst. (AP 1) 
Like Dostoevsky's underground anti-hero, Ellis presents one who is buried alive, who is 
also imprisoned although the prison walls are gilded. Dostoevsky has his protagonist 
assert that man has lost touch with the natural world and lives in his world of ideas, no 
longer able to tell ''where this 'real life' lives nowadays ... " (Notes from the Underground 
91).44 Patrick is drowning in a world ofsignifiers, or in Plato's ideology, at the third 
44 Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Notes From Underground. Translated by Michael Katz. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1989. Hereafter cited in text as ''NFU." 
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remove from reality. His connections, such as they are, must be mediated through 
television talk shows, videos, or horrific acts of violence. Unlike some other literary anti-
heroes, both Dostoevsky and Ellis present characters that do not represent an oppressed 
class, but rather they offer us educated intelligent men. Each possesses some degree of 
self-knowledge; each reflects on his situation. Patrick Bateman realizes what he is: your 
classic psychopath: 
Patrick is not a cynic, Timothy. He' s the boy next door, aren ' t you honey? 
No I'm not, I whisper to myself. I'm a fucking evil psychopath. (AP 20) 
What makes him tick? Self-interest only. The saddest song he knows is "You Can't 
Always Get What You Want." Underneath this obsession with material possessions, 
though, is a void: "I feel empty, hardly there at all" (AP 300). Unlike Sherman McCoy in 
Bonfire of the Vanities, Patrick Bateman does not lose his possessions, nor does he go to 
jail for all his crimes. His conscience is not his punishment as it is for Cross Damon in 
The Outsider. He has no unique identifying traits, such as a Yale man, husband, etc. 
There is no gaze of the Other to define him. Like Ellison's Invisible Man, he is 
transparent; no one really sees him at all. He does not lose himself, because he has no 
sense of self to lose. 
3.5 Existential Angst: Underground Man 
American Psycho is a novel that presents its existential themes very directly. It is 
framed by Dostoevsky in the epigraph and existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre in the 
conclusion. The epigraph invites us immediately to draw an analogy between Patrick 
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Bateman and other classic existential heroes. The "underground man" of Dostoevsky is 
desperately seeking some attention and acknowledgement of his existence. Like Bateman, 
he recognizes his own moral depravity: "I am a sick man .. .I am a spiteful man. I am an 
unattractive man" (NFU 3). He too, wallows in his narcissism: "Now, then, what can a 
decent man talk about with the greatest pleasure? Answer: about himself' (NFU 5). "I 
slavishly worshipped convention in all external things", he informs us (NFU 31). His 
literal prison is symbolic ofthe imprisonment of man's psyche, his lack of freedom. His 
response to this lack, albeit on a much smaller scale than that perpetrated in American 
Psycho, is to intrude himself onto his environment with cruelty. So removed from reality 
are we, maintains this protagonist, that "we're all cripples, everyone of us, more or less. 
We've become so estranged that at times we feel some kind of revulsion for genuine 'real 
life', and therefore can't bear to be reminded of it" (NFU 91). No one will wish to read 
his Notes due to their unpleasant impression, he feels, and because they prefer not to 
engage with reality (91). It is rather startling how relevant these words remain for the 
existential novel oftoday. Problems of alienation, lack of freedom, and the resulting need 
to strike out with violence: all are recognized by the Russian author. 
At the end of Ellis's novel, in response to a questioned "Why" that 
seemingly relates to nothing, Bateman reiterates this position on life as he sees it: 
Well, though I know I should have done that instead of not doing it, 
I'm twenty-seven for Christ sakes, and this is how life presents itself in 
a bar or in a club in New York, maybe anywhere, at the end of the 
century and how people, you know me, behave, and this is what being 
Patrick means to me ... so, well, yup, uh .... [sigh, shrug, another sigh]. 
(AP 399) 
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We are then directed to the sign in red block letters above a door that simply states: THIS 
IS NOT AN EXIT. The allusion to one ofSartre's most famous plays, No Exit, is 
obvious. For Patrick, or for the anyman that he represents, there is no escape from being 
Patrick in this self-defming moment. One of the most famous lines from No Exit warns 
that "Hell is other people." Patrick is trapped inside his own individual hell by his 
inability to have meaningful communication with other people. Bateman reveals this 
location from the opening lines of the novel: " ' Abandon hope all ye who enter here' is 
scrawled in blood red lettering on the side of the Chemical Bank ... " (AP 3). Reminiscent 
ofT.S. Eliot's epigraph at the beginning of"The Wasteland," Ellis also has his character 
call to us from the depths of his hell. No one can be reached; no one actually listens, even 
when he confesses to multiple murders. Buses displaying advertisements for Les 
Miserables continually flash before the dead, uncaring eyes of the characters. Meanwhile, 
in the real world of the heartless city, the homeless beggars are abused, tormented and 
killed: they are the true miserable ones. Their pleas for help also fall on deaf ears; no one 
is paying attention: 
"My life is a living hell," I mention off the cuff ... "And there are many 
more people I, uh, want to ... want to, well I guess murder," I say this 
emphasizing the last word, staring straight into Armstrong's face ... 
Armstrong is still eating, cutting into the perfectly square slices of calf's 
liver, and he keeps talking while I become increasingly mournful. (AP 141) 
Bateman's attempts to shock others out of their self-absorption become ever more 
outrageously absurd. Towards the novel ' s conclusion he tells his fiancee, over a wedding-
planning lunch, that he wants to bring an AK-47 assault rifle to the wedding: 
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"Or an AR-15. You'd like it Evelyn: it's the most expensive of guns, but 
worth every penney." I wink at her. But she's still talking; she doesn't hear 
a word; nothing registers ... Azy essence is eluding her. (AP 124; italics are mine) 
Ellis presents us with an individual who is as invisible as Ellison's narrator in Invisible 
Man. In the narcissistic world that Bateman inhabits, it is each man for himself. The 
epigraph offers yet another quote, this time from the Talking Heads, that speaks of social 
chaos and destruction. It echoes "The Second Coming" by Yeats: 
And as things fell apart 
Nobody paid much attention. (AP 1) 
In The Culture of Narcissism Lasch addresses the effect that this powerlessness has on the 
individual: 
When it finally occurs to the new Narcissus that he can 'live not only 
without fame but without self, live and die without ever having had 
one's fellows conscious of the microscopic space one occupies on this 
planet' he experiences this discovery not merely as a disappointment 
but as a shattering blow to his sense of selfhood. (22) 
Threats to our sense of selfhood are as visceral, as biologically determined in the response 
elicited, as are physical threats. Violence in the face of such a threat is one possible, and 
not at all unlikely, response. Patrick Bateman is enraged by this sense of powerlessness 
and externalizes this rage, using people as things to be overpowered, as capitalism has 
taught him. 
Interposed throughout the work are various other existential references. Bateman 
sends a box of flies to the girlfriend he has abandoned, and frequently makes reference to 
buzzing sounds around his head. Here again we have an obvious allusion to another 
existential play of Sartre, The Flies; this drama itself harks back to the ancient Greek 
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tragedies and the Furies that followed the tragic hero as punishment for indiscretions. In 
Patrick's world, though, there is no external punishment. "My pain is constant and sharp 
and I do not hope for a better world for anyone. In fact I want my pain to be inflicted on 
others" (AP 377; italics are mine). When Patrick stops to purportedly 'help' a young girl 
holding out a coffee cup, assuming that she is begging, she berates him for ruining her 
coffee; he notices that she is reading a book by Sartre. The presence of such pervasive 
existential references demands an existential reading of the text that goes deeper than 
surface discourse on alienation and angst. 
So what, one may wish to ask, does existentialism suggest apart from the 
conditions of anxiety, fear, dread and yawning voids? Many contemporary critics argue 
for a new understanding of philosophical existentialism, which has suffered neglect in 
recent years. No longer considered trendy, its potential for enriching the understanding of 
contemporary literature has gone largely untapped. As a critical response to the 
contemporary situation, its philosophic approach might allow for the possible 
transformation of that very situation. Sartre himself saw the tremendous capacity for 
change that might be wrought by literature. Both his works of fiction and of literary 
criticism aim to "empower readers to act and to extend the limits of human freedom" 
(Lancaster 53). The philosophic concept of freedom, as understood by existentialists, can 
illuminate the current need for violence, both real and mediated. 
Bateman is preoccupied with freedom, although he has little belief in it. As he 
a,nd his fiancee make a toast, she asks: "To what [should we drink]?" "Freedom?" I ask 
tiredly." Sartre first drew a connection between violence and the pursuit of freedom in the 
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philosophic work Being and Nothingness. As discussed in Chapter one, Sartre affirms that 
human existence and human freedom are simultaneous. I begin to see myself as Object, 
rather than Subject, when I encounter the Other; his look transforms me into the Object of 
his gaze. My possibilities now become limited by the Other's regard and I am enslaved 
by the Other's freedom: "the objectifying look of the Other ... causes me to experience the 
freedom of the Other" (BN 270-1). In attempting to recover my own freedom, my 
individual possibilities, the fundamental project is to absorb the Other. There are two 
ways in which I can attempt to break his hold on me. The central and authentic mode is 
through love and empathy wherein, by identifying with the Other's freedom as the 
foundation for my own, I am impelled to treat him with respect. We saw the stirrings of 
this in Morrison's Beloved. This option is not open to the psychopaths of this world, 
whose response to the Other is always mediated through their own needs: 
It did not occur to me, ever, that people were good or that ... the world could be a 
better place through one's taking pleasure in ... receiving another person's love or 
kindness. (AP 375) 
The other option is to objectify the Other, denying his freedom, and violence/sadism is 
one means to attempt this. Of course this is Sartrean bad faith, a form of inauthentic 
existence that violates being-for-itself(the free conscious being as Subject). Violence as 
an exercise in pure freedom depends upon the recognition by the Other of the legitimacy 
of the violence. Bateman's gratuitous violence is bad faith and does not aim at the full 
realization of our humanity (BN 147). It does aim, however, to help the violent Subject 
escape his unbearable feeling of aloneness. For Bateman it does not work: 
1(>5 
Some kind of existential chasm opens before me while I'm browsing in 
Bloomingdale's ... and I decide [it] has some connection with the way I 
treated Evelyn ... though there is always the possibility it could just as 
easily have something to do with the tracking device on my VCR ... (AP 
179-80) 
The ever-increasing violence of the murders is not sufficient to allow him an escape from 
this existential chasm: 
Though I am satisfied at first by my actions, I'm suddenly jolted with a 
mournful despair at how useless, how extraordinarily painless it is to 
take a child's life .. .l feel empty, hardly here at all. (AP 300; italics are 
mine) 
His attempts to reach inside the Other, figuratively as well as literally by cutting into 
them, are futile: 
As usual, in an attempt to understand these girls I'm filming their 
deaths (AP 304; italics are mine). 
I can already tell that it's going to be a characteristically useless, 
senseless death, but then I'm used to the horror (AP 329). 
Through the gaze of his victim, he encounters only himself as inanimate Object: 
I can imagine that my virtual absence of humanity fills her with 
mind-bending horror (AP 327). 
A sense of individuality, of self-consciousness, is developed from our encounters 
with others. There are no orthodoxies to speak ofto reconstruct one's freedom, so we 
really are in that existential state that Sartre calls "dreadful freedom." In contemporary 
postmodem culture, in which the Other is undifferentiated (is simply not-me), then 
violence in response to freedom-threats becomes equally undifferentiated and 
indiscriminate. Any target will do! The serial killer chooses victims arbitrarily, usually 
from among strangers. Bateman kills those vulnerable Others, such as prostitutes, the 
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homeless, children, and criminals that no one seems to miss. His anger is directed at 
those to whom society does not offer its protection. 
In a society such as America, that hails its freedom at every opportunity and holds 
itself forth as a beacon to the world, it seems incongruous to speak of direct threats to 
freedom. The absence of obstacles to the exercise of choice is only a negative freedom, as 
previously discussed: what Erich Fromm refers to as a "freedom from." Positive liberty, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the provision of conditions required in order for one 
to take advantage of freedom, conditions which the individual cannot create on his/her 
own. This type of freedom depends largely on social conditions. Of the homeless beggars, 
Bateman and his friends ask, "Why don't they get a job?" They do not consider what 
barriers, internal or external, those indigents might face in an effort to exercise choice. 
Such thoughts might be too frightening for Bateman, reminding him in turn of his own 
existential fears and lack of freedom. Viewing the homeless, the objects of poverty and 
discrimination, as lacking freedom is not that much of an imaginative stretch for most of 
us. Taking the position that a wealthy, young, handsome WASP male has his freedom 
curtailed is a rather more difficult sell. 
As mentioned above, Bateman mouths the discourse of consumerism; the clothes, 
the music he listens to, all are needs created by the ad industry. His world, like that of the 
' underground man,' is circumscribed. John Walsh explains it well: 
In his murky vision, a skewed and suicidal materialism is the sole 
currency of his [Ellis's] young metropolitans, the only stuff of 
conversation, the single realm of thought, the measure of personal 
wealth and social health. (qtd. in Bilton 209; italics mine) 
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Saturated in consumer capitalism, he cannot see beyond it. He is analogous to Plato's 
cave dweller, chained in his cave and able only to see the flickering reflections of a 
counterfeit reality. When he gains some reflected light oftruth, "a flood of reality," he is 
truly dazzled and terrified (AP 379). In the most intimate of moments, during sexual 
encounters for example, his mind cannot shut off the flood of images from movies, 
television, and violent videos. He is unable to live in the moment; it is already occupied 
with the detritus of the inert. For him there is no sense of autonomy, no capacity to 
govern oneself; this is a prerequisite for true freedom. Battered about by an instilled 
demand for immediate gratification, he is ruled by factors outside the self. His life is "a 
blank canvas that reconfigures itself into a soap opera" (AP 343). 
Erich Fromm, philosopher and psychoanalyst, elucidates postmodem man's 
situation thus: 
[T]his man-made world has become his master ... He seems to be driven by 
self-interest, but in reality his total self with all its concrete potentialities 
has become an instrument for the very machine his hands have built ... His 
relationships have assumed a spirit of instrumentality and manipulation ... he 
does not only sell commodities he sells himself and feels himself to be a 
commodity. (FF 103)45 
Objectified himself, another commodity to be consumed, his only recourse is some 
primitive act that aims at getting in touch with what is real: flesh and blood. Without 
45 Erich Fromm, the famous psychoanalyst, reveals significant parallels with the 
ideas ofSartre in several ofhis works on freedom. Although we know that he did read 
some ofSartre's literary work, as well as the published notes of his lecture, Existentialism 
is a Humanism, by his own account he was not familiar with Sartre's main philosophical 
opus. I feel justified in drawing my comparisons between the two thinkers on freedom 
since Sartre's translator, Hazel Barnes, also perceives a strong philosophical connection. 
For more on her position, see her explication of Sartrean ideology in Humanistic 
Existentialism: The Literature of Possibilities. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P. 1962. 
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evolution from the burden of"freedom from" to the more positive "freedom to," man's 
urge will be to escape from the burden of what Sartre calls "dreadful freedom" by 
whatever means presents itself. 
Objectified himself by the capitalist system, another trader from Pierce and Pierce, 
Bateman objectifies his victims in a futile attempt to appropriate their freedom for 
himself. Incapable of self-mastery, he struggles to gain mastery over them. With no 
connection to his own humanity, he attempts to grasp and hold theirs. Naturally, as 
readers, we see ourselves as far removed from Patrick's craziness and violence. Yet we 
feel complicit. One way in which we reject our complicity in the world's violence is by 
projecting responsibility onto the criminal psychopaths. In his essay "On Freedom," 
Sartre describes an evildoer as "a man whose situation makes it possible for him to 
present to us in broad daylight and in objective form the obscure temptations of our 
freedom" (qouted in Santoni 134). The good man has the clearest conscience in war time, 
he says, adding sarcastically "[But] from time to time there must be peace" (135). For 
these times we have our professional evildoers, our BTK killers, our Robert Batemans. 
Sartre argues that we all act on a demand for meaning, and violence is one distorted way 
in which some subjects seek meaning and autonomy in their lives. In the manner of an 
acting-out child in a dysfunctional family, these characters express the anger, tension and 
fear that seethes below the smooth social surface of our world. 
The criminal forces us to consider the question of liberty in the American society 
where individuals believe themselves to be fully free. For the violent individual the 
feeling of powerlessness inherent in postmodern society may well be so threatening that 
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only the most extreme action can overcome the feeling of objectification. Ellis seems to 
ask us to consider what it might take, in our very jaded culture, to pierce (figuratively or 
literally) our mask of complacency. We focus on serial killers in the news while striving 
to ignore the killing of millions through poverty. This dichotomy is revealed in the novel 
by the constant appearance of beggars and homeless, juxtaposed with violent excess. 
Patrick may be the one to literally kill these derelicts, but all ofhis acquaintances engage 
in less direct forms of cruelty, such as offering money only to take it back with a laugh. 
The evening news confronts us simultaneously with destructive violence and celebrity 
divorces; our responses are correspondingly flattened. Patrick sees all this, and believes 
himself to be alone with this knowledge: 
surface, surface, surface ... nuclear warheads, billions of dollars, the total 
destruction of the world, someone gets beaten up, someone else dies ... 
life played out as a sitcom .. .It's an isolation ward that serves only to 
expose my own severely impaired capacity to feel. I am at its centre ... 
and no one ever asks me for any identification. (AP 343) 
This denial or self-deceit, Sartre' s "mauvaise foi" (bad faith), permeates our social 
structures and is deliberately utilized by parts ofthe system. As Hare remarks above, 
internal corporate culture fosters a psychopathic attitude of deceit toward the general 
public. This attitude allows businesses to do such things as sell dangerous products and 
pollute the earth for corporate gain, all the while preaching their altruism. They actually 
seem to believe their own propaganda; in the words of Jerry Seinfeld's friend George: 
"It' s not a lie if you believe it." It would seem, then, that the most important person one 
needs to convince is oneself. Patrick Bateman can no longer buy into this hypocrisy. He 
110 
may be a murderer, but he is open about it. He can't help it if no one believes him. He 
lives by another pop dictum: tell them the truth and they'll never believe you! 
What are we to make of the vision of the artist Bret Easton Ellis? The idea of the 
objective vision, so significant to the modem artist, is no longer possible today. How does 
one attack social taboos when there are none? How can one disturb a social order, which 
gobbles up all resistance, regurgitating it for the commercial market? Everything is, as 
Bilton says, incorporated (198). It is no longer possible for an author to directly condemn 
the social culture because it is difficult to see outside the Cave and imagine another 
reality. According to Bilton, this is the impression with which Ellis leaves us: 
It is this idea of distance, of being outside of things, which no longer 
seems tenable to us today. Nobody illustrates this better than Brett 
Easton EIIis. 'This is not an exit' he writes at the end of American 
Psycho and this motto could be seen as emblematic of the Postmodem 
dilemma: there's simply no way out ofthe mall. (Bilton 198) 
Ellis's implication is that we are all trapped here in this consumer Hell--author, reader 
and characters all complicit in this "dangerous text". If any moral values are to be 
inserted, in true Sartrean fashion, we have to choose them. Much ofthe novel's prose is 
decidedly boring, creating a type of suspense or longing for the violent action that 
follows. Many critics, as I have previously mentioned, focus only on the violence to the 
exclusion of the blatant critique of commercialism inherent in the text. Ellis, like Patrick 
Bateman, struggles with the issue of how our banality might be shaken. It would seem 
that even he has not been offensive enough to shake us from our traditional knee-jerk 
responses. Yet we compartmentalize the character of Patrick at our own peril. One can 
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imagine Ellis warning that not only the movie might be coming soon to a neighbourhood 
near you. "One could argue that Ellis's work is a kind of homeopathic medicine, 
inoculating the diseases, curing us by making us aware how sick we really are" (Bilton 
212). 
Does Ellis suggest that there is any hope for the Batemans of the world or more 
importantly for the world in which he flounders? Towards the end of the text Patrick does 
evince a spark of humanity in response to the love offered him by Jean. Determined to 
live an authentic existence, she tells Patrick that "a lot of people seem to have ... lost touch 
with life and I don't want to be among them" (AP 375). During their conversation, she is 
the only one truly present; Patrick floats on the plane ofhyperreal, absorbed in images 
from the media. Throwing a rope to a drowning man, she tells him that people need each 
other. It almost seems as if he might at least accept the rope; he begins to feel something 
real: 
[There is] a flood of reality. I get an odd feeling that this is a crucial moment in 
my life and I'm startled by the suddenness of what I guess passes for an 
epiphany .. .I am moved that I might have the capacity to accept, though not return 
her love ... And though the coldness I have always felt leaves me, the numbness 
doesn't and probably never will. (AP 379; italics are mine) 
Although the moment passes and he realizes that the relationship with Jean is going 
nowhere, there is the hint of a movement outside of himself. He admits to fear of the 
unknown, but "I also know that one day, sometime very soon, she too will be locked in 
the rhythm of my insanity" (AP 378). He is not totally without altruism; he walks away 
from Jean, and this is her salvation. 
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Imagine a society in which true freedom is made possible, in which ''the 
individual, his growth and happiness, is the aim and purpose of culture, in which life does 
not need any justification in success or anything else, and in which the individual is not 
subordinated to or manipulated by any power outside himself ... "(FF 233). This sounds, 
indeed, like an updated version of the American Dream. The innocence is gone, but as 
Patrick reminds us, "This is no time for the innocent" (AP 382). 
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Chapter Four 
On the Road to the Self: 
Slouching Towards Freedom 
Twentieth century peoples have erected so many psychological 
barriers against strong emotion, and have invested those defenses with 
so much of the energy derived from forbidden impulse, that they can 
no longer remember what it feels like to be inundated with desire. 
They tend, rather, to be consumed with rage ... 
Christopher Lasch 
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of everyone 
of its members ... Whoso must be a man, must be a nonconformist. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
4.1 The Struggle for Individuation 
Individuation, defined by psychoanalyst Erich Fromm as "the growing emergence 
ofthe individual from his primitive social and natural ties," is at the centre of man's 
awareness of, and striving towards his own freedom (FF 23). This growth of the 
individual is marked not only by increasing strength but also by an increasing sense of 
aloneness. The dialectical nature of individuation is met, as one might assume, by a 
corresponding ambivalence in the individual. Wanting freedom, the individual is yet 
frightened by the implications of what Sartre referred to as a "terrible freedom." 
Beginning in childhood, Fromm explains it this way: "The child becomes freer to develop 
and express its own individual self unhampered by those ties which were limiting it. But 
the child also becomes more free from a world which gave it security and reassurance" 
(FF 24). We see the early positive and negative aspects of freedom: freedomfrom and 
freedom to. Like Sartre, Fromm sees human existence and freedom as essentially 
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inseparable because it involves freeing mankind from the instinctual determination of his 
actions. What this freedom is for is what the individual must determine for himself, and 
this is the meaning of life, as existentialism defines it. If economic, social, and political 
conditions do not support the individual in the full realization of his/her possibilities, then 
freedom from external ties becomes merely an "unbearable burden" (FF 30). The result is 
a life without meaning or direction, accompanied by a sense of alienation that has 
frequently been the subject of literary, philosophic and psychological discourse. 
4.2 Alienation: The Quest for Authenticity 
"Although the term alienation or self-alienation originally derives from Stoic 
philosophy, Hegel gives the category its uniquely modem definition," asserts philosopher 
Mark Taylor in his cogent study, Journeys to Seljhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (7). In the 
journey to selfhood, various forms have been explored, most significant for our 
discussion is the existential quest for authenticity. In the words of Walker Percy's 
character in The Moviegoer: 
The search is what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in 
the everydayness of his own life ... To become aware ofthe possibility 
of the search is to be onto something. Not to be onto something is to be 
in despair. (qtd.in Taylor 8) 
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard were philosophers who were concerned with the 
spiritlessness of their time. "Hegel insists that modem man faces the difficult task of 
finding the way from fragmentation and disintegration among and within individuals to a 
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harmonious intra- and interpersonal unification or integration" (Taylor 12). Hegel's 
concern with the reconciliation of the concepts of"self' and "other" can offer guidelines 
for the community/individual dichotomies we have outlined above. Taylor proposes that 
Hegel's cure for the sickness of the spirit, a sickness that he diagnosed in his own time, 
might lead the way out of our present dilemma, our "unhappy consciousness," and 
towards a more fully realized selfhood (32). The evil of the time, writes Hegel, is the 
result of "caprice of subjective feeling and its opinions associated with the culture of 
reflected thought which has proved to its own satisfaction that spirit is incapable of 
knowing the truth" (Qtd. in Taylor 41; italics Taylor). Reflection, Hegel defines as the 
activity of mind that sets up oppositions and goes from one to the other without ever 
realizing their essential unity (42). This analytical activity of the mind, typical of 
Cartesian rationalism, separates categories without the fmal integration, or synthesis, 
which is an essential aspect ofHegelian philosophy. In this system, typified in Hegel's 
day by Kant's philosophy, subject and object are unknowable to each other. "If subject 
and object remain antithetical , the object becomes an unknowable other . . . " (Taylor 44); it 
is this dualism that Hegel finds so disturbing, a dualism which postmodemism seeks in its 
way to deconstruct. Such dualisms result inevitably in the alienation of the self, since no 
reconciliation of self and other is possible. We cannot live authentically, to use Sartre's 
terms, in solipsism. We can only know ourselves as freedom through the Other; the 
challenge is to accomplish this without destroying self or Other in the process. 
If, as Hegel argued, the evjl of the present time reveals the need of the time, then the 
need of our time is to answer the question "How can we exist as free subjects without 
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losing our concern for humanity?" In fact, this is not a very different question from that 
posed by Schiller and related by Mark Taylor: "How are we to restore the unity of human 
nature?"( 50). "The malaise of spiritlessness can be cured only by the mediation of all the 
opposites fragmenting the self' (Taylor 226). To see the self as identity within the 
difference between subjectivity and objectivity is to know the self in all its fullness. This 
subjectivity cannot be given by the Other, but relationships in the world are an essential 
part ofthe dialectic. The fullness ofthis deliverance from solipsism, accomplished 
through the meeting of self with itself in the other, is experienced thus: 
As existing for self, this deliverance is called I; as unfolded to its 
totality, it is free spirit; as feeling, it is love; as enjoyment, it is 
blessedness. (Hegel, qtd. and italicized Taylor 228) 
As Sartre would explain it, our responsibility to ourselves is forever connected with our 
responsibility to Others. To understand our freedom, we must acknowledge the freedom 
of all mankind. 
The responsibility towards all those who might be affected by our deeds is, 
according to Sartre, an integral aspect of all human action. The importance of action to 
the development of the self is expressed in these words of Hegel, which are echoed by 
Sartre: "In so far as I act I determine myself' (Qtd. in Gordon 89). In an insightful thesis, 
R. Hallon Gordon explores the relationship between freedom and the sel:rs sense of 
identity. The value we place on freedom in our society, asserts Gordon, is in direct 
relation to our sense of self-identity and to our ability to forge our own identity through 
our actions. "Human beings are concerned, in a profound and fundamental way, with 
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making ourselves, with building an identity" (Gordon 9). There are, says Gordon, three 
aspects of freedom that connect to our sense of personal identity: 1. our capacity for self-
rule; 2. our capacity to act or choose; 3. our experience of existing relatively free from 
undue external constraints. Human freedom must be viewed in its totality, argues Gordon, 
rather than from the one-sided position often taken by classical liberalism. 
4.3 Individualism as a National Narrative 
In fashioning myself I fashion man. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
Cyrus Patell asserts that "some of the most important philosophizing that is going 
on within late twentieth-century U.S. culture can be found in works of fiction ... " (xv). 
Literature, he says, brings philosophy to life. Concerning himself with the negative 
consequences of individualism as it appears in contemporary American thought and 
fiction, Patell explores the work of Morrison and Pynchon as they deconstruct the official 
narratives of freedom and self-reliance. "Philosophers like Emerson, Rawls, and Kateb 
make compelling cases for the potential of individualism as the basis for an ideal 
democratic society, but as Pynchon and Morrison so dramatically depict, this potential 
has yet to be realized in American culture, let alone elsewhere in the world" (xviii). 
However, neither novelists nor critical deconstructionists have made much of an impact 
on the American love affair with the concept of individualism as an a priori desirable 
reality. 
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The American national narrative of individual freedom contains within it various 
undifferentiated concepts such as liberalism and individualism. The latter has become part 
of the national American identity since the nineteenth century, and the concept is largely 
attributed to the writings ofEmerson. Individualism extols the virtues of non-conformity 
and self-reliance; the individualist is the "Adam," the self-made man who is figured so 
often in American literature. Patell, however, argues that the concept is misunderstood: 
"from the time that the term became part of the American vocabulary in the early part of 
the nineteenth century, Americans-including Emerson and his followers-have always 
conceived of individualism as a social formation. Herein lies the genius of the ideology 
and perhaps the reason for its efficacy: it enforces conformity at the very moment that it 
extols conformity" (xii). Such a social ideology, suggests Patell, creates a false sense of 
liberty by enforcing beliefs, advantageous to the goals of the ruling majority, which 
support such a delusion. Emersonian liberalism, so popular in U.S. thought, is centered 
on a false concept of self-reliance. The rugged individualist, as symbolized in media 
characters such as Indiana Jones, is an example of wish fulfillment. Readers or viewers 
can fantasize that they are masters of their own fate even as they succumb to the mind-
numbing bureaucracy that defines their lives. Indeed, few persons have any belief in the 
ability of the average individual to be master ofhis own fate. Such broad individual 
freedom exists only in the projections of popular culture. Even on-screen rugged 
individualists, like Indiana Jones or Batman, never seem to deviate from socially 
sanctioned actions, often to the detriment of their own interests. The anti-heroes, the anti-
social psychopaths, are the ultimate individualists: characters that seem able to act in their 
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own best interests even when these do not align with those of society. Perhaps this is why 
we are so fascinated with them. 46 Cultural theorists have directed their interests to these 
conflicting ideologies that comprise the American national identity. 
Pursuant to such analysis is the frequently referenced work, Habits of the Heart: 
Individualism and Commitment in American Life, authored by Bellah et al. This text 
explores the difficulties inherent in the American myth of individualism. Well-known 
theorist Fredric Jameson describes Habits of the Heart as "a powerful onslaught on ... 
'therapeutic' values and ideologies" (ONHH 98),47 and a backlash against the rampant 
individualism described in Christopher Lasch's "culture of narcissism." From Jameson's 
perspective, one primary difficulty with the analysis presented in Habits is its failure to 
distinguish between an individualism born of a culture, which he refers to as biblically 
grounded, and that resulting from economic forces ("market type" 99). Jameson deplores 
the failure of Habits to consider, correctly, what he identifies as the "decentering of the 
centered subject" (ONHH 1 00). Such consideration, he maintains, would lend depth to 
the discussion of the therapeutic character of the individualist. As the work stands, 
46 For a fascinating and thorough study of individualism as it permeates American 
culture, see Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Bellah, 
Robert N. et al. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986. Although the information 
gathered there has informed my work, allowing for an understanding of the basic 
ideology and development of American individualism, much of it is not directly relevant 
to my current thesis. Its series of essays offer alternatives to the radical individualism 
portrayed in Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism, and promote a return to a communal 
spirit in America. Some critics, Fredric Jameson for example, view the work as 
dangerously allied to the American Religious Right. 
47 Fredric Jameson, "On Habits of the Heart." Community in America: The 
Challenge of "Habits of the Heart." Eds. Charles H. Reynolds and Ralph V. Norman. 
Berkeley: U of California P, 1988. Hereafter cited as "ONHH." 
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Jameson views the essays as perhaps more pernicious than the false belief in the power of 
the individualist. 
Using concepts from Jean-Paul Sartre, Jameson maintains that the social 
characters described in Habits of the Heart are examples of Sartre' s practico-inert: "a 
scar left in the present by the outmoded and forgotten practices of the past" (1 02). Such 
characters show a persistence of traits that were once necessary, but have since lost their 
function. Jameson argues that the problem with two such diverse approaches to social 
problems, that of the individualist and that of the communalist, is their failure to include 
the dialectic that needs to be overcome; both the needs of the individual and the needs of 
society must be included in any discussion of freedom. Jameson addresses one such 
dialectical moment that needs to be engaged, when he describes the current culture's loss 
of historicity. This "loss of a sense of the past (as well as a sense of the future)" (1 04) is 
one which we discussed in our analysis of American Psycho. Such waning of a distinct 
sense of identity with the past prevents us, Jameson argues, from achieving a sharper 
sense "of the uniqueness of our own present" (104). He links the current obsession with 
simulacra as a form of a Freudian return ofthe repressed. The juxtaposition of present 
and past, inherent in Bellah's text, may not be possible any longer, Jameson suggests. 
Any analysis that makes use of the history of ideas is fraught with problems that Jameson 
believes can only be avoided by the discourse analysis method, which views struggles as 
taking place "within language" ( 1 08). The best critique of individual ism is founded "in its 
limits as a language of discourse" (105). As such a discourse individualism has us locked 
into a way of perception that "deflects and deforms everything that passes through it," 
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leaving us with no true understanding of social reality (ONHH 1 05). The authors of 
Habits of the Heart attempt to make us aware of these limits using the word community as 
a focus, yet, according to Jameson, they merely offer us a second mode of discourse also 
marked by the past. Habits of the Heart, from this socialist perspective, offers the reader 
no deeper understanding ofthe concepts of freedom, as they apply to the dichotomous 
needs of society and the individual. The beginning of a new improved society, suggests 
Jameson, must begin with "a self-punishing enumeration of all the blocks that make the 
reimagining of utopia today a difficult, if not to say a well-nigh impossible task" ( 111 ). 
Although Jameson alludes to Sartre, he fails to consider that the latter's philosophy might 
have much to impart to the realization of such a new improved society. "Our point of 
departure is, indeed, the subjectivity ofthe individual, and that for strictly philosophic 
reasons. It is not because we are bourgeois, but because we seek to base our teaching 
upon the truth, and not upon a collection of fme theories, full of hope but lacking real 
foundations" (E&H 44). The self-conscious subject is, for Sartre, the foundation of any 
successful society. The next concern is the development of such a grounded subject. 
4.4 The Psychological Process of Individuation 
Suzanne R. Kirschner sheds light on this self-development process in her broad 
and interdisciplinary work, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis: 
Individuation and Integration in Post-Freudian Theory. Developmental psychology is 
concerned with the liberation or freedom of the individual (Kirschner 107). The goal is a 
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greater sense of autonomy, and "a movement towards freedom from external constraint 
and internal conflict" (1 08). Implicit in this goal is the ongoing dialectic between the 
self's needs and the demands of the others one must relate to, between the 'me' and the 
'not-me'. "Self and object constancy, developed in the ftrst three years, ensure that the 
reawakening of feelings derived from the symbiotic phase do not bring with them a loss 
of the sense of self' (Edward, Ruskin, Turrini 1 07). Firm self/object boundaries make it 
possible to become involved in a love relationship without losing oneself to the Other. 
When these boundaries are not sound, the self can feel its identity threatened by the 
relationship and respond in violent or self-destructive ways. Without a sufficient degree 
of self-object differentiation, feelings of closeness that threaten the self's independence 
can be pushed away by rage reactions. Relationships then become a power struggle, such 
as revealed in Hegel's master-slave dialectic. 
R.N. Goodwin, in his article entitled "Power and the Individual," puts forth this 
position: "Power is central to individualism, for without real power choice is 
meaningless" (251 ). Goodwin discusses the sense of powerlessness that is eating away at 
our social structures today, "evoking an aimless unease, frustration, and fury" (251). This 
fury, Goodwin asserts, is primarily found among the middle classes rather than among the 
poorer groups, where one might expect to ftnd such anger. It might be the case that the 
minority groups, those most often marginalized, have a stronger connection to the past. 
As expressed above, this connection can provide grounding to a socially floundering 
subject. Lacking strong familial, racial, or other ties, such a decentered subject might be 
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blown about by the winds of the social system. Christopher Lasch, in The Culture of 
Narcissism, has this to say about the plight of the powerless individual in America today: 
Today Americans are overcome not by the sense of endless possibility 
but by the banality of the social order they have erected against 
it. .. Twentieth century peoples have erected so many psychological 
barriers against strong emotion, and have invested those defenses with 
so much of the energy derived from forbidden impulse, that they can no 
longer remember what it feels like to be inundated with desire. They 
tend, rather, to be consumed with rage, which derives from defenses 
against desire and gives rise in tum to new defenses against rage itself. 
Outwardly bland, submissive, and sociable, they seethe with an inner 
anger for which a dense, overpopulated, bureaucratic society can devise 
few legitimate outlets. (italics mine, 11) 
Lasch is describing a form of emotional repression that, one could argue, is 
particular to the middle classes. He intimates that serious self-reflection is 
required before attempting to resolve the polarities of individual and community 
requirements that haunt the American social system. We need, suggests Lasch 
and others, a new understanding of individualism and liberty. 
If a new concept of individualism is needed in America, it needs to balance the 
individual's rights to freedom with society's right to safety. As explained by philosopher 
Bertrand Russell's article, "The Role of Individuality," the conflict is between "too little 
liberty [which] brings stagnation, and too much [which] brings chaos" (4). One ofthe 
difficulties in contemporary life, says Russell, is that "society is centralized and organized 
to such a degree that individual initiative is reduced to a minimum" ( 12). Subtle, but 
nonetheless powerful constraints have been placed on the individual, despite the 
prevailing belief that America is the freest nation on earth. J. W. Gardner's essay, 
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"Individuality and Its Limits," succinctly articulates the problems encountered by the 
emerging individual subject: 
In the process of growing up the young person frees himself from utter 
dependence on others. As the process of maturing continues he must 
also free himself from the prison ofutter self-preoccupation. To do so 
he need not surrender his individuality. But he must place it in the 
voluntary service of larger objectives. (Gardner 22) 
Although we have largely learned how to accomplish the former, the latter task is one we 
have not mastered. The result, says Gardner, is youth who do not understand their place in 
a complex societal web and are inclined to "flee the responsibility of individual choice" 
(23). This flight from facticity defines Sartre's inauthentic mode of living. The Book of 
Daniel, by D.L. Doctorow, is the next narrative under discussion. Through the struggles 
for individuation experienced by its central character, we will explore this phenomenon of 
fear of individual choice and the potential resolutions. If ideology cannot offer dialectical 
synthesis, perhaps one might emerge from existential narratives. 
4.5 Breathless: Images of Anxiety and Individuation in Doctorow 
And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: 
and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man 
became a living soul. 
Genesis 2:7 
The use of somatic metaphors is as common in literature as it is in ordinary 
discourse. We speak of being 'breathless' with anxiety, of 'holding our breath' in 
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anticipation, of 'choking with rage' or of 'choking back tears. ' Doctorow's novel, The 
Book of Daniel, a fictional account of the infamous Rosenberg executions, contains 
recurrent images of breathing and breathing difficulties. Surprisingly, this constellation of 
images has not been addressed in the critical literature. If one considers expiration or 
exhalation as metaphors of expression, the narrative may be viewed as a physiological act 
of telling: a 'getting it off the chest'. Breathing becomes the physiological metaphor for 
the act of narration itself. 
God the Creator, in the book of Genesis, breathes life into Adam; so Daniel 
Lewin creates and breathes life into this story of his search for the truth about his 
biological parents. It is simultaneously a spiritual odyssey for Daniel, and an act of 
individuation that results in a successful confrontation with the ghosts of the past. Just as 
breathing is essential for the life of the body, so Daniel decides that the telling of his story 
is essential to his psychological and spiritual existence. Unlike the biblical Daniel, who, 
although grieved in his spirit, "kept the matter in [his] heart" (12), Daniel Lewin decides 
that such suppression is not wise: "But I, Daniel was grieved ... and I do not want to keep 
the matter in my heart" (The Book of Danie/17).48 As his sister lies in hospital following 
a suicide attempt, he begins his exploration of the facts surrounding his parents' 
execution. All of the images that this "criminal of perception" has taken in (or inhaled, if 
you will) over the years are now fmally released in a fusion of experiences, letters, 
conversations and historical data. Images of breathing, from Daniel's frightening 'spells ' 
(159,238 etc) to the fear of suffocation that he and Susan share, frame the novel. By 
48 E.L. Doctorow, The Book of Daniel. 1971. Toronto, Plume, 1996. Hereafter cited in text as "BD." 
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analyzing these images, I hope to produce a richer understanding of the narrator and his 
journey. In so doing, I also cast light on the existential issues that permeate the novel. 
Daniel'sfreedom to become his own person is initially frightening to him, but once 
finally embraced it becomes exhilarating. 
The character that Doctorow creates here has distinctive elements of sadism, as 
described by Sartre. Critics have pointed out a fact that is often true of characters in 
novels which have an existential motif: Daniel is not a very sympathetic character. Brian 
Dillon, for examp1e, asserts that Daniel "has extremely unappea1ing personal 
characteristics that serve to distance his audience from him" (375). Many readers seem to 
share this negative view of the narrator. Confronted by an interviewer with this 
perspective, Doctorow offers this amplification of his character: 
Suffering doesn't make people virtuous, at least in my experience. But I 
see his "sadism", as you call it, in a slightly different way. I see the 
scene where he abuses his wife, for instance, as the same kind as the 
scene in which he throws his son up in the air. The act has existential 
dimensions. Daniel is over-tuned to the world. He doesn't miss a thing. 
He's a hero-or a criminal-ofperception ... Daniel gives himself to the act 
of perception and opens himself to it- much as all writers must - and he 
survives that way, survives by however cold and frightening an embrace 
with the truth. This is perhaps his only strength. Of course, it would take 
a tremendous act of the will to accept the very idea of a family after this 
kind of thing has happened to you as a child. Daniel recognizes this, and 
in acting out the terrible conflicts within himself between giving in and 
not giving in ... he is enduring - by letting in as much truth about himself 
and his life as he can. (Morris 86-7) 
The author directs us to an existential significance ofDaniel's actions. The following 
sections will consider this in its various dimensions. 
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Approaching the novel with Doctorow' s allusions to existential philosophy as a 
guide, the character of Daniel can be further illuminated by reflecting upon the persistent 
breathing imagery in the novel. The Book of Daniel, seen from this perspective, is an 
inquiry into the role of anxiety in the individuation process. I assert that Daniel's anxiety, 
primarily somatized through breathing difficulties, is in direct relation to his fear of his 
existential freedom. Doctorow explores breath imagery from three perspectives: first as a 
somatization of anxiety, second, as reference to a ghostly 'haunting' of Daniel by 'spirits' 
from the past that help to ground him; and fmally, as an expression ofDaniel's spirit or 
soul, as he comes to embrace his freedom. This character struggles through the difficult 
circumstances of his life, and learns to make his own decisions despite the consequences. 
In this way, Daniel comes to emulate his parents, and fmally to accept his subjecthood, 
with all its dangerous freedom. 
Breathing problems, if without a physical etiology, are often associated with 
anxiety. Anxiety and fear are central to this narrative, so it seems safe to hypothesize that 
the breath imagery is associated with anxiety in The Book of Daniel. As Michelle 
M.Tokarczyk contends, E. L. Doctorow's novel is much more than a fictionalization of 
the Rosenberg case; it is about the legacy of survivors, defined as those "who have come 
into contact with death and remained alive" ( 3). This approach allows us to consider 
Daniel Lewin as a survivor, with all the anxiety that accompanies such a role. Having 
experienced the arrest and eventual execution ofhis parents by the government, fear 
becomes a part of life for the boy and his sister. Daniel's upbringing has taught him to see 
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himself as aligned with his parents in the fight against capitalism, a fight which has had 
fatal consequences for them: 
'The battle is not fmished, the struggle ofthe working class is still going on. 
Never forget that, Danny.' And it seemed to me then that I was marked. Because 
they had a lot more power than we had ... that power of theirs to destroy and put 
down and take vengeance on the ideas in my head, on the dangerous information 
put in my head by my reckless father. (36) 
Daniel is frightened of his father, and of his dangerous ideas. He comes to 
associate passion, or strong emotion, as analogous in its menacing nature to these same 
ideas: "In our house there could be a laying on of words like lightening. Dispensed 
outrage, the smell of burning in the mouths of our mother and father" ( 61 ). This image, 
linking his parents' words with electricity, seems to suggest that perhaps his mother and 
father had precipitated their own deaths by their discourse. Daniel wants to make no such 
mistake and he chooses, at first, to renounce the radicalism of his parents. A choice 
dictated by fear is no existential choice; rather, Daniel is fleeing from the facts of his 
childhood. His own struggle with his anxiety absorbs him as he tries to hold back the 
flood of feelings and memories. Daniel's relationships with the Others in his life, such as 
wife, child, and sister, bear witness to the effect of his anxiety. 
One of the first remarks that Daniel makes about his wife is that she has the ability 
to assuage fear in others ( 4). This observation provides some insight as to why he has 
married her, despite the fact that neither his family nor her family finds the match 
appropriate. As the book opens, he, his wife and baby are traveling to see his sister who is 
hospitalized following a suicide attempt. Daniel is clearly anxious, as he watches exhaust 
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fumes from a nearby car: "Daniel imagined it curling around his ankles, his waist, and 
finally his throat" (5). Sitting silently in the patient's lounge with his sister, Susan, he tries 
to understand her emotional pain: 
He thought he knew what it was, that sense of being overcome. You suffocated. 
The calamity of it. He had had such spells ... Something was torn, there was a 
coming apart of intentions, a forgetting ofwhat you could expect from being 
alive. You couldn't laugh. You were in dread of yourself and it was a dread so 
pure that one glance in the mirror scorched the heart and charred the eyes. (9) 
In his own way, Daniel Lewin, like his biblical counterpart, has also suffered through the 
fiery furnace. 
Doctorow's Daniel shares, as we saw above, a sense of complicity with his 
parents' leftist beliefs. All of them have refused to worship at the altar of capitalism as 
demanded by their government: "And whosofalleth not down and worshippeth shall the 
same hour be cast into the midst of a burning fiery furnace" (Daniel 3 :4 ). The importance 
of this quotation is demonstrated by its inscription at the opening of the novel. Daniel 
continues to worry about his fate, and he believes that government agents are continually 
watching him. Tokarczyk remarks that: "On the American Left, many feared this 
execution [of the Rosenbergs] was only the beginning" (5). Daniel's fear, like his 
indoctrination in Marxist beliefs, begins early, and is disclosed in the following episode. 
Daniel is only seven years old when his parents take him to a 'concert,' which is 
more like a peaceful political demonstration. His realist mother fears danger and doesn't 
want to take him, but his idealist father argues that ''there's a court order protecting the 
thing, for God's sake" (46). Pleased to accompany them, the young boy feels safe and 
cozy on the bus: "I sit on her lap at the window. Next to me my father sings ... The window 
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of the bus is streaked with dried rain" ( 47). But of course the day ends in fear and 
disaster. The bus is attacked and the cries of the passengers leap "out from throats of 
perception." Now they and Daniel perceive the truth of how things are. Daniel fmds 
himself buried in the skirts of his mother, while his father makes a solitary attempt to 
subdue the angry crowd and is attacked by them. A wonderful day with his mother and 
father turns into a nightmare: "I am in an intoxication of fear," the boy remembers (50). It 
is unlikely that the child could ever feel safe again. 
With this new insight into the world, his perceptions alter. The curses of his 
grandmother, previously assumed by Daniel to be the ravings of a mad woman, are now 
seen as the "exact and potent introjection of measures of doom into our lives" (51). His 
new sense of vulnerability haunts him, along with an awareness of "the quality of calmly 
experienced, planned revolutionary sacrifice" in his father (52). He feels that there is an 
evil threatening them of which he has previously been unaware. The sense of some 
unknown threat that seems to loom over them, and his helplessness in the face of it, is 
omnipresent. His father's actions are not explicable in the ordinary way: "what he did was 
mysterious and complicated and not anything like what people were saying" (52). He 
begins to sense, vaguely, that his father is on some self-destructive mission and that he, 
Daniel, is along for the ride. He cries for the loss of his innocence and for the fate of all of 
them. 
Sadism: The Effort to Appropriate the Other's Freedom 
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From this scene in the narration we go directly to the "sadistic" episode with 
Daniel and his wife. Immediately we can see the parallels: mother, father, and son are 
riding together in a car on the highway, off on a family adventure. It is raining and Daniel 
feels secure with his family: "The rain has the effect of a cocoon, it encapsulates us" (56). 
Suddenly, perhaps because of his wife's expressed concerns for their child, Daniel seems 
to become angry. He knows, none better, that any sense of safety is illusory. Then, as if 
neurotically compelled to repeat a previous pattern, he forces his wife to assume the 
crouched position similar to the one assumed by himself and his mother on that bus. As 
he drives in the rain without wipers, demanding that she remove her pants, Phyllis echoes 
Daniel's earlier fears: "You're going to kill us!" his wife screams (59). "We are all going 
to die," the young Daniel believes (50). No one dies in either case, but the car ride, 
similarly to the bus ride, ends in pain and humiliation. The reader is not told any further 
details of the occurrences between husband and wife, but is left in mystery as was Daniel 
in the primary situation. He recalls: "I cannot see what is happening outside. There are 
frightening sounds" (50). In the current experience, Daniel refuses to explain exactly what 
he does to his wife, although there is a suggestion that he bums her with the lighter: "Do 
you believe it?" he demands of the reader. "On the other hand the only thing worse than 
telling what happened is to leave it to the imagination" (60). We, too, are now haunted by 
the unknown and by our inability to intervene, as Daniel was unable to prevent the attack 
upon his father during the fatal bus ride. 
The theory of sexuality presented by existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre helps 
illuminate these events. Normal sexual desire is a mutual attempt to appropriate the 
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freedom, the individuality, of the other. The sadist, "in perpetual flight from his own 
facticity" (BN 518), attempts to deny his own nature by forcing the Other to recognize her 
facticity. In this way, the sadistic act is simultaneously a rejection by the sadist of his own 
' thrownness' into a world where freedom has factual limits, and an attempt to remove 
consciousness of freedom in the Other whom he torments. It is a blind alley: 
What the sadist thus so tenaciously seeks, what he wants to knead with his hands 
and bend under his wrists is the Other' s freedom .. .it is born from anxiety in the 
face of the Other ... The sadist discovers his error when his victim looks at him; 
that is, when the sadist experiences the absolute alienation of his being in the 
Other's freedom. (BN 524-25). 
In a continuous state of anxiety, Daniel spends his life running from the events that have 
defined him. He is attracted to his wife's innocence and "overassumption of life," and 
concurrently angered by it. His sadism is an attempt to appropriate her sense of comfort 
and freedom: to make her share in his Sartrean "anxiety in the face of the Other." 
Daniel is not the first family member to suffer psychosomatic anxiety. When 
Daniel asks his grandmother's ghost why in life she 'blew her mind' in a way so 
frightening to children, she responds that "it begins with the fear of not being able to 
breathe" (BD 70). In post-WWII America, with the Cold War intensifying, a family such 
as the Isaacsons would have much to fear. Daniel ' s difficulty breathing first appears in 
the novel following Mind ish ' s arrest. He hears his parents' worried conversations late at 
night, and begins to dream that he is suffocating: 
I was afraid to go to sleep. I had terrible nightmares which I couldn't remember 
except in waking from them in terror and suffocation. I was terrified that if I 
went to sleep, the house would bum down, or that my parents would go away 
somewhere without telling us. For some reason, the second of these possibilities 
came to seem more likely. I would lie in the dark and think that I couldn't fall 
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asleep because the minute I did, they would leave me and Susan and go 
somewhere they had never told me about.. .I could feel now in everything since 
Mind ish ' s arrest, a coming to stay in our lives of the worst possible expectations. 
The world was arranging itself to suit my mother and father, like some mystical 
alignment of forces in the air; so that frictionless and in physical harmony, all 
bodies and objects were secreting the one sentiment that was their passion, that 
would take them from me. (BD I 09-1 0) 
When his father is finally arrested, Daniel stands impotently watching: "The cold of the 
morning had driven itself into his chest. It filled his chest and his throat. It pressed at the 
backs of his eyes. He was frightened ofthe way he felt" (115). As his father is led away, 
"Susan was hysterical, sobbing with great gasps for air. We have none of us ever had 
enough to breathe" (my emphasis 116). I will return to the existential implications ofthis 
statement, but here emphasize that the anxiety is transparent. 
By the time both parents are in jail, and the children are with their reluctant Aunt 
Frieda, Daniel has developed serious behavioural problems: 
I put the newspapers I stole into the garbage. I often had spells of difficult 
breathing. These frightened me. I found that if I ran around and waved my arms 
like a windmill , I could breath better for a moment. I knocked over a lamp and 
broke it .. .l found that when I couldn' t breathe well I became manically active. I 
did not speak, I screamed. I did not walk, I ran. I couldn't keep still. I made a 
game of spying on Aunt Frieda. (BD 159) 
His aunt is less than understanding, and the children are sent to a Shelter. 
Meanwhile, Daniel struggles to be a big boy and care for his sister, as the media 
paints a frightening and unfamiliar picture of his parents as master spies. He is confused, 
alone, and guilty. The father who had defmed his world ''was being transformed before 
my eyes and he wasn ' t there to stop it from happening. If he was in jail maybe he was an 
atomic ringleader" (160). As Daniel's fear for himself and his family increases, so does 
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his disturbed, asocial behaviour. In striking contrast to the nurturing behaviour he 
demonstrates towards his sister, Susan, Daniel begins to show deliberate cruelty to others. 
An autistic child becomes the object of his cruel mimicry as he desperately attempts to 
assuage his anxiety and alienation: "I was under some kind of compulsion to prove 
myself to the other unreclaimed kids in the hardcore ... Leaders are the only ones who ever 
feel at home. The rest are displaced by the anxiety of trying to make it with the leaders" 
(170). The cruelty towards the "Inertia Kid" becomes outside his control: "I even forgot 
to breathe. I listened for my heart to stop. My guts strained for air while I tried to 
remember how to breathe. I was blacking out trying to remember what the light was for" 
(171). All that seems worth living for is his family, so he takes his sister and runs back to 
his old house. This solution, of course, doesn't work. Daniel does not stop running for 
years. 
There are other images ofDaniel's breathing difficulties that are linked to anxiety 
provoking situations. During the car ride to visit their parents in jail, he asks Ascher to 
open a window because there are gas fumes. The lawyer is surprised: "Fumes? There are 
no fumes," he claims. Daniel responds: '"Just a little.' I was having trouble breathing" 
(238). He is ashamed ofthis weakness and tells no one about it. It arises, as we have seen, 
when he goes to visit Susan in the opening of the novel. Other episodes appear in 
childhood remembrances. As Daniel begins to face his fear of political involvement, his 
breathing problem grips him with the old intensity. During his first activist demonstration, 
he feels again ''the first whispers of death by suffocation" (254). He has, however, made 
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the decision to confront his past and this means confronting his anxiety. It takes a great 
deal of courage for Daniel to take this step and to live through temporary imprisonment: 
And I will tell you now how one boy in the big cell, in this grand 
community of brotherhood bust, how this one boy is unable to share 
the bruised cheery fellowship of his companions ... but sits in the comer, 
unable to stretch out full length, a spasm ofwariness bowing his spine 
knotting his fingers to his palms, his knees to his chest, his head to his 
knees. He cannot enjoy such places. They are too familiar. He cannot 
survive such places in careless courage. He is sensitive to the caged 
air ... (257) 
This is the last reference to Daniel Lewin's breathing problems associated with anxiety. 
By the final section, "Christmas," he is symbolically reborn as Daniel Isaacson who no 
longer feels alienated but at home in California. "I was exhilarated. I took deep breaths of 
the balmy air" (264). Prior to reaching this place of relative peace, Daniel has to come to 
terms with the cause of his anxiety - the ghosts of his past. 
Ghostly Haunting 
"Daniel's narrative is a posthumous recovery of not only his parents but also his 
sister" (Dillon 373). What precipitates this recovery is Susan's attempt at suicide, her 
movement towards the ghostly world, inhabited by his parents and grandmother. As 
Susan appears to be drawn in this direction, Daniel is fleeing from it. He remarks, "To be 
objective, the weaker her signals the stronger mine become" (BD 209). The old fear that 
his death will be demanded, as was that of his parents, still haunts him: "To be objective, 
they are still taking care of us, one by one" (209). His guilt results in part from his own 
determination to survive. In childhood he is not able to face the facts of his parents' 
137 
deaths. Holding his breath, he holds or represses the memories of his biological parents so 
that he can be comfortable with his adoptive family. "It seemed so easy to break free 
because it was what the world wanted of you ... The world did not want to visit the sins of 
the fathers" (63). The past, however, refuses to stay buried; instead it haunts Daniel in 
the form of dreams, images, his sister's presence, and the ghost of his grandmother. 
In the book Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, A very 
F. Gordon establishes a language to describe the social and political effects of the dead 
upon the present. Haunting, she asserts, is a "special instance of the merging of the 
visible and the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the present ... " (24). Literary 
fiction has a significant role to play in bringing attention to the issues of invisibility and 
exclusion. Such issues were portrayed more directly in Ellison and Morrison. As Gordon 
indicates, and the narratives illustrate, that which seems to be dead is, in fact, very much 
alive and still affecting the present. Although Daniel avoids becoming involved 
politically, he is nevertheless tainted by the political actions of his parents: 
I am not applying for a fellowship because if I sign a hundred loyalty oaths, I 
still won't get it ... I live in constant and degrading relationship to the society that 
has destroyed my mother and father. I will never be drafted. If I left school 
today my classification would still be 2-A, which covers any situation not in the 
national interest. Listen, Professor, I could bum my draft card on the steps of the 
Pentagon and nothing would happen. Nothing I do will result in anything but an 
entry in my file. (72) 
Even as he tries to run from his past, he realizes that it is always with him in some sense. 
The ghost, says Gordon, is primarily a symptom of what is missing (63). When 
Daniel first sees his sister after her suicide attempt, he thinks that "without saying much 
of anything, without even caring if he was there, Susan could restore in him the old 
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cloying sense of family ... " (9). In her ghostly state, she conjures up this remembrance of 
their mutual loss, that of their original family. It is the experience of seeing Susan half-
dead that shocks her brother out of his apathetic denial: 
He was thankful to Susan for relieving the dangerous tedium of his graduate life. 
She would be alright. In the meantime there was drama, a sweet fatality, a 
recharging of the weak diffused impulses of giving a shit. (15) 
This shock is analogous to what Benjamin refers to as "blasting" (262-3). Gordon 
redefines this concept of Benjamin's as "a method of dialectics that reconstructs a 
lifework by following the scrambled trail the ghost leaves, picking up its pieces, setting 
them down somewhere else" (66). It represents a constructivism based upon associations 
and correspondences rather than upon a conventional linear, temporal mode. Unlike the 
"monstrous sequence" of history that has found his parents guilty, Daniel's narrative 
seeks to reconstruct the oppressed past and breathe new life into it in the present. 
However, this reckoning with the past also involves a self-reckoning "with how we are in 
these stories, with how they change us, with our own ghosts" (Gordon 22). 
Such is Daniel Lewin's task: to confront his own ghosts. This he sets out to do 
from his sister's hospital bed: '"They're still fucking us', she said. 'Goodbye Daniel. You 
get the picture"' (9). He tries to figure out exactly what Susan means by these words and 
sets out to unravel certain subjects that seem to relate to them. Although he feels guilty as 
he begins to explore his feelings about the past, he knows that he does not ''want to show 
Susan how it's done" (16). He wants to survive and in order to do so he must take up the 
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subjects of his relationships with his biological parents, with his sister, with his grandma 
and with his adoptive parents: 
IS IT SO TERRIBLE NOT TO KEEP THE MATTER IN MY HEART, TO 
GET THE MATTER OUT OF MY HEART, TO EMPTY MY HEART OF 
THIS MATTER? WHAT IS THE MA TIER WITH MY HEART? (17). 
So Daniel is summoned to his sister's car. "The feeling that crept upon me was of being 
summoned. They're still fucking us. That somehow it wasn't the old pain-bum across 
Susan's eyes that was important ... " (29). The most significant meaning about Susan's. 
message to him was that it was an attempt at communication: 
Susan had communicated with me; just that; and if now in our lives only extreme 
and dangerous communication was possible, nevertheless the signal has been 
sent, discharged, even from the spasm of soul that was required - and that was 
the sense of summons I felt sneaking up over the afternoon like a blanket of 
burned space around my ears. Susan and I, we were the only ones left. And all 
my life I have been trying to escape from my relatives and I have been intricate 
in my run, but one way or another they are what you come upon around the 
corner ... (30) 
Susan points her brother to the rest of his family relationships and to the troubling visions 
in his head. 
The picture we get is of a little boy desperate to protect his younger sister in the 
midst ofthe crisis surrounding them after their parents are arrested. When the lawyer 
becomes impatient with Susan, Daniel poignantly reminds him: "Just a minute, Mr. 
Ascher. .. She's only a little girl, you know" (19). He learns to disregard his own feelings 
as he becomes responsible for nurturing his sibling. As they grow, he helps her with 
homework, teaches her to ride a bike, and otherwise assumes the tasks of a parent. He 
was "the mother, the father, the brother, the family. And it was painful and they had 
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some terrible fights" (62). Finally, in their last Christmas together, Susan rejects him 
because of his opinions concerning their parents: "You think they are guilty. It's enough 
to take someone' s life away" (77). The letter she writes, and he receives after she is 
hospitalized, informs Daniel that: "You no longer exist" (77). He himself has now 
become a ghost, joining the land of the non-existent as he has often feared he would. 
Holding his breath has not prevented it. "If this boy is breathing make a ghost of him" 
(168). His existence, denied by the Other, must now be forged by Daniel alone. To do so, 
he needs to confront all the ghosts of the past that he has so indefatigably tried to escape. 
As he approaches the memory of his parents, the Isaacsons, Daniel is struck by the 
elusive nature of reality. "You've got these two people in the poster, Daniel, now how 
are you going to get them out?" ( 43). How are all the different and invisible aspects, that 
lurk in the shadows of his parents' picture, to be integrated? How, in tum, is he going to 
integrate all the fragments of his self, of which his parents are a central part? He does 
have the picture, in the literal sense; he has the poster of his parents left in Susan's car. 
The figurative picture is not so easy to access. It begins to take shape, to become visible, 
through Daniel' s narrative reconstruction. Doctorow's novel offers narrative as one 
potentially successful path to individuation. It begins, as usual, with childhood. 
During the boy' s childhood, the past is always before him in the figure of the 
grandmother who lives with them. She is bothered by breathing difficulties herself, as she 
suffers from asthma: "It begins with the fear of not being able to breathe," she tells Daniel 
(70). Her appearance, after her death, is remarked upon matter-of-factly by her grandson: 
"Occasionally, after her death, she liked to visit me and press a penny into my palm and 
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bless my head, and call me a good boy" (69). His grandmother recognizes the compassion 
in him as well as ''the strength and innocence that will reclaim us all from defeat" (70). 
Although this vision of hers is frightening to Daniel, it also gives him the encouragement 
for the self-reckoning he needs to do. The images that arise in his consciousness, as he 
allows his mind to move backwards, "are essentially instruments of torture exploding 
through the individual's calloused capacity to feel powerful undifferentiated emotions full 
of longing and dissatisfaction and monumentality" (71). The pain caused by the 
memories has no social purpose he believes, but he is wrong. 
Unfortunately for the Isaacson children, their new adoptive parents, the Lewins, 
have their own difficulties adjusting to the children's past: 
These ghosts were not strange sounds in the attic, nor were they mists who 
moaned in the midnight garden. These ghosts were ironies. These ghosts were 
slips of the tongue. They were the brutal meanings in innocent remarks. (BD 75) 
Daniel, the ever-observant "criminal of perception," realizes the nearness of these ghostly 
presences that demand to be confronted. Yet Daniel is afraid of the emotional 
confrontation, as he suggests when he remarks ofthe biblical Daniel: "His is a life of 
confrontations ... not a job for a man sensitive to loud noises or bright light" (12-13). He 
longs to feel ''the flesh of the soul healing" in the peaceful milieu that his new parents 
have provided (30). Simultaneously, he feels that enjoying himself is, in some way, a 
betrayal of his birth parents. Not until Susan's suicide attempt does he realize that he must 
confront his past and the memories haunting him. "Indeed to fight for an oppressed past is 
to make this past come alive as the lever for the work of the present...ending this history 
and setting in place a different future" (66). As Daniel deals with his past, he comes alive 
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to his present. As he confronts the fear of his freedom, the terrible freedom to take 
responsibility for his own life choices, he faces the existential dilemma of all men. Daniel 
begins to find ways to exist authentically in a world where one is "being-towards-death." 
Setting the Spirit Free 
There is ample evidence to support the connection between self-expression, or 
self-actualization, with the expiration of breath. Concepts of soul and spirit are frequently 
interchangeable in mythical and religious stories. God, reveals the lines from Genesis, 
breathed life into man and he became a "living soul" (2:7). The Jewish Encyclopedia 
informs us that, in the Talmud, the words 'spirit' and 'soul' are interchangeable, for the 
most part (472-76). Along with the Christian, the Jewish tradition owes much to the 
ancient Greek philosophers and their ideas on spirit. The development of the Kabala, in 
particular, shows the influence of the Neoplatonists. The individual soul or spirit exists as 
an incarnation of the "universal soul," later called "Absolute Spirit" by Hegel. The 
association of breath with soul or spirit originates in ancient, primitive societies. Frazer's 
The Golden Bough explains the ancient belief that the soul must be protected from 
leaving the body suddenly, for example during a sneeze: "The soul is commonly 
supposed to escape by the natural openings of the body, especially the mouth and nostrils 
(125). This clarifies the custom of saying, 'God bless you'. It follows that the images of 
air or breath informing Doctorow's novel may be taken as references to spirit. 
In his major study of the Bible, The Great Code, Northrop Frye describes the 
ancient concept of spirit thus: 
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Even Aristotle's De Anima describes a complex soul. But the nearest to the 
purely metaphorical conception is perhaps the word "spirit," which, with its 
overtones of "breath," expresses the unifying principle of life that gives man a 
participating energy with nature. (emphasis mine; Frye 19) 
Creation began with light and air, the two symbols of spirit, according to Frye (124). 
When we conceptualize things that we know exist, but that we cannot see, we usually 
think of air. In another sense we do not actually 'see' light, either, but "what we see is 
metaphorically fire, a source or reflection of light" (Frye 124). By these elements ofthe 
invisible world, are we able to see. The Bible presents the invisible world as the medium 
by which the material world becomes visible. The spirit of man is the medium by which 
the material world is interpreted, or made actual for him. In accordance with the strength 
of his spirit, a man is able to understand and come to terms with what the existentialists 
call facti city. Daniel's spirit has been damaged and it begins to heal in the process of 
narration. Whatever truth he cannot let in is symbolized by breathing difficulties. 
Daniel informs us from the beginning that he is" grieved in spirit" and does not 
wish to keep the matter in his heart (17). The Jewish Encyclopedia explains that the soul 
"has its seat in the heart" (474). His memories from childhood explain this dis-
spiritedness, while the act of narration is itself an inspiration, an act of spiritual recovery. 
The relationship that Daniel describes between himself and his father is primarily one of 
the spirit: 
He wrestled society for my soul. He worked on me to counteract the bad 
influences of my culture. That was our relationship - his teaching me how 
to be a psychic alien. That was part of the training. He had to exorcize the 
influences, the "bad spirits." (BD 34) 
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Merely a boy who wanted only his father's love, the adult Daniel realizes that he 
"listened because that was the price I paid for his attention" (35). His resentment of 
radical politics stems, in part, from this jealousy of the father's passion for his principles. 
With his parents in jail, Daniel is lost, spiritually as well as emotionally. An alien in his 
own culture, he has no father to create the world for him: "I tried to work things out the 
way he used to but I couldn't summon up that power" (160). He wanders aimless 
and alienated until the narration begins. Shocked into recalling his strength and his spirit 
by the fading of Susan's spirit, Daniel takes up his odyssey to fmd and reclaim his self. 
Revelations concerning the father, Paul Isaacson, unfold from passages that deal 
with his breathing. Images that relate to him allude to breath as spirit rather than as 
anxiety: 
Nothing he did was obscure - how beautiful that is to contemplate. Even his 
breathing was noisy. Bending over those radios. You could hear the 
concentration of the job in his release of breath. . .I would stand at his worktable 
and listen to him breathe, the twist of a screw or the soldering of a wire allowing 
him to reward himself with another exhalation. It was just the way he existed in 
the space he occupied. Right out to the edges. (my emphasis 33) 
His father's spirit was strong enough to hold out against the zeitgeist, to strain against the 
socially imposed limits. His "elaborate breathing" (39) becomes a metaphor for 
willingness to move out into the world, to take risks. Unfortunately for all of them, this is 
not a time conducive to the expression ofthe human spirit, of individuality and freedom. 
Groups are at work that attempt to confine and limit this freedom: "Their intent is to stifle 
and intimidate the forces of progressivism in this country, to tum back the tide of history, 
which is of course futile" (BD 86). These groups do, however, serve to temporarily stifle 
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or suffocate the spirit, the self-expression, of Daniel. After Paul Isaacson's arrest, Daniel 
notices changes in the way the family inhabits space: "Our lives are shrinking. The 
Isaacson family exists now only to the edges of its own domesticity" (121). 
Simultaneously, as their real world diminishes, their existence in the media takes on an 
expanded dimension. Confused by this intermingling of real and unreal, Daniel fears the 
experience of moving out into an unknown world. The children's first attendance at a 
protest, after their parents are arrested, brings an alarming sense of being crushed to 
death. '"I don't like this,' Susan said. 'I can't move!"' He and his sister feel suffocated 
and "alone in the Cold War" (173). There are far too many deterrents of self-expression. 
With his individual freedom curtailed, Daniel attempts to appropriate some sense of 
power and control from Others. 
After Daniel relates the events surrounding the arrest of his parents, he follows 
with a description of another episode of his sadism; this time, it involves his baby son. 
The family is in the park feeling intimate: "we were tight" (131). Daniel is doing what 
fathers do: throwing his son in the air to make him laugh. Suddenly, Daniel feels 
conflicted by this fearful pull of family: 
I tossed my son higher and higher, and now he laughed no longer but cried out. 
Still I did not stop and I threw him higher and caught him closer to the ground. 
Then Phyllis was begging me to stop. I can't bear to think about this murderous 
feeling .. .! can't remember my thoughts. I think his weight, the heft of his little 
body freaked me. ( 131) 
His feeling here echoes the words of his grandmother's spirit: 
And my curses are my love for them whom I curse for existing at the mercy of 
life and God and for the dust they will allow themselves to become for having 
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been born. And my complicity in their being, the fruit of my womb, that I could 
have tricked them this way outrages me. (70) 
The existential dimensions of this episode are easier to discern than that of the episode 
with Daniel's wife. Here, it is clear the sheer weight of the responsibility for another 
being "freaks" him. Sartre explains existential anguish or anxiety in these words: 
When a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only 
choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for 
the whole of mankind - in such a moment a man cannot escape from the sense of 
complete and profound responsibility. (E&H 30) 
As he sees himself mirrored in that of his child, Daniel experiences the full weight of this 
freedom. 
From another perspective, one might regard this incident as Daniel's 
experimentation with setting himself free. His son looks at him with "my Isaacson face" 
locked in terror of"the breath-taking flight," just as Daniel is afraid of moving forward 
into life without his father to clarify things for him (BD 131 ). This fearful approach to 
existence begins to alter in the last section of the novel. It symbolically begins with 
Daniel Isaacson on a plane. "Often the soul is conceived as a bird ready to take flight" 
(Frazer 124). Daniel's spirit was sent forth into life, without parental guidance, long 
before he was ready for this freedom. The circumstances of his parents' early death left 
him with a sense of the dangerous responsibility of freedom, before his subjective self 
was prepared to confront such an existential challenge. Daniel's words towards the end of 
the novel suggest this: 
It is the kind of day the crocuses get fucked, exposing their petaled insides of 
delicate hue, yellow and white, lavender and flesh, to the spring. And it is too 
soon. It' s a miscalculation. (300) 
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The Isaacson children were not grounded enough to sustain themselves in the aftermath 
of their parents' deaths. It was too soon for them to take metaphoric flight. 
The existentialist perspective reveals Doctorow's narrative as the revelation of 
Daniel's efforts to come to terms with his own facticity, to fmally stop running. The 
German existentialist philosopher Heidegger defined the experience of finding oneself in 
a particular world gestalt as ''thrownness." This experience alone results in anxiety about 
the world itself and the possibilities it holds. In his opus Being and Time, Heidegger also 
aligns this fear with respiration. The individual, asserts the philosopher, does not truly 
comprehend this anxiety, which "is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's 
breath ... " (Heidegger 231). Until Susan's suicide attempt, Daniel has avoided all serious 
involvement. Afterwards, he alters rapidly as he moves through his self-expression, his 
self-articulation: "I was learning how to be an Isaacson ... My face now bearded, my hair 
longer than it has ever been, I careen through my changes at an accelerating pace. The 
sense is of running too fast downhill. But why not, why the fuck not?" (BD 207). He 
moves out into his world, starting the Foundation, interviewing people regarding his 
parents' case, and generally taking a stand. Susan's world continues to shrink until, in the 
final analysis, it is totally self-enclosed. Action is essentially spatial, for ''to act is to 
modify the shape ofthe world ... " (BN 559). As his father's loud breathing reflects his 
assumption and consumption of space, so Daniel finally moves out to occupy his space 
via action. He comes to know himself, to define himself with every moment as an 
individual subject. 
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Of the novels included in my thesis, I maintain that the Book of Daniel is both the 
most clearly expressed and the most positive exploration of the philosophy of 
existentialism. Making use of the breath imagery metaphor, Doctorow allows us to track 
the movement ofDaniel through anxiety to individuation. The reborn Daniel Isaacson 
sets off on a flight much like that of Joyce's Stephen Daedalus, symbolizing the soaring 
forth of his self into life. In stasis, as can be seen in Susan's deterioration, there can only 
be death, not security. Daniel has come to realize that life means movement outward, and 
he chooses life with all its risks. The act of narration itself is the first choice forward. 
The awareness of the body, the somatizing that is revealed as central to self-
knowledge in The Book of Daniel, is illuminated again in the novels of Walker Percy. In 
works such as The Moviegoer we are introduced to a philosophy that places its central 
importance on the relationship between subject and object, or between the 'for-itself' and 
the ' in-itself.' The pursuit of individual freedom is posited as essentially linked with the 
well being and freedom of the Other, a resolution of the primary problem of existence. 
4.6 Walker Percy's Grail Quest in The Moviegoer 
The specific character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware 
of being despair. 
Kierkegaard 
The search is what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in 
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the everydayness of his own life ... To become aware of the possibility 
of the search is to be onto something. Not to be onto something is to be 
in despair. 
The Moviegoer 
Existentialists are often accused of being nihilistic and depressing. Sartre speaks 
to this criticism in his lecture, published as Existentialism and Humanism: 
The essential charge laid against us is, of course, that of over-emphasis upon the 
evil side of human life [ ... ] In the light of all this, what people reproach us with is 
not, after all, our pessimism, but the sternness of our optimism. If people condemn 
our works of fiction, in which we describe characters that are base, weak, 
cowardly and sometimes even frankly evil, it is not only because those characters 
are base, weak, cowardly or evil. For suppose that, like Zola, we showed that the 
behaviour of these characters was caused by their heredity, or by the action of 
their environment upon them, or by determining factors, psychic or organic. 
People would be reassured, they would say, "You see, that is what we are like, no 
one can do anything about it." But the existentialist, when he portrays a coward, 
shows him as responsible for his cowardice. (42-3) 
We can recall the failure of our different characters to rationalize their violent actions. 
That is one element that readers often fmd most disturbing about Ellis' American Psycho. 
We have also considered novels such as Invisible Man, Beloved, and finally The Book of 
Daniel, which present us with the possibility of self-realization. Walker Percy belongs to 
the latter group, whose view of life seems focused on the potential of individuation. 
Percy's search for meaning led him to explore the works of philosophers such as 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre and Marcel, as well as the literary works of Dostoevsky 
and Camus.49 He differs from the French school of existentialism by virtue of his 
49 There are several studies on Percy's philosophy. In The Gift of the Other: 
Gabriel Marcel's Concept of Intersubjectivity in Walker Percy's Novels, Mary Deems 
Howland offers a comprehensive inquiry into Percy's distinctive form of existentialism. 
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religious belief; he was a devout Roman Catholic. In her comprehensive study of the 
works that inspired Percy, The Gift of the Other, Howland explores the philosophic basis 
for Percy's existentialism. His ideology is closest to the writings of Gabriel Marcel, says 
Howland, because they both place focus on the reconciliation ofthe subject/object 
dichotomy. All existentialists acknowledge the significance of the synthesis which Hegel 
made central. This issue of constructive relationships with the Other was one which Sartre 
alludes to in his works, but never fully develops. Such an affirmative vision is a vital part 
of Walker Percy's literary approach; he states in an essay: "The psychical forces presently 
released in the postmodern consciousness open unlimited possibilities for both destruction 
and liberation, for an absolute loneliness or a rediscovery of community and 
reconciliation" (The Message in the Bottle 112). His narratives focus on embracing 
liberation, rather than on destruction, as did Doctorow's The Book of Daniel. 
His first novel, The Moviegoer (1961), develops around the alienation experienced 
by the narrator and his growing awareness of the importance ofhuman relationships in 
allaying this angst. In light of the previous chapter, it is interesting to note that Percy's 
central character, John Bickerson Bolling, is a young white male stocks-and-bonds 
broker. Unlike the characters found in the novels by Wolfe and Ellis, "Binx" resides in 
the Southern city of New Orleans rather than in New York City. Although he enjoys his 
money and his casual affairs, his life is essentially an "exercise in cultivating different 
sensations" (Howland 24). Since the narrative reveals the events of only eight days in his 
Based primarily on Marcel, Percy's position is that coming to self-awareness is a 
continuous process: a journey, not a destination. 
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life, days that are marked by dramatic change, one can call the novel an experience of 
epiphany. As the novel opens, Binx tells the reader that he chooses to live in a basement 
apartment in a suburb, a detail which has caused several critics to compare him to 
Ellison's Invisible Man and Dostoevsky's Underground Man. He has decided on this 
simple, "peaceful" existence because of his previous experiences living in the center of 
the city: 
But whenever I try live there, I find myself first in a rage during which I 
develop strong opinions on a variety of subjects and write letters to editors, then 
in a depression during which I lie rigid as a stick for hours staring strai~ht up at 
the plaster medallion in the ceiling of my bedroom. (The Moviegoer 6) 0 
This vacillation between rage and powerlessness, between action and inaction, is 
analogous to the description of the individual given by Christopher Lasch at the 
beginning of this chapter. Percy, as well as Lasch, gives a clear picture of alienating 
powers of the big city. 
Now away from the city, Binx enjoys carrying out ''the duties of a citizen and to 
receive in return a receipt or a neat styrene card with one's name on it certifying, so to 
speak, one's right to exist" (M 7). He lives, in short, a life stripped of all extremes of 
passion, an inauthentic life full of "quiet desperation." Not unlike Ellis' Patrick Bateman, 
he relates all his real world experiences to some movie or other: "The fact is I'm quite 
happy in a movie, even a bad movie" (M 7). Any form of escape will do nicely, from 
50 Percy, Walker. The Moviegoer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1967. Hereafter 
cited in text as "M." 
152 
movies or television to a series of dead-end relationships with the succession of 
secretary/girlfriends that he refers to as "my Lindas." 
A Southern Catholic writer who believes in redemption, Percy is often compared 
to Flannery O'Connor, with whom he shares a Southern and a Roman Catholic heritage. 
Violence is certainly redemptive in O'Connor's work, but as with many of the narratives I 
have considered here, redemption for O'Connor's characters frequently comes 
accompanied by death. What is positive about the novels of Walker Percy is that the 
violence itself becomes the vehicle for transcendence beyond the despair inherent in what 
he refers to as "everydayness," a term from Heidegger. Another distinction ofPercy's 
narratives from those of other authors discussed in this thesis is that the physical violence 
that occurs in The Moviegoer is not subject-to-subject; it is the impersonal violence of 
wars and car accidents. As a situation, it holds within itself a secret for the survivors. It is 
this secret which marks the onset of the main character's movement away from his 
"peaceful existence" and onto a quest for the meaning of existence. The narrative 
represents the journal ofthis particular journey, which actually begins in the past and 
extends into the future. It spans eight days leading up to the narrator's thirtieth birthd~, 
which is symbolically Ash Wednesday, the first day of Lent in the Roman Catholic 
liturgical calendar. Lent, in turn, marks the beginning of the movement towards the 
rebirth and resurrection of Easter Sunday. 
The event that precipitates the novel's self-quest occurs in the immediacy of a war 
trauma memory: 
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But things have suddenly changed. My peaceful existence in Gentilly has been 
complicated. This morning, for the first time in years, there occurred to me the 
possibility of a search. I dreamed of the war, no, not quite dreamed but woke 
with the taste of it in my mouth, the queasy-quince taste of 1951 and the Orient. I 
remembered the first time the search occurred to me. I came to myself under a 
chindolea bush. Everything is upside down for me, as I shall explain later. What 
are generally considered to be the best times are for me the worst times, and that 
worst of times was one of my best. My shoulder didn't hurt but it was pressed 
hard against the ground as if somebody sat on me. Six inches from my nose a 
dung beetle was scratching around under the leaves. As I watched, there awoke 
in me an immense curiosity. I was onto something. I vowed that if I ever got out 
of this fix, I would pursue the search. Naturally, as soon as I recovered and got 
home, I forgot all about it. (M 11) 
In this moment Binx confronts his own past, his facticity. Previously, he has been 
defming himself by reference to different movie characters: he loves like Clark Gable, or 
he seduces girls like Cary Grant. In the present moment, by means of this very evocative 
real memory, our narrator finds that his life begins to feel real. He begins to be present to 
his own life. Looking at his belongings, the accoutrements of his existence, he reflects: 
"A man can look at this little pile on his bureau for thirty years and never once see it. It is 
as invisible as his own hand. Once I saw it, however, the search became possible (M 11 ). 
The entire search involves, he tells the reader, simply "what anyone would undertake if he 
were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life" (M 13). Not to be involved in this 
search is to be in despair. Binx is onto something, and therefore he is moving away from 
his despair. 
Trauma or catastrophe is essential, Percy believes, to permit an individual to 
become self-aware. It is the first step towards accepting the burden of choice inherent in 
existential freedom. The work of theologian Jerome Taylor, In Search of Self: Life, Death 
& Walker Percy, is an exploration ofthe quest for selthood in all ofPercy's central 
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characters51 • In his analysis ofthe moment described above, the precipitating moment of 
Binx Bolling's search, Taylor explains its significance to selfhood: 
The essential moment of catastrophe is obviously present here: Binx is lying 
wounded. He does not fight it or rail against it. There he is; he accepts it. And 
then something happens: his interest is caught by a dung beetle scratching 
around among the leaves. He sees it as he has not seen things before, as a kind of 
"revelation of being." (Taylor's italics, 98) 
Kierkegaard's injunction to "choose despair" is offered by Taylor to explain the 
resolution of this catastrophe. In the midst of suffering or death man as being-for-itself 
still can assert his freedom by choosing to own the moment, rather than attempting to 
escape it. Thus did Faulkner's Joe Christmas choose his death, although he could not have 
prevented it. This coming to himself, as Taylor terms it, as one who is aware in the 
immediate sense is the first step of a responsible, acting agent. From this first step of self-
recovery the individual "will begin a search for an answer to the question of who he is, 
where he came from, and where he is going" (Taylor 101 ). 
The eight-day search which constitutes this narrative is merely the beginning of 
what is a life process. Man is responsible for creating himself in every moment, according 
to the precepts of existentialism. Like a movie actor, man creates his role, but without the 
direction provided for the performer. "The movies are onto the search, but they screw it 
up. [ ... ] They like to show a fellow coming to himself in a strange place-but what does he 
do? [ ... ] In two weeks time he is so sunk in everydayness that he might just as well be 
51 This work by Jerome Taylor, theologian, is a study of Percy's philosophy, which 
he sees as mainly Kierkgaardian, and his religion, which is Roman Catholic. Of the text 
Percy himself asserts: "[It is] quite brilliant, both in its unerring dead aim on my 
characters, but also in his treatment ofKierkegaard" (cover of In Search of Self 
Cambridge, Mass: Cowley Publications. 1986.). 
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dead" (M 13). Binx however, rejecting the "reality" he has found in movies, is on his 
way towards authenticity and away from "bad faith". He carefully seeks out the truth in 
ordinary experiences. Going to his aunt's home, he is greeted by the black servant: 
For some reason it is possible to see Mercer more clearly today than usual. 
Ordinarily it is hard to see him because of the devotion. He worked for my 
grandfather in Feliciana Parish before Aunt Emily brought him to New Orleans. 
He is thought to be devoted to us and we to him. But the truth is that Mercer and 
I are not at all devoted to each other. My main emotion around Mercer is unease 
that in threading his way between servility and presumption, his foot might slip. 
(M22) 
Recognizing the humanity in the Other, a servant whom he has taken for granted in the 
past, Binx begins to relate with those around him as reflections ofhis own subjectivity 
and freedom. 
Binx is good at making money, and he acknowledges that he enjoys money, but 
unlike the protagonists of Wolfe and Ellis this trader does not place a great deal of 
significance on material things. His aunt speaks ironically of "barbarians at the inner 
gate" with "Mr. Bolling the stockbroker" as defender of the spoils (M 33). However, 
Percy's character does not see himself, like Wolfe's McCoy, as a "master of the 
universe." He is not obsessively engaged, as are the characters of Ellis, in a game of 
'keeping-up-with-the-Joneses.' Binx is able to resist the attempt to seduce him to return to 
the prosperous and prestigious company of his Uncle Jules. In his search for authenticity, 
though, Binx Bolling finds that few others are interested: "People often ask me what is 
wrong with the world ... and I always try to give an answer ... ! have noticed, however, that 
no one really wants to listen to an answer" (M 39). 
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"Percy's first novel, The Moviegoer (1961), has at its center the developing 
intersubjective relationship between Binx Bolling and his aunt's stepdaughter, Kate 
Cutrer'' (Howland 21). Asked by his Aunt to attempt to "get through" to Kate, whom he 
has not seen in years, Binx finds that they still have much in common. "You don't fool 
me," she tells him; "You're like me, but worse. Much worse" (M 43). She too is living 
"underground" in a basement. More significant still is the fact that she too is on a search. 
Having been involved in a car accident in which her date was killed, friends and family 
believe she is depressed by the experience. Unlike Binx, though, she is "trapping herself' 
in various roles she chooses to play. Kate is living in "bad faith," as she refuses to 
confront the circumstances which have led to her incapacitating fear of action, and 
therefore of life (M 63). 52 
Although Bolling is moving towards authentic existence throughout the narrative, 
he does not realize the inauthenticicty of most of his life stratagems until the end. He 
makes money, he goes to movies, and he has an endless series of uncommitted 
relationships with women. The money gives him little pleasure; he seems to live very 
simply in a basement apartment without attachment to material things that money can 
offer: "My apartment is as impersonal as a motel room. I have been careful not to 
accumulate possessions" (M 78). His daily life is dull: "In the evenings I usually watch 
television or go to the movies" (M 7). He experiences his life, as in the Platonic Cave: 
several degrees removed from reality: 
52 As we have seen "bad faith" involves trying to define oneself through the eyes 
of others, thereby avoiding responsibility for one's own freedom. 
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Other people, so I have read, treasure memorable moments in their lives: the 
time one climbed the Parthenon at sunrise, the summer night one met a lonely 
girl in Central Park and achieved with her a sweet and natural relationship, as 
they say in books. I too once met a girl in Central Park, but it is not much to 
remember. What I remember is the time John Wayne killed three men with a 
carbine as he was falling to the dusty street in Stagecoach, and the time the kitten 
found Orson Wells in the doorway in The Third Man. (M 7) 
He has no real intimacy in his life; he reveals that he has not had a friend in eight years: "I 
spend my entire time working, making money, going to movies and seeking the company 
of women" (M 41). He avoids intimate relationships until he begins his search for the 
meaning of his life. With Kate, he begins to open the door to the real. 
"Have you noticed", Kate asks, "that only in time of illness or disaster or death are 
people real?" (M 81 ). Discussing the accident with Binx, she tells him that "it gave me 
my life. That's my secret, just as the War is your secret" (M 56). She attempts to recreate 
this feeling of reality by causing herself physical pain: she constantly picks at the skin on 
her hands, causing them to bleed. This attempt to make use of physical pain is similar to 
the situation of the sadist and/or the masochist as described by Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness. Relations with the Other "presuppose facticity; that is, our existence as body 
in the midst ofthe world" (BN 471). Masochism is one response to the fear one feels in 
the presence of the Other's freedom as signified by the "gaze." The answer, for the 
masochist, is to make the self into an object which cannot arouse the Other's attempt to 
appropriate the freedom ofthe subject. As with sadism, masochism is doomed to fail at 
the task it intends: "The more he tries to taste his objectivity, the more he will be 
submerged by his subjectivity -hence his anguish" (BN 493). 
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This use of self-inflicted pain has a twofold result: ftrst, it serves to force 
awareness of facti city, the flesh as the immediate real; second, it is simultaneously a 
means of escaping the responsibility of freedom. In her interesting work The Body in 
Pain, Elaine Scarry points out that "in serious pain the claims of the body utterly nullify 
the claims of the world" (33). Pain destroys language, says Elana Gomel, and through this 
process ''the body in pain emerges as absolutely, uncompromisingly real, real beyond the 
construction of language and discourse" (xxiv; my italics). Both Kate and Binx are 
obsessed with the lack of reality in their worlds. It follows logically that they both seek 
what is most solid and real: ''the power over the body is the only real power there is" 
(Gomel xxvi). Kate approaches this reality through self-mutilation. For Binx, the 
approach to the real is made through sexual encounters with various objectified women. 
In the midst of her therapy session, Kate comes to an epiphany concerning the 
inauthenticity of her life. She attempts to relate this extraordinary experience to Binx: 
You see, there is nothing he can say. He can't tell me the secret even if he knew 
it. Do you know what I did? After a minute or so he asked me: what comes to 
mind? I sat up and rubbed my eyes and then it dawned on me. But I couldn't 
believe it. It was too simple. My God, can a person live twenty-five years, a life 
of crucifixion, through a misunderstanding? Yes! I stood up. I had dis<(overed 
that a person does not have to be this or be that or be anything, not even oneself. 
One is free. (M 115) 
Shortly after this announcement Kate groans, "I'm so afraid" (116) and she trembles in 
the face ofthe responsibility of that ''terrible freedom." Binx, fleeing his malaise in his 
little sports car accompanied by one of his women, finds that "a little tongue ofhellfire 
licks at our heels" (M 123). The burden of freedom so assaults him that he envies his 
wheelchair constrained step-brother: "His life is a serene business" (M 137). 
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Kate and Binx make a choice directed towards the future: they decide to marry. 
The proposal begins almost as a joke for Binx. For Kate, it is another attempt to run from 
her existential freedom. With marriage, she believes, Binx will have to direct her life for 
her: "It may not be the noblest way of living, but it is one way" (196). Refusing her 
subjective responsibility, Kate sets Binx up as her god: "You are the unmoved mover [ . .. ] 
I don't know whether I love you, but I believe in you and I will do what you tell me 
(197). Binx, who has secretly wished often for the world to end, now wonders "Is it 
possible that- it is not too late?" (231). He has moved from a detached objective outlook 
on life to a more involved subjective perspective. She acknowledges his essential 
solipsism and he recognizes her precarious emotional state. They do fmd some sort of 
intimacy together, because they each understand the other's alienation. Hazel Barnes 
expounds on Sartre's position that reflects this reality: "Out of the awareness of our 
mutual solitude is born a sense ofhuman solidarity" (217). Thus Kate and Binx begin an 
authentic existence, which, by defmition, must originate with meaningful human 
interaction. In this mutual recognition of the other's being as freedom, there is no sense of 
alienation. Percy's characters have found a way to bridge the gap between self and Other, 
individual and community. That bridge is the one that Morrison's Sethe begins to 
hesitantly cross at the conclusion of Beloved. Doctorow's Daniel rediscovers it, and even 
Ellison's invisible man stretches tentatively towards it. Love seems to be the answer after 
all. 
From this platonic, universal and fraternal love, we tum now to its more specific 
form in relationships between the sexes. Prior to entering into sexual relationships, 
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individuals require a sense of themselves as sexual beings. In our society, that involves 
confronting a complex system of gender identity issues. Here, the threat to the 
individual's sense of self is often great, as he/she struggles to define the self as free 
subject. 
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Chapter Five 
En-Gendering Violence: 
Pitfalls on Freedom Road 
"You fit into me 
Like a hook into an eye. 
A fish hook, 
An open eye." 
Margaret Atwood 
5.1 Male & Female Subjects: The Violence of Stereotyping 
I cannot make my liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally 
my aim. 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
Jean-Paul Sartre has fmally begun to be recognized for his contributions to 
feminism, after years of being maligned by feminist theorists .53 Feminist and 
philosopher Julien Murphy claims that, not only was Sartre always an advocate for the 
oppressed, "he was one of the first contemporary philosophers to make gender a 
philosophical issue" (Murphy 3). His famous relationship with Simone de Beauvoir, 
whose writings have influenced French feminists, offers testimony to Sartre's 
understanding of gender related difficulties. Beauvoir maintains that it was Sartre who 
suggested to her that gender was a legitimate category worthy of analysis (Murphy 4 ). 
Several sections of her famous work, The Second Sex, were initially published in Sartre's 
53 For a succinct and coherent account of these theorists see the article by Phyllis 
Sutton Morris, "Sartre on Objectification: A Feminist Perspective" in Feminist 
Interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
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journal Les Temps Modernes. The second wave of the Women's Movement has been 
inarguably influenced by Beauvoir's text. The unconventional and egalitarian relationship 
between these two philosophers, Sartre and Beauvoir, speaks volumes about Sartre's 
personal gender politics. In her seminal book, Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Murphy remarks: 
Given all this, the silence from feminists about Sartre's value is 
perplexing, having more to do with the historical moment in which Sartre 
found himself in his later years than with substantive evaluations of his 
work. Though Sartre's influence looms large over the century he has 
been temporarily displaced over the past few decades by two trends in 
particular, poststructuralism and feminism. Only now is he being restored 
to his rightful position of prominence. (4) 
Feminist philosophy has attempted to distance itself from existentialism largely in 
response to the latter's lack of favour in the intellectual community. Murphy, Judith 
Butler, and others assert that the time has finally come to reverse that trend. 
The long established debate concerning established binary oppositions of 
gender/sex calls into question previously accepted theoretical models. Freud's account of 
the oedipal stage of development, with its controversial theory of penis-envy, depicts a 
female enslaved by her body's deficiencies. Even as feminists rejected Freudian premises 
in favour of other analytic positions, the tremendous influence of Jacques Lacan on 
critical theory found women as much enslaved by gender as did Freud's account of the 
Oedipal stage. Judith Butler explains the female's status under Lacan's Law of the Father: 
In yet other words, the human subject only becomes a discrete "I" 
within the matrix of gender roles. Hence to exist as a subject is to 
exist as a gendered being, "subjected" to the Law of the Father which 
requires that sexual desire remains within the rules of gender; in fact 
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the subject's sexual desire is dictated, sanctioned, and punished by 
the rules of gender. (Subjects of Desire 202)54 
Even if one rejects the Lacanian position, one must still acknowledge and confront the 
import of gender in establishing the subject's identity. Human beings seek recognition, 
and "the terms by which we are recognized as human are socially articulated and 
changeable" (Undoing Gender 2). 55 Butler warns that some methods of recognition, such 
as those based on race or gender, can ''undo" the person by conferring recognition, or 
"undo" the person by withholding recognition (Ibid). The socially constructed world in 
which the subject fmds him/herself might, in fact, result in total undoing when this self 
"no longer incorporates the norm in such a way that makes this 'I' fully recognizable" (U 
3). Despite the individual's need for recognition by the Other, sometimes the terms of that 
recognition are intolerable to the selfs sense of identity. 
Butler maintains that the notion of gender is in fact performative rather than 
essential, that we become female by acting in a required way dictated by cultural norms. 
In her noteworthy text Gender Trouble Butler argues that gender is a doing rather than a 
being, a process rather than an existent. 56 This antinaturalist approach is sometimes 
interpreted as a rejection of the materialism of the self. Critical theorist Terry Eagleton 
addresses this dichotomy with his usual clarity: "we are not 'cultural' rather than 'natural' 
creatures, but cultural beings by virtue of our nature" (qouted in Alcoff 161). Recent 
54 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century 
France. New York: Columbia UP, 1987. Hereafter cited in text as "SD." 
55 Judith Butler, Undoing Gender. Boca Raton, FLA: Routledge, Taylor and 
Francis Group, 2004. Hereafter cited in text as "U." 
56 For a complete discussion on the various feminist ideologies, see Linda Martin 
Alcoffs Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. 
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feminists Toril Moi and Nancy Bauer argue for combining gender and sex by making use 
of existential categories based primarily on the writings of Simone de Beau voir (Alcoff 
163). Regardless of theoretical approaches to gender no one can argue the significance of 
gender identity to the self-conscious subject, and to that subject's awareness that 
sometimes such role determinations "make life unlivable" (U 4). Basing her "feminism of 
freedom" on the work of Simone de Beauvoir and philosopher Merleau-Ponty, femininist 
theorist Toril Moi speaks, not of sex and gender, but of bodies and subjectivity. She 
affirms that, if one refuses the traditional terminology defming femininity, one is left free 
for self-definition: 
To say that my subjectivity stands in a contingent relationship to my 
body is to acknowledge that my body will significantly influence both 
what society - others - make of me, and the kind of choices I will 
make in response to the Other's image of me, but it is also to 
acknowledge that no specific form of subjectivity is ever a necessary 
consequence of having a particular body. (Moi 114) 
This self-definition is not for the faint of heart, however, and combating the 
socially prescribed conventions is not without consequences. The individual's 
struggle for freedom of identity, and the cost extracted, is explored in the 
following texts, Palahniuk's Fight Club and Alison's Bastard Out of Carolina. 
These two novels, both contemporary works of fiction, demonstrate the 
destruction and limitations inherent in a rigid gender structural system. The first narrative, 
Fight Club, centers on a dissociated subject whose masculine identity confusion engages 
him in a sado-masochistic struggle for identity. This work, and the film based on the 
novel, has had a significant influence on the young men of our culture. Self- termed 
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"Fight Clubs" have sprung up all over North America. The less-than-positive conclusion 
of the narrative does not bode well for the males who seek to emulate the experiences of 
its central character/narrator. In Bastard Out of Carolina, the narrator is a young girl 
whose femininity makes her prey to physical and sexual abuse by her step-father. She 
initially accepts the role of sexual masochist, but gradually learns to reject it as she 
struggles towards individuation. We begin the analysis of these novels with a necessarily 
brief grounding in Sartre's concepts of sexual sadism and masochism, with their 
stereotypical gendered associations. 
5.2 Sartre and Sadomasochism 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre affmns that all intersubjective relationships have 
sadism and masochism as permanent possibilities. This reflects the nature of human 
freedom, something both sought and feared by the individual subject. Butler explains 
Sartre's position thus: "Sadomasochism is the paradox of determinate freedom revealed 
in sexual life" (SD 139). Consciousness is always individual and therefore separate from 
all Other forms of consciousness. In sexual desire the subject seeks to know the Other as 
freedom manifested by the body; in fact, desire is "consciousness making itself body" 
(BN 389). All sexual desire has at its base the demand for recognition by the Other; two 
forms that desire might take, sadism and masochism, differ only in the means each 
chooses to achieve such recognition. I come to realize the limits of my freedom when the 
Other looks at me, that is to say makes of me an object for himself. Simultaneously, the 
Other is revealed to me as a separate freedom that necessarily limits the possibilities of 
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my freedom. In the presence of the Other's "look," I am no longer master of the situation 
(BN 265). As such, the Other is a constant threat to me, and his freedom a reminder of the 
objectifying limits placed on my own freedom. Attempting to recover myself as free 
subject, then, involves absorbing the Other (BN 364). This attempt, for it is clearly 
doomed, involves various strategies. One such strategy is sadism: "The aim of sadism is 
to secure the freedom of the sadist at the expense of the freedom of the victim" (Martin 
92). In Chuck Palahniuk's 2003 novel, Fight Club, we are introduced to a man "who must 
torture himself into manhood" (Ta 267). 
5.3 Sadistic Masculine Stereotyping: Fight Club 
By the end of the American Century, every outlet of the consumer world-
magazines, ads, movies, sports, music videos-would deliver the message 
that manhood had become a performance game to be won in the 
marketplace, not the workplace, and that male anger was now part of the 
show. Susan Faludi, Stiffed 
Sadomasochism 
The societal stereotype is that of the aggressive, even sadistic, male and the 
passive or masochistic female. Sartre's explanation of the sadism/masochism response is 
non-gender specific. Either might assume the role of sadist or masochist; in fact the roles 
are often interchangeable: 
[T]he sadist's effort is to ensnare the Other in his flesh by means of violence and 
pain, by appropriating the Other's body in such a way that he treats it as flesh so as 
to cause flesh to be born. But this appropriation surpasses the body which it 
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appropriates, for its purpose is to possess the body only insofar as the Other's 
freedom has been ensnared within it (BN 403). 
As with Doctorow's narrator in The Book of Daniel, the sadist is in flight from "facticity," 
which is to say from the human condition. Rejecting his position as object for the Other, 
he attempts to render it impossible for the Other to view him as such by "drowning" the 
victim in his/her own facticity as flesh. Severe pain commands all one's consciousness, or 
perhaps even destroys consciousness. It takes one beyond the world of discourse and into 
the world ofbeing-in-itselfwhere existence is simply that of a body mired in pain. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the sadist's efforts are doomed to failure; he recognizes this 
failure in the gaze of the Other. As objectified as this Other appears, all he has enslaved is 
the Other as being-in-itself; the Other as being-for-itself, as a free and individual 
consciousness, still exists. "[T]he sadist experiences the absolute alienation of his being in 
the Other's freedom" (BN 405). Needing the free recognition of the victim, the sadist 
comes to realize that he needs the very freedom which he is attempting to destroy. 
Although Sartre makes no gender based distinction for sadism and masochism, there are 
compelling arguments that these behaviours are linked to masculine and feminine 
identities. 
White Males: Violent Aggressors or Endangered Species? 
The leading cause of violence is maleness. 
Tanner 
Susan Faludi's Stiffed: The Betrayal of the American Man offers some startling 
information for feminists and other gender theorists. Her central thesis follows the post 
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war (WWII) changes in the American economy and the resulting alterations in male roles. 
Faludi argues that as America moved from an essentially production-based to an 
information-based economy, middl~-class working men became "feminine," passive, 
consumers rather than active manufacturers. " The frontier, the enemy, the institutions of 
brotherhood, the women in need of protection- all the elements of the old formula for 
attaining manhood had vanished in short order" (Faludi 30). In an effort to counteract this 
loss of masculinity the media began to glamorize "bad boys" and rebels. The 1957 sci-fi 
film The Incredible Shrinking Man follows a character who loses everything and wonders 
if he is "the man ofthe future" (Faludi 31). As he becomes smaller, be begins to become 
aggressive towards those around him: "The tinier he gets, the greater his combativeness 
becomes-and his desire for a combatant to defeat" (Faludi 31). In the real world, those 
enemies range from Communists in the 1950s to Iraqis today; they may include gays, 
women in the work place, and illegal aliens at the border. Sometimes the aggression is 
controlled, as in video games, and other times it takes the form of anonymous attacks 
against elusive enemies, as with sniper killings. "And what act," Faludi asks, "could be 
more crudely and stereotypically masculine than a show of violence?" (37). 
What becomes of this directionless masculine aggression, of this "rebel without a 
cause"? With very little in his life remaining under his control, the male stereotype is still 
expected to dominate something or someone. "[W]hen mastery of a trade and mastery 
over one's life fade as possibilities, all that may seem to be left is raw dominance. The 
urge to control, unharnessed and unmoored, soon spins out of control. Without a society, 
Daniel Boone would have been just a killer" (Faludi 38). Alternate masculine qualities are 
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reduced by the "culture of ornament," says Faludi, to 'props' such as youth, money and 
aggression. Her portrayal of this infantilized version of masculinity is an accurate 
description of the narrator's milieu in Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club: "The gyms you go 
to are crowded with guys trying to look like men, as if being a man means looking the 
way a sculptor or an art director says" (Fight Club 50). 57 
Fight Club: The High Cost of Masculinity 
In her article on Fight Club, published in The Journal of American Culture, Lynn 
M. Ta is chiefly concerned with the consumerism of the cultural milieu, and its effect on 
the characters in the text. She claims that "Jack's melancholic sadomasochism is the 
product of what he perceives to be the feminization of late capitalism; as a corporate 
drone, he feels victimized by a culture that has stolen his manhood" (Ta 266). In fact, one 
might wonder ifPalahniuk has read Susan Faludi, so closely does her assessment of the 
crisis in masculinity echo in the pages of his novel. Huddled in his apartment cocoon, 
filled with Ikea furniture and designer dishes, the narrator lives an emasculated and 
superficial existence. His only means of escape is through the deconstruction of the 
subject position which is fabricated on the cultural system he comes to abhor, Jameson's 
"late capitalism." This deconstruction involves the tearing down of his socially 
constructed identity; in its place he constructs a new alter-ego in the form ofTyler 
Durden. By definition, this character must, and does, reject all the values of the subject's 
57 Chuck Palahniuck, Fight Club. London: Vintage, 2003. Hereafter cited in text 
as "FC." 
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old identity. The difficulty lies in the fact that he has no role model to enable him to 
construct a viable masculine model. 
Faludi deals extensively with a culture that has removed all the traditional societal 
domains where men used to prove themselves, leaving them no longer an important cog 
in the social wheel. Fathers, too, have failed their sons, bestowing them with "not the GI 
ethic but the GI Joe 'action figure,' a twelve-inch shrunken-man doll whose main feature 
was his ability to accessorize" (Faludi 36). Fight Club's protagonist has no understanding 
of what it means to be male, and he realizes this. As one of many fatherless males, he 
frequently reminds us that he has had no real male model: "What you see at fight club is a 
generation of men raised by women" (FC 50). In true existential fashion he is burdened 
by his own freedom; he has no idea how to create the self he wishes to become. In fact, he 
has no conceptual model of what kind of self he might become. Turning away from the 
vacuity experienced by Patrick Bateman, so frighteningly portrayed in American Psycho, 
our character-narrator knows only what he does not want: "It's nothing anymore to have a 
beautiful stock body" (FC 48). His sense of identity, such as it is, lies only in negation. 
His alter ego, Tyler, the opposite of everything he sees in himself, is the realization or 
actualization of this negation. The only freedom he can visualize is the freedom of what 
Heidegger calls "being-towards-death." As the philosopher Nietzsche expresses it, 
"Chaos is the only order." 
As the novel opens, the nameless narrator, a chronic insomniac whose doctor is 
unable or unwilling to offer any help, initiates attending various support groups for those 
with terminal illnesses. "This is why I loved the support groups so much," he says, "if 
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people thought you were dying, they gave you their full attention" (FC 1 07). There he 
believes he finds the authenticity he has been seeking, and he is able to cry in the arms of 
a man dying of testicular cancer. It is significant that these men suffer from a disease of 
their sexual organs. Bob, the man into whose arms Jack cries, has had his testicles 
removed and the ultimate castration fear realized. Significantly, his emasculating cancer 
is the result of steroid use, taken to achieve the ultimate male physique. 
Big Bob was a juicer, he said. All those salad days on Dianabol and then the 
racehorse steroid, Wistrol. His own gym, Big Bob owned a gym. He'd been 
married three times. He's done product endorsements, and had I seen him on 
television, ever? The whole how-two program about expanding your chest was 
practically his own invention. (FC 21) 
Symbolically, Big Bob is emasculated by the very culture whose stereotype of male 
perfection he has striven to achieve. It is the confrontation of this truth, as much as facing 
his mortality, which leads to the changes in the narrator. His castration fear, moreover, is 
somewhat relieved by being in the male cancer group. At least he still has his 
physiological 'balls.' When he leaves these disease victims he feels renewed: 
Walking home after a support group, I felt more alive than I'd ever felt. I 
wasn't host to cancer or blood parasites; I was the little warm center that 
the life ofthe world crowded around. And I slept well. Babies don't sleep 
this well. Every evening I died, and every evening I was born. Resurrected. 
(FC 22) 
The problem is that he is not authentic, unlike the group members. He manages to evade 
this knowledge until a woman enters the meeting of Remaining Men Together, the only 
group in which Jack has felt able to cry and feel release. In the presence of this observing 
gaze Jack is suddenly aware of his inauthenticity: "To Marla I'm a fake. Since the second 
night I saw her, I can't sleep[ ... ] In this one moment, Marla's lie reflects my lie, and all I 
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can see are lies" (23). Following the first meeting, Marla turns up at all his support groups 
and he becomes angry, sleepless, and desperate. It is after this initial introduction to 
Marla that he meets Tyler Durden, his aJter ego, for the first time. Seeing the 
superficiality of his masculine self reflected by this female presence, our narrator seeks 
something more tangible. 
Tyler is not fully revealed as the narrator's Other self until the end of the novel, 
but there are various indications throughout the text that they are one and the same. On 
the second page into the text, we fmd the narrator initiaJiy making an assertion which he 
frequently repeats: "I know this because Tyler knows this" (12). "Sometimes Tyler 
speaks for me," he informs us. This splitting of the self allows the narrator to actualize 
both feminine/passive/masochistic characteristics, as well as those that are 
masculine/aggressive/sadistic. He can be both victim and victimizer, as he (narrator) and 
Tyler (his Other) engage in physical violence towards each other. In their fights they 
project the anger and frustration brought on by life. As he hits Tyler, the narrator explains 
the relief he feels: 
Instead ofTyler, I felt fmally I could get my hands on everything in the world 
that didn't work, my cleaning that came back with the collar buttons broken, the 
bank says I'm hundreds of dollars overdrawn. My job where my boss got on my 
computer and fiddled with my DOS execute commands. And Marla Singer, who 
stole the support groups from me.[ ... ] I asked Tyler what he'd been fighting. 
Tyler said his father. (53) 
Most men, though, attend fight club "because of something they're too scared to fight" 
(54). After a few months each man "trusts himself to handle anything" (51). As 
sadists/masochists, the fighters move into a world beyond words (51) where 
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consciousness is forced into flesh or facticity. Sartre affirms both sadism and masochism 
as "permanent possibilities of all sexual encounters" (SD 139). Since it is impossible to 
be both subject and object simultaneously, this determinate nature of freedom is revealed 
in sexual life and sadomasochism is one potential response. By splitting his subject, 
Palahniuk's character has found a way to be subject and object, sadist and masochist 
concurrently. The price, of course, is his mental health; a split subject is one in the 
process of dissolution. In this case the cure is worse than the illness, and the narrator's 
blood-thirsty games destroy both his body and his mind. In the words ofElana Gomel in 
describing a serial killer, he attempts to "glue together his fragmented self with blood" 
(Gomel60). 
Redemptive and Liberating Violence? 
Palahniuk's novel poses the question: how does one escape from an empty 
existence founded on material acquisition? The answer he provides is simultaneously 
confusing and disturbing. Are we all to engage in violence against ourselves? As the story 
progresses we learn that the hero, when engaged in physical fights with Tyler, is in fact 
fighting with himself. This echoes the episode in which the narrator beats himself up in 
front of his boss, as a means of blackmailing him. The fight scenes in both the novel and 
its film version, David Fincher's Fight Club, are uncomfortably painful to read/watch. 
Leftist cultural theorist Slovaj Zizek directly addresses this issue in his text Revolution at 
the Gates. As we have previously discussed, Sartre presents masochism as a self-
defeating attempt to gain one's subjective freedom. Zizek contends, however, that self-
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inflicted violence is not self-defeating; in fact, he describes it as one "direct way out of 
the closure of capitalistic subjectivity" (252). This, he argues, is the main point of the 
text: 
The first lesson of Fight Club is thus that we cannot go directly from capitalist to 
revolutionary subjectivity: the abstraction, the foreclosure of others, the blindness 
to other's suffering and pain, has first to be broken in a gesture of taking the risk 
and reaching directly out to the suffering other-a gesture which, since it shatters 
the very kernel of our identity, cannot fail to appear extremely violent. (252) 
The narrator attempts to trigger some emotional release by misleadingly attending a 
testicular cancer support group. The compassion that he feels towards those genuinely 
afflicted is a "Thank God it's not me" response, one that encourages the distance between 
subjects. Whatever bonding he feels there is clearly superficial, based as it is, on false 
premises. Soon after he begins to attend these groups, he meets Tyler and the fighting is 
initiated. Although he assaults himself, and eventually shoots himself, Zizek remarks that 
such self-torture is a necessary means of depriving the sadistic master of his dominion: 
"Sadism involves a relationship .of domination, while masochism is the first step towards 
liberation" (253). It might be the first attempt at liberation, but it is difficult to agree with 
Zizek that this is an attempt that will succeed. From Sartre's reading of the 
masochist/sadist dichotomy, there is a strong possibility that the masochist will then 
change roles and become a sadist. Perhaps such role reversal explains the previously 
humane revolutionaries who become monsters once they have overthrown their sadistic 
masters. As a case in point, the "Fight Club" organization in the text becomes a neo-
fascist group called "Project Mayhem". If major change from within capitalism depends 
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upon numbers of people freeing themselves through self-abuse, it seems an unlikely and 
untenable project. 
5.3 Palahniuk's Existentialism 
Stirrings Still: The International Journal of Existential Literature devotes an 
entire volume (2005) to author Chuck Palahniuk. Writing in this journal, existentialist 
critics, such as Robert Bennett and Andrew Hock Soon Ng, also view Fight Club as an 
expression of existentialist philosophy. Ng asserts that the Palahniuk's novel "neatly 
packages existentialism for the scarcely uninitiated in both its thematic concerns and in 
adequate doses of rather 'hip' phrases that smack profoundly of the philosophy [of 
existentialism]" (116). There are, as Ng suggests, many such phrases: "This was freedom. 
Losing all hope was freedom" (Italics mine, FC 22); "It's only after you've lost 
everything," Tyler says, "that you'refree to do anything" (Italics mine, 70). "[B]ut God's 
got this all wrong. We are not special. We are not crap or trash, either. We just are. We 
just are and what happens just happens" (Italics mine, 207). Each of these quotations 
might be said to allude to Sartre's position that being is essentially nothingness; we must 
create ourselves by our actions and our free choices. Ng's strange mixture of Freudian 
analysis, Sartrean concepts, and Rank's doppelganger theory, interferes with the clarity of 
Palahniuk's existentialism as expressed in the novel under discussion. 
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In contrast to this broad definition of the existentialism contained in Fight Club, 
"Freedom Fighters" has its focus primarily on Sartre's philosophy of sado-masochism. 
Our reading of the protagonist's circumstances in Palahniuk's novel discovers far more 
than 'hip' phraseology. The narrator's attempts to transcend his current situation, which 
Ng perceives as an effort towards existential transcendence, I reason to be the flight from 
facticity that is central to the sadist's project. It is an act of bad faith in which the narrator, 
frightened by the emptiness of his existence, chooses to posit an alternate identity which 
is an "absolute." In the same way that Walker Percy's character, Kate, tries to escape her 
existential angst by marriage, Fight Club's central character creates another self who will 
choose for him. Thus, he attempts to absolve himself of all responsibility for his life and 
his "terrible freedom." 
The narrator posits Tyler as a god figure, as surely as is Richard Wright's Cross 
Damon. He is also the father figure: "'what you have to understand is your father was 
your model for God"' (FC 140). Jack doesn't want real life; he wants "something better 
than real life" (FC 22) and he believes that Tyler can give him that. Reality is both too 
boring and too frightening. He creates Tyler to deal with the responsibility for both. When 
the novel concludes, the narrator has decided that he is in heaven and he doesn't want to 
go back (207). He has escaped responsibility once again through a symbolic death, but 
this time he is able to acknowledge his bad faith. Sartre tells us that bad faith involves 
self-deception that is not necessarily unconscious. Fight Club's central character/narrator, 
aware of his own self-deception, describes his new situation: 
In my Father's house there are many mansions. 
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Of course, when I pulled the trigger, I died. 
Liar. 
And Tyler died. 
With the police helicopters thundering toward us, and Marla and all the support 
group people who couldn't save themselves, with all of them trying to save me, I 
had to pull the trigger. 
This was better than real life. 
And your one perfect moment won' t last forever. 
Everything in heaven is white on white. 
Faker. (Italics are mine; Fight Club 206) 
He is aware that he is attempting to escape, although he reveals that he remembers 
everything that has happened. "Marla's still on Earth, and she writes to me" our hero 
informs us. "Someday, she says, they' ll bring me back. [ ... ]But I don't want to go back. 
Not yet" (FC 207). Defining oneself as masculine in the 21st century is no easy task. 
Sometimes it is all a man can do to try and hang on to his sanity. Few men, though, would 
choose to assume the difficulties familiar to those persons of the opposite gender. 
5.4 The Female Masochist: Bastard Out of Carolina 
A 1990 Senate committee report indicates that three out of four women will be 
victims of violent crime during their lifetime. 
Marilyn Maxwell 
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The dichotomy of victimized women and victimizing men is solidly established in 
literature, as it appears to be in life. In her text Intimate Violence, feminist and literary 
theorist Laura E. Tanner connects this polarity to differing senses of embodiment: "For 
the male violator, embodiment emerges as a source of strength rather than vulnerability 
[ ... ] the male body, then, emerges as a tool that extends the power of subjectivity out into 
a larger universe that the violator can remake within the configurations of his own desire" 
(115). The female victim of sexual assault is violated as body and as subject; her body 
"becomes a text on which his will is inscribed, a form that bears the mark of his 
subjectivity even as she cannot divorce it from her own" (Tanner 115). The female 
narrator in Dorothy Allison's novel Bastard Out of Carolina must negotiate her identities 
as female, and as poor "white trash." These stereotypical gender and class distinctions 
must be overcome if she is to claim herself as free subject and reject the victim role that 
has been thrust upon her. 
Allison's novel is sometimes criticized as one more salacious story of incest. It 
tells the story of a young Southern girl, nicknamed 'Bone,' who is born to a family 
defined by poverty, anti-social behaviour, and drunkenness. She does not know her father 
and when her mother finally marries, the girl is physically and sexually abused by her 
step-father, Daddy Glen. It begins while the mother is in hospital delivering a baby, and it 
becomes progressively more violent. Although the mother makes every effort to deny the 
seriousness of the abuse, in chapter eight she is finally confronted by an angry doctor who 
sees the signs of physical assault in Bone. After this, other family members become 
involved and Bone spends time with them to avoid the man whom her mother seems 
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unable to renounce. The story of the abusive relationship is uncharacteristically halted, 
and does not appear again until a horrific rape scene when the novel is almost at 
conclusion. Vincent King explains the significance of this change of focus in a positive 
article entitled "Hopeful Grief: The possibility of a Postmodemist Feminism in Allison ' s 
Bastard Out of Carolina." King' s analysis supports the position of this current project, 
that Allison's novel presents a redemptive response to violence. Bone, unlike Palahniuk's 
hero, successfully resolves her gender-dictated, determined masochism and emerges as a 
stronger subject. 
With Chapter Nine the novel moves from the story of abuse to the recounting of 
"Bone' s efforts to survive, and even transmute these horrors. But to do so Bone must 
rewrite-and in some cases simply reject-the names and stories that make her 
vulnerable to violence" (King 124). In the process she comes to understand that her own 
identity is not something fixed, but something she must construct out of the material 
presented by her milieu. Although this knowledge of her own freedom threatens her 
initially, she comes to accept and value this liberation. Making use of it, she rewrites the 
narrative established for her by the rest of her family, the other Boatwrights. The chapters 
from eight until the final rape scene chronicle the young girl's experiments with differing 
identities, from sexual masochistic fantasies to born-again Christian. In order to establish 
a strong subject position she must explore the possibilities open to her. Not until she is 
finally able to fight Daddy Glen's subjectivity, which has been imposed upon her, does 
she finally begin to freely establish her sense of self as other than victim. Unlike 
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Palahniuk's protagonist, she does not need to hurt herself to resist the domination forced 
upon her by the patriarchal system in which she finds herself. 
The novel informs the reader at once that identity is a central issue for the main 
character. The confusion with which she struggles appears in the opening line: "I've been 
called Bone all my life, but my name's Ruth Anne," the narrator states (Bastard Out of 
Carolina 1).58 Her very introduction into the world is precipitated by violence, 
drunkenness, and confusion. While Bone's mother is asleep, in the car driven by her 
drunken brother and surrounded by her drunken sisters, the resulting car accident causes 
her to prematurely deliver a baby "'no bigger than a knucklebone"' (BC 2). The aunts 
give the baby the names Ann, after her mother, and Ruth, after her aunt. Not certain of the 
father's name, they give two conflicting ones; for this sin against the system the baby's 
birth certificate loudly pronounces her illegitimate. This stamp, even if not a visible one, 
represents a "mark on her and hers" (4) which the mother, Anne, is determined to alter. 
The facts of her daughter's identity, established by the courthouse, are not unalterable in 
her eyes. From her mother's determination, Bone begins to learn that you do not have to 
accept the identity that is thrust upon you. 
Bone's name, then, marks her in various ways. Her legal first names bond her 
with her mother and aunt, the matriarchal lineage. With no legal connection to her 
biological father, she is certified a "bastard by the state of South Carolina" (3). Echoing 
the Book of Genesis, the nickname given to her is a reminder that she is a woman and 
58 Dorothy Allison, Bastard Out of Carolina. New York: Penguin Books, 1993. 
Hereafter cited in text as "BC." 
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therefore dependent upon, and inferior to, the male of the species. Once God has taken a 
rib from Adam to create Eve, Adam announces: "She is now bone of my bone and flesh 
of my flesh" (Genesis 2:23). Granny alludes to another metaphor when she complains that 
Glen Waddell, who later covets and abuses her grand-daughter, looks at her "like some 
old junkyard dog waiting to steal a bone" (37). Bone enters the world defined by the 
language that has already been applied to her family: they are poor, white, trash. Like her 
mother, who persistently works to have the stamp of illegitimacy removed from her 
daughter's birth certificate, Bone wishes to change the terms that classify her. Her first 
conscious effort occurs when she once again has to move to a new school, following the 
family's loss of yet another home. Enraged by the humiliation of their circumstances, 
Bone responds by creating a new identity: 
The frrst day at the district school the teacher pursed her lips and asked 
me my name, and that anger came around and stomped on my belly and 
throat. I saw tired patience in her eyes, a little shine of pity, and a contempt 
as old as the red dust hills I could see through the windows of her classroom. 
I opened my lips but could not speak. 
'What's your name, now, honey?' the woman asked me again, 
speaking slowly as if she suspected I was not quite bright. The anger lifted 
in me and became rage. 
'Roseanne,' I answered as blithely as if I'd never been called anything 
else. I smiled at her like a Roseanne. 'Roseanne Carter. My family's from 
Atlanta, just moved up here.' (BC 67) 
As a result of that lie, Bone "enjoys a brief popularity," confirming her instinctive belief 
that identity is fluid rather than static. In beginning to re-name herself, she initiates the 
long and painful process of creating a self-defining subject. 
Bone's path to self-empowerment involves the central task of narrating her story 
of abuse. Allison's character struggles to use the strands of a language which has defined 
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her to weave together her own precarious sense of self. "The human subject," asserts 
Gomel, "is constructed by a life story" (Gomel xiv). Bone learns to narrate, and so to self-
construct, from years of listening to the family stories told most often by the women. Not 
until the end of her story, when she feels safe with her Aunt Raylene, does the shattered 
young girl begin to heal. At twelve years old, betrayed by those who were supposed to 
protect her, Bone realizes that she is changed forever. Because she is writing this story, 
one where she begins to move past the hate and anger, the reader feels that she will be 
able to make her own life "out of pride, and stubbornness, and too much anger" (BC 263). 
She becomes, says Giles, "a very different kind of storyteller from the other Boatwright 
women" (The Spaces of Violence 82). She refuses to accept many ofthe notions which 
they do, including the heroism of the males, the insignificance of the females, and the 
powerlessness determined by their poverty and alcoholism. 
Sexuality in Bastard Out of Carolina 
This novel may be disturbing to readers because of the nature of the masturbatory 
fantasies described by the narrator, fantasies that are steeped in masochism. 
The daydream was about struggling to get free while the fire burned hotter 
and closer. I am not sure ifl came when the fire reached me or after I had 
imagined escaping it. But I came. (BC 63) 
The sexual and physical abuse she suffers at the hands of her step-father, Glen, ensures 
that she confuses sexuality and violence. In the masturbation incident described above, 
Bone is erotically stimulated by watching Glen and her mother "hugging and rubbing on 
each other[ ... ] Sex. Was that what Daddy Glen had been doing to me in the parking lot?" 
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( 63 ). The motif of fire runs through all such scenes, a hell fire that bums and destroys 
Bone because she sees herself as evil: 
Sometimes when I looked into his red features and blazing eyes, I knew 
that it was nothing I had done that made him beat me. It was just me, the 
fact of my life, who I was in his eyes and mine. I was evil. Of course I was. 
I admitted it to myself, locked my fingers into fists, and shut my eyes to 
everything I did not understand. ( 11 0) 
Meanwhile, her sexual fantasies become more violent, and she is "more ashamed of 
masturbating to the fantasy of being beaten than for being beaten in the first place. I lived 
in a world of shame" (113). At this stage, Bone is accepting the identity imposed by those 
around her. As a member of a dysfunctional family, she perceives herself as 
dysfunctional. As the object of her mother's neglect and her step-father's abuse, she 
accepts herself as hateful, shameful, and unlovable. How is she to move past this distorted 
sense of identity? Nevertheless, move past it she does. 
Bone's victim fantasies are evidence of her acceptance of the Other's definition of 
her existence. The process of self-creation is a complex one, even given the least difficult 
of external circumstances. The desire to become oneself, what Judith Butler refers to as 
"existential desire" (SD 121 ), is an "existential project that structures the spontaneity of 
the for-itself' (121). For Sartre, as Butler interprets him, "desire is the mode through 
which the self comes to be, i.e., its mode of self-realization" (SD 123). One determines 
oneself in a particular world, of course, in a particular set of external circumstances. We 
are not, however, in the Sartrean view, the victims of our feelings or our desires in 
response to our external situation. "Under no circumstances can the past in any way by 
itself produce an act ... we must recognize that the i~dispensable and fundamental 
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condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being" (BN 563). This is both the good 
and the bad news of existentialism. We can indeed change our lives, and if we do not do 
so, we must acknowledge that it is the result of our free choice. With our desires we make 
an existential choice of how we wish to be. Butler elucidates this understanding: 
In Sartre's view, desire is not a psychic irreducible, except as much as 
desire is understood as a manifestation of choice. Desire is not given, 
but, in an important sense, created and recreated; as such, it indicates a 
free agency prior to its own emergence. (SD 130) 
In the context of our novel, this reveals to us the significance of the changing character of 
Bone's desires as expressed primarily in her fantasies. 
In an initiatory step she fantasizes saviors; a powerless child herself, she imagines 
that all the adults, who have failed her in reality, become her heroes. She creates a scene 
in which her repentant step-father begs forgiveness for abusing her: 
Daddy Glen would weep tears of blood. Jesus, maybe, would come 
into his heart. He'd follow us out to Alma's and get on his knees before 
the whole family. 'I have sinned,' he'd say, and hold out his hands to 
me, beg my forgiveness and cry my name. Mama would say no. My aunts 
would say no. My uncJes, Reese, the minister, everyone in the world would 
stand up and say no. But I would pull myself up from my sickbed. I would 
look right into his eyes, into the lamps of his soul. Yes, I would say. Yes. I 
forgive you. Then probably I would die. (BC 116) 
She imbues herself with the only power available to her, the power to forgive. However, 
despite this fantasy, her mother does forgive Glen and the abuse continues. Bone's 
fantasies become more violent than ever, as she tells her younger cousins stories of "boys 
and girls gruesomely raped and murdered, babies cooked in pots of boiling beans, 
vampires and soldiers and long razor-sharp knives" (BC 119). This anger finds some 
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temporary resolution in the gospel music that begins to enthrall her. There, she begins to 
accept the binaries within herself: 
That was what gospel music was meant to do -make you hate and love 
yourself at the same time, make you ashamed and glorified. It worked on 
me. It absolutely worked on me. (BC 136) 
This inaugurates the integration of the pieces of her shattered self. Not until the final 
horrific rape scene does Bone actively reject the identity that has been thrust upon her: "I 
had always been afraid to scream, afraid to fight. I had always felt like it was my fault, 
but now it didn't matter. I didn't care anymore what might happen. I wouldn't hold still 
anymore" (BC 282). At the end ofthe novel, with her mother's symbolic gift of the 
blanked out birth certificate, Bone receives her life, her existential freedom. No longer 
defined by her past, she is now free to reinterpret her past and define herself. 
"Sartre understands the struggle for recognition intrinsic to early childhood as the 
self's dramatic evolution into existence. The desire to be at its earliest stages is the urge to 
exist for another-in other words, the need to be loved; this primary relation to the Other 
forms the pathic structure of every individual life" (SD 161 ). The original project of the 
child-self is to come to self-consciousness through the "look" of the Other, who is the 
parent. One's immediate environment is a ''throwness," to use Heidegger's term, from 
which one never fu11y escapes. All future experiences are grounded in how one responds 
to that given situation, but Sartre asserts that this is in no way deterministic. In his 
biographical studies of Genet and Flaubert, explorations in existential analysis, Sartre 
investigates the process of coming to self-identity. The experiences of the unloved child 
mirror the basic existential human situation. In each case, the choices made in the struggle 
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to self-consciousness determine the way in which these experiences are lived. Sartre 
refers to the individual as both sign and signifier. Judith Butler explains it thus: 
Although the early childhood struggle for recognition is surely definitive 
of adult life, it does not determine the texture of adult experience in a strict 
sense. The earliest dramas of desire establish the reigning motifs of a given 
life and circumscribe the domain of possible choices. Early childhood does 
not unilaterally produce adult life; its causality is less mechanical than 
dialectical. Childhood maintains its power in adult experience to the extent 
that its themes are appropriated and reinterpreted in contemporary terms. (SD 163) 
Both Bone and Jack are engaged in the effort to come to terms with the implications of a 
socially prescribed gender. 
Gender, as Butler asserts, is a doing rather than a being. The import of gender to 
the subject's sense of self will continue to raise important issues. Sartre' s philosophy is in 
keeping with the words of the feminist critic, Toril Moi, that "no specific form of 
subjectivity is ever a necessary consequence ofhaving a particular body'' (114).59 
Nevertheless, until gender becomes a less rigid social determination, it will continue to 
provide the subject with an imposed identity that is difficult to subvert. The traditional 
association of the male subject with sadistic impulses, the female with masochistic, add to 
the general sexual confusion. The narrator of Fight Club attempts to know himself as 
male/female, sadist/masochist, and in the process becomes a dissociated subject. 
However, the novel's conclusion leaves us with a suggestion that this subject is coming to 
the self-awareness that is essential to self-conscious freedom. He is not ready to go back 
to his environment yet, he offers, implying that he will come to be ready. Acknowledging 
that he is a "faker" and a "liar", he is now at least consciously aware that he has been 
59 For the complete quotation from Moi, see page four of this chapter. 
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living in bad faith (FC 206). One cannot be both subject and object; it is an impossibility 
of corporeal, fmite existence. It reflects, in one sense, the desire to be God 
which represents "a coincidence of for-itself and in-itself such that human freedom would 
be at the origin of the in-itself' (SD 136; italics mine).60 Life choices would certainly be 
made easier with the perspective of infinite knowledge and infinite freedom. This project, 
analogous to the sado-masochist's efforts, is doomed to fail. Only the truly unbalanced 
can believe in such a possibility; the narrator's new awareness at the conclusion of Fight 
Club discloses that he is no longer in this state of unreality. There might be hope for him 
yet! 
As for Bone in Bastard Out of Carolina, she accepts the task of creating her own 
identity when she violently rejects, literally as well as figuratively, the subjectivity that is 
thrust upon her. The role of sexual masochist, which her step-father forces upon her, 
gradually becomes displaced as she learns to accept the varying aspects of her self. 
Gospel music, which Bone fmds both glorifies and shames simultaneously, initiates the 
integration of self. Although her home life is abusive, she has her aunts as an alternate 
source of love and recognition: 
We still wanted to go visiting at every chance. It was alive over at the 
aunts' houses, warm, always humming with voices and laughter and 
children running around. The quiet in our own house was cold, no matter 
that we had a better furnace and didn't leave our doors open for the wind 
to blow through. There was something icy in Daddy Glen's houses that 
melted out of us when we were over at the aunts. (BC 80) 
60 This section ofButler's Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-
Century France is an analysis of the Sartrean "project to be God". 
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Bone is surrounded by those who live in bad faith, who run from their own facticity and 
freedom. All the men are held unaccountable for their actions. Speaking of Daddy Glen, 
Bone paraphrases her mother's attitude: 
It seemed our unbelief was what made him fail. Our lack of faith made 
him the man he was, made him go out to work unable to avoid getting in 
a fight, made him sarcastic to his bosses and nasty to the shop owners he 
was supposed to be persuading to take his accounts. (BC 81) 
At the conclusion of her story, she acknowledges the insidiousness ofthis perspective: "It 
wasn't God who made us like this, I thought. We'd gotten ourselves messed up on our 
own" (BC 306). She accepts from her mother the ownership of her own life, knowing it 
will be a life of painful freedom. Symbolically, both Bone and the character from Fight 
Club attempt to glue together fragments of their selves with the blood of the violence that 
surrounds them. The path to subjectivity and freedom can be a messy one, strewn with the 
bodies of half-realized selves. 
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Conclusion 
Know then thyself; presume not God to scan. 
The best study of mankind is man. 
Pope's "Essay on Man" 
I dwell in possibility. 
Emily Dickinson 
Taking up the Yoke of Freedom 
It is a cliche to assert that with freedom comes responsibility. Yet, it is human to 
try to evade this responsibility, while still setting freedom as our goal. It is important to 
humanity, as well as to each individual, that this dichotomy be at least acknowledged. 
Centuries of great thinkers have turned their minds to the articulation of the problem and 
towards its solution. Nevertheless, as academics we cannot allow ourselves to be 
intimidated by the depth of the project. Any efforts in that direction can only assist in the 
development of the clarity and distinction of the relevant ideas. We begin, in this study, 
with narratives that combine motifs of violence and existential philosophy. As with most 
academic research, my thesis uncovers more questions and areas for exploration. It points 
to other narratives that would add to the strength of the project by their inclusion, and 
suggests many possible areas for future research. Despite this intellectual curiosity that 
beckons me onward, "Freedom Fighters" has proven that the philosophy of existentialism 
has much to teach about the meaning of violence both in our fiction, and in our world. 
One significant aspect of existentialism, whether it is atheistic or deistic, is that it 
allows no place for rationalizations. There can be no claims that "the devil made me do 
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it," nor that God is responsible for the evil in the world. This is simultaneously the awful 
truth about the philosophy, and its most optimistic moment. If I am not a slave to 
deterministic forces, I can make myself anew with every new action. As long as I am 
alive, I am in the process of self-creation. Life is experience, which can be destructive or 
celebratory. Writers and other artists realize this central truth better than anyone. They are 
practiced at living in the moment. They, unlike characters of Walker Percy or others, do 
not need to wait on a moment of catastrophe to shake them out of their everydayness. The 
lives which great authors will choose to examine will almost certainly be those lives that 
are authentic, or are striving to be so. The famous dictum of Socrates, that the 
unexamined life is not worth living, is an early expression of the tenets of existentialism. 
The inauthentic life is not worth examining, an author might assert. Writers strive to find 
that inner space, inside the cage or under the metaphoric bell jar. Mulder's article on 
existential female poets reminds us that this self-reflection is not a narcissistic endeavour: 
"Paradoxically, a sense of community emerges from such an intensely private pursuit of 
self' (53). In existential terms, it is by understanding the nature of being that one begins 
to understand the world. 
Sartre reminds us that we would all prefer to believe that the violent individual is 
determined by heredity, environment, temperament, etc. He will allow no such excuses 
for behaviour: 
If people condemn our works of fiction, in which we describe characters 
that are base, weak, cowardly and sometimes even frankly evil, it is not 
only because these characters are base, cowardly, or evil. For suppose that, 
like Zola, we showed that the behaviour of these characters was caused by 
their Heredity, or by the action of their environment upon them, or by 
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determining factors, psychic or organic. People would be reassured, they 
would say, 'You see, that is what we are like, no one can do anything about 
it.' But the existentialist, when he portrays a coward, shows him as responsible 
for his cowardice. He is not like that on account of a cowardly heart or lungs 
or cerebrum, he is not like that through his physiological organism; he is 
like that because he has made himself into a coward by his actions. There are 
nervous temperaments ... but what produces a coward is the act of giving up or 
giving way; and a temperament is not an action. (E&H 43) 
Sartre argues for an understanding of environmental forces, for which we are all 
responsible, but each of us must accept his/her own responsibility for the self created in 
the face of these given factors. 
All the novels in my study explore the efforts of the individual to assert his 
freedom in the face of a threatening world. From these subjective narratives emerge 
knowledge of the self, and of the milieu in which the self encounters the Other. The 
works in Chapter Two inform us about the injustices of the social system that permitted 
slavery, while allowing us to share the characters' efforts to escape it. Chapter Three 
considers the less visible chains that beset man in what Fredric Jameson refers to as the 
"culture of late capitalism." As a social critique, American Psycho could scarcely be 
more scathing. The last two chapters take us on different novelistic journeys towards 
existential enlightenment. Even at their most angst ridden, all these narratives glow with 
the light ofthe human spirit. They offer hope in the midst of whatever darkness they 
confront. As Sartre explains, ''what is alarming in the doctrine that I am about to try to 
explain to you is - is it not? -that it confronts man with a possibility of choice" 
(E&H 25). This is both exciting and frightening simultaneously. It involves action, 
engagement in the world at all levels, and the willingness to accept responsibility to 
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institute personal, social, or political change, when we see that it is required. In Sartre's 
famous dictum: If I do not choose, that is still a choice. As existentialists we dwell, along 
with Emily Dickinson, in the realm of possibility. There, as Faust comes to understand 
through painful experience: 
He only earns both freedom and existence 
Who must reconquer them each day. 
Goethe's Faust 
Act V, Lines 11575-6 
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